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Artist Statement: The art I designed for the cover of this book is part of a series of works titled 
Signs of Our Times. This series of original paintings draws from visual elements— graffiti and 
other street art, signs, posters— collected in my travels in North America, Europe, and Japan to 
create phenomenological collages of contemporary urban life. Rather than focusing on my own 
engagement with landscapes in different parts of the world, this particular collage, however, ref-
erences key elements of the book’s journey through reality television, news coverage of disaster, 
global magazines, French rap, and Japanese animation. Taken as a whole, the image illustrates 
the hybrid and polysemic nature of global culture.
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Introduction: A Translocal Approach to 
Imagining the Global
Winnie the Pooh, Snow White, Batman, Pikachu, Zorro, Spiderman, two 
flamenco dancers, and a kimono- clad Japanese girl shading herself with a 
waxed umbrella walked along with a collection of cowboys, Indian girls in 
saris, Venetian beauties, knights, Native Americans, ninjas, and musketeers 
(all d’Artagnans), toward the small center square. The beat of the Brazilian 
percussion band that had followed the procession’s journey through the hills 
from the neighboring village suddenly stopped as a man advanced toward 
the straw figure set atop a woodpile. The Carmentran (a friendly looking 
scarecrow dressed in old jeans and a lumberjack shirt) was to be set on fire 
to symbolize the end of winter— a local Southern French tradition on this 
carnival day.
The short vignette above, drawn from my experience in a small French com-
munity, illustrates the extent to which elements of “the global” have come to 
permeate individuals’ daily lives. As space- and time- defying communication 
technologies facilitate virtual mixing on an increasingly global scale, this kind 
of hybrid engagement with a wide array of globalized cultural forms has be-
come commonplace. The fact that the culture we experience as “local” (or 
even, in this case, “traditional”) is inescapably embedded in broader global 
processes is increasingly difficult to ignore. Globalization theorists identify 
this “collective awareness of growing global interconnectedness” (Pieterse, 
2009, p. 16, emphasis in original) as a defining element of our contemporary 
condition. They point to the fact that globalization is marked by a new role 
for the imagination in social life as individuals simultaneously envision “the 
global” and negotiate their own locality through their engagement with flows 
of cultural products, images, and information increasingly disconnected from 
their place of origin (Castells, 2000; Giddens, 1990; Tomlinson, 1999). “The 
global,” in other words, is a space that is envisioned and imagined rather than 
directly experienced (Appadurai, 1990, 1996, 2001). It is a space built upon the 
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spread of increasingly culturally mixed, or hybridized, mediated texts embed-
ded in increasingly complex processes of transcultural exchange that result in 
the development of a “plurality of imagined worlds” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 5).
Recognizing, however, that the hybrid products of global interconnected-
ness are inescapable and that the imagination they foster is a key component 
of our contemporary global order is merely a necessary first step in under-
standing our historical moment. A more important— and significantly more 
difficult— task lies in exploring hybridity’s “finer points and meanings” (Pi-
eterse, 2003/2009, p. viii). The most critical question to ask, in other words, 
is not whether hybridity exists or even matters (we know it does), but how it 
matters. How do individuals “imagine the global” as cultural products and 
social relations are lifted out from local contexts to be restructured “across 
indefinite spans of time space” (Giddens, 1990, p. 21)? What kinds of “imag-
ined worlds” do they construct? How is this imagination built and negotiated 
through processes of production, distribution, and consumption of global-
ized cultural forms? How does it intersect with “local” and/or “national” 
conditions? How does it relate to other elements of individuals’ identities? 
How, as scholars, can we better conceptualize its complex dynamics as a 
space of both potential domination and resistance, neither “purely emanci-
patory” nor “entirely disciplined” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 4)? How can we better 
“imagine the global”?
This book explores these questions through an examination of the trans-
national forces at work in the relationship between three sites (listed in al-
phabetical order throughout the book): France, Japan, and the United States. 
These sites were chosen in response to global media scholars Marwan Kraidy 
and Patrick Murphy’s call for a “multisited, translocal approach” to global 
communication studies “working comparatively between and within various 
locals” (2008, pp. 346, 351, emphasis in orginal; see also Shohat, 2002, p. 
78). A number of other scholars have pointed to the need to move beyond the 
recognition that “globalization means radically different things to different 
people in different places” (Sorge, 2005, p. 8) to explore what we can learn 
from these differences. A translocal approach focuses on the concrete condi-
tions under which various local/national environments relate to each other in a 
globalized world.
While working comparatively, a translocal perspective moves beyond a tra-
ditional comparative approach by putting the emphasis on the multifaceted 
relations, connections, and dynamics between the sites rather than on each 
site individually. It focuses, as media scholar Terhi Rantanen puts it, “on places 
rather than place” (2005, p. 12, emphasis in original). It draws from the works 
of scholars, particularly within the British Cultural Studies tradition, who 
have proposed to trace the trajectories of modern cultural practice through a 
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theoretical and methodological model “based on the articulation of a number 
of distinct processes whose interaction can and does lead to variable and con-
tingent outcomes” (Du Gay, 2013, p. xxx).
Starting from the assumption that “theory is always a response to a par-
ticular context” (Grossberg, 1993, p. 5) the concept of articulation allows us 
to study cultural practice “without falling into the twin traps of reduction-
ism and essentialism” (Slack, 1996, p. 113). From a methodological point 
of view, articulation offers an empirically driven framework through which 
to approach different dimensions of cultural analysis in relationship to each 
other as mutually constituted elements. It “provides a mechanism for shap-
ing intervention within a particular formation, conjecture or context” (Slack, 
1996, p. 113) while keeping a critical eye on broader power dynamics (see also 
Grossberg, 1996). A translocal perspective builds on articulation’s “radical 
contextualism” (Grossberg, 1993, p. 5) as both a theoretical agenda and a 
methodological strategy. It proposes to challenge the binarism of global vs. 
local— where the local typically acts as “the global’s presumptive victim, its 
cultural nemesis, or its coerced subordinate” (Kraidy and Murphy, 2008, p. 
339)— to consider the local/national/global as mutually constitutive elements. 
It helps us embed “large- scale realities in concrete life- worlds” (Appadurai, 
1996, p. 55).
This book illustrates what a translocal approach looks like, and what 
it can theoretically teach us, by exploring multiple dimensions of the trans-
national relationship between the “power triad” (Warnier, 2004) identified 
above. This three- way comparative focus offers opportunities to reflect on di-
mensions of the global rarely considered— such as, for instance, the implica-
tions of the French consumption of nostalgic representations of America in 
globally distributed Japanese animation. Making such connections between 
local social spaces encourages us to address thus far neglected local- to- local 
links and productively rethink local- global dynamics. To put it differently, a 
translocal approach allows us to explore not only how “the global” is negoti-
ated and imagined in different contexts (what hybridity) but also what we can 
learn from both the differences and the similarities between these contexts 
about the nature of larger processes of globalization (how hybridity matters). 
Thus, developing a translocal perspective is both an empirical task and a theo-
retical one. Taking as a starting point the notion that the global/national/lo-
cal are mutually constituted, this book empirically explores, through the study 
of globally distributed hybrid cultural forms and their “local” negotiation, 
the ways in which these three central sites define their imagined national/
cultural/local identities in relationship to each other. The three sites are con-
sidered in different configurations throughout the book, each one adding to 
our understanding of the relationships between them— and, ultimately, to 
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our theoretical understanding of broader processes of transnational influence 
and identity formation.
The Japan/France/U.S. Triad
Relatively recent historical developments, including the rise of China and 
East Asian economies, seem to suggest that economic globalization can no 
longer be characterized solely as a process of “‘Triadization,’ confined to 
the ‘interlinked economies’ of Europe, North America, and Japan” (Pieterse, 
2003/2009, p. 13). The consequences of this common history of global hege-
monic power— in particular as it relates to transnational cultural influence— 
are, however, yet to be fully explored. The “power triad” of France, Japan, and 
the United States thus remains a productive focus. It allows us to consider 
how powerful global cultural producers negotiate the global/national/local 
nexus in relationship to each other— just as “the global” contains an imag-
ined dimension, the nation/national is a contested site, “an evolving, imagi-
nary construct rather than an originary essence” (Shohat and Stam, 2003, p. 
11). Because it involves sites that have historically, and at times contentiously, 
been positioned as “Western” (France and the United States) and “Eastern” 
(Japan), it also offers opportunities to complicate, and possibly deconstruct, 
“East/West” and well as “West/West” dynamics.
There is no denying that the United States has historically been an influen-
tial force in the development of global popular cultural forms. This book will 
demonstrate that this historical legacy remains a significant, even if contested, 
element of individuals’ imagination of the global. Furthermore, while there is 
evidence that the global influence of the U.S. media is declining, exactly what 
this decline might mean for both U.S. and “global” media audiences is yet to 
be fully articulated. Studies of global media “flows” such as, for instance, Jer-
emy Tunstall’s (2008) The Media Were American (written as a revision to his 1979 
classic Media Are American) usefully point to a number of new actors entering 
the scene of transnational popular cultural influence (Bollywood movies, tele-
novelas, animation). A number of scholars have critically analyzed various 
aspects of these texts. Fewer works, however, have empirically and compara-
tively examined how these relative newcomers’ entry onto the global popu-
lar cultural scene might intersect with transnational audiences’ negotiation 
of the global— or how they might, concretely, shift the balance of power of 
transnational cultural influence beyond the most obvious economic level.
Global media scholar and feminist critic Radhika Parameswaran suggests 
that “the ‘American dream’ and the ‘American ways of life’” remain “per-
suasive ideological constructs that circulate in varied transnational contexts 
to produce shifting global allegiances that in turn revive the idea of America 
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as a mythical national space of unbridled freedom and democracy” (2009, p. 
201). What this means for different audiences including those in the United States 
needs to be carefully considered. Cultural historian Francis Shor suggests, 
for instance, that this mythical vision of the United States “as the repository 
of good in the world” (2010, p. 32) is preventing U.S. citizens from coming 
to terms with the reality of its declining global power. He concludes that our 
ability to develop a more egalitarian global order rests in part on our ability 
to raise U.S. media consumers’ consciousness about the nature of their na-
tion’s relationship to the rest of the world. Or, as cultural critics Ella Shohat 
and Robert Stam argue, “In the current situation, U.S. power is global, yet the 
knowledge of too many of its citizens is local and monoperspectival. At this 
point in history, as a consequence, transnationalizing media studies has be-
come a political and pedagogical responsibility” (2009, p. 5).
The relationship between France and the United States— described by New 
York Times reporter William Grimes as “a folie à deux that’s lasted nearly three 
centuries” (Grimes, 2006, p. 33E)— provides a terrain on which to explore 
West- to- West relationships characterized by significant cultural and linguistic 
differences. Defining France as a “‘paradigmatic’ European nation- state . . . 
historically linked to foundational theorizations of nations and nationalism,” 
Stam and Shohat remind us that “the France- United States relationship began 
as a passionate romance” characterized by a reciprocal movement of ideas (at 
the time of the French and American revolutions), even if the two countries 
have since then been engaged in “a perennial love- hate relationship . . . accom-
panied by the emotions associated with sibling rivalry” (2012, pp. 26, 44, 482).
While the United States surpassed France in its economic hegemony in 
the 20th century, the largest western European nation remains an influential 
global media producer— thanks to a combination of heavily subsidized cul-
tural industries and the legacy of colonialism, which helped secure a global 
francophone market. Perhaps more importantly, France’s official positions 
on a number of political, economic, and philosophical issues significantly 
differ today from those of the United States— the boycotting of French wine 
and renaming of “freedom fries” in some U.S. locales following France’s op-
position to the U.S. intervention in Iraq is a relatively recent reminder of how 
contentious these differences of opinion can become. In other words, and to 
borrow from Bourdieu, the United States and France represent “two imperial-
isms of the universal” (cited in Stam and Shohat, 2012, p. 482).
Most significantly for the purpose of this book, France’s view on cultural 
policies powerfully contrasts with that of the United States (and, incidentally, 
the United Kingdom). While the United States has historically actively resisted 
trade restrictions to global media flows— as its withdrawal from UNESCO fol-
lowing the New World Information and Communication Order debate in the 
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mid- 1980s illustrates (it rejoined in 2003; McPhail, 2010)— France has long 
asserted that the unique nature of cultural products means that they cannot 
simply be treated like any other goods on the market. Its strongly culturally 
protectionist policies (the much defamed “quotas”) aim at protecting French 
culture and the French language from (mostly U.S.) “cultural imperialism” 
but also serve to secure the country’s position as a global media exporter.1
Japan’s relationship to the United States is equally (if not more) tortured 
and complex. The formation of the Japanese nation itself is entangled in the 
country’s relationship with “the West” and is a thoroughly modern endeavor. 
Cultural anthropologist Marilyn Ivy points to the lack of “a discursively uni-
fied notion of the ‘Japanese’ before the eighteenth century” and to the need 
to recognize “the coincident modernity of Japan and the West” (1995, p. 8). 
Japan as a nation- state was born from the territory’s sudden forced engage-
ment in transnational relationships sparked by Commodore Perry’s 1853 ar-
rival on its shores— in response to the threat of domination by Europe and 
the United States.
The process of “self- westernization” that characterized Japan’s Meiji res-
toration starting in 1868 (Duus, 1998) is frequently equated to colonization. 
It significantly differed, however, from the forms of U.S. or European colo-
nial violence found in other parts of the world. Japanese leaders’ decision to 
“Westernize” stemmed from the desire to avoid a much more direct form of 
colonial influence. Fueled by anti- foreign rhetoric, the borrowing was selec-
tive, rational, and intentional, and while the importation of technology from 
Europe and the United States was (self- )consciously recognized, the form 
industrialization took was argued to be specifically Japanese (Boyle, 1993). 
Furthermore, if Japan started embracing “Western” ideas after Perry’s arrival, 
the process was not unilateral. The Meiji era also marks a period of strong 
Japanese transnational influence, particularly in France where the Japonisme 
movement started. Indeed, some of the most celebrated elements of French 
culture— from impressionism to cubism— drew heavily from artists’ and in-
tellectuals’ active engagement with Japanese culture. As we will see in chap-
ter 5, this historical exchange would set the stage for a continuing process of 
transnational cultural engagement between the two nations.
Finally, Japan’s colonial aggression in other parts of Asia further compli-
cates the picture of its relationship to the rest of the world. While the postwar 
occupation resulted in more direct— even if contested— U.S. intervention, it is 
also the period during which Japanese leaders worked to strategically frame 
Japan as a war victim and erase its aggression in China from official memory 
(Dower, 1993; Duus, 1998). In a move that historian Carol Gluck (1993) char-
acterizes as public amnesia, Japanese leaders advocated a total break from the 
past and promoted the notion of a new Japan entirely reformed, and focused 
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on economic prosperity. Because of its spectacular rise as one of the most in-
fluential global economies in the second half of the 20th century, globaliza-
tion scholars often simply do not know where to “fit” Japan in their maps of 
global geopolitics. In other words, Japan’s history and geopolitical position as 
a quasi- colonized colonizer, as “Westernized” yet assertively “non- Western,” 
as a nation positioning itself “in and above Asia” (Iwabuchi, 2004), power-
fully blur the boundaries between colonizer and colonized, East and West, ag-
gressor and victim, and points to the political and problematic nature of all of 
these categories.
Moving beyond East and West
Indeed, as globalization theorist Jan Nederveen Pieterse reminds us, the divi-
sion of the world along East/West lines was always “an artificial and polemi-
cal” one that “played a much larger role in rhetoric and representation than 
in reality” (2003/2009, p. 126). The hybrid and multidirectional nature of 
21st- century transnational cultural exchange makes this fact particularly dif-
ficult to ignore today. As “new frameworks of hybridity are being produced 
where the linear logic of East- West, or for that matter even West- East, simply 
does not hold” (Shome, 2006a, p. 120), scholars have struggled to develop 
new conceptual maps that more adequately take into account the complex and 
often contradictory subject positions that mark our contemporary condition 
(Grewal and Kaplan, 2003). This, however, has not been an easy task.2
One problem with conceptualizing global dynamics along an East/West 
axis is that it erases differences and tensions within regions/nations/local 
sites, and consequently makes it difficult to address (or easier to deny) power 
relations that do not follow the traditional lines of “the West” vs. “the Rest.” 
In the case of Japan, for instance, strategically locating the Japanese nation 
in binary opposition to “the West” has historically served to direct attention 
“away from the doubleness of Japanese (post)colonial experience as a non- 
Western colonizer” (Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 61).
The division further results in a tendency to associate “the global” with 
“the West,” with global- local interactions “predominantly studied in terms of 
how the Rest resists, imitates, or appropriates the West” (Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 
50). In a related rhetorical twist, “the West” is also frequently merged with the 
United States— as if the latter were the inherent designated representative of 
the former. This failure to recognize differences within “the West” translates 
into an easy dismissal of other “Western” nations’ concerns with perceived 
U.S. cultural imperialism and consequent attempts to protect themselves (see, 
for example, Hachten, 2005, p. 71). More disturbingly, it obscures the pres-
ence of other modes of organization, knowledge production, and distribution 
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as valid Western alternatives. It contributes, for instance, to the neoliberal- era 
positioning of U.S.- style consumerism as “the norm of capitalism” (Pieterse, 
2003/2009, p. 20) by denying the existence of different interpretations of cap-
italism in other parts of “the West.”
Recognizing these quandaries, scholars have attempted to move beyond 
essentializing characterizations of both East and West. The lack of adequate 
vocabulary available to more sensitively speak of different areas of the world 
while at the same time recognizing the historical legacy of their engagement 
with each other has, however, made this task particularly challenging. Even 
scholars clearly attuned to these dynamics tend, for instance, to merge Anglo- 
American experiences with those of the rest of “the West.” In an essay power-
fully critiquing the West/Rest divide, cultural critics Raka Shome and Radha 
Hegde conclude that “global mass culture is firmly entrenched in the West. It 
absorbs differences within the larger, overarching framework of what is es-
sentially an American conception of the world” (2002, p. 185, emphasis mine).3 
Likewise, in his influential critique of pessimistic interpretations of globaliza-
tion as a homogenizing process of “Westernization,” John Tomlinson recog-
nizes that various elements of “Western” culture “do not constitute an indivis-
ible package” (1999, p. 168), but the elements he describes are nevertheless 
all drawn from Anglo- American culture— McDonald’s, Coca- Cola, Levi Jeans, 
Sesame Street.
Scholarly work originated in non- U.S. Western locales is also frequently 
positioned in an awkward liminal position “in and outside the West.” For 
instance, Hamid Mowlana describes early postmodernist writing as “mostly 
an intellectual exercise in the French social science tradition” whose “appeal 
to and acceptance by Western social scientists was to come much later, in the 
1980s” (1986/1997, p. 213, emphasis mine). Shome similarly distinguishes 
French intellectual work from the “Western” tradition when addressing the 
politics of translation of scholarship into English: “a French intellectual— 
given the ‘high culture’ connotations of French intellectual thought— is far 
more likely than, let’s say a Bangladeshi intellectual— to find a publisher to 
translate her/his work through which it can enter high brow arenas of western 
intellectual space” (2009, p. 708, emphasis mine). This may be true, but are 
French scholars not “Western” unless translated into English?4
Generally, while scholars have effectively confronted essentializing con-
structions of “the East,” the notion that “the West” is not a homogenous 
totalizing whole has been less successfully addressed. This is due in part to 
the fact that, as Pieterse reminds us, the polarities of North/South, East/West, 
colonizer/colonized were, historically, “such overriding fields of tension that 
differences within the West/North, among imperialist countries and within 
capitalism faded into the background” (2003/2009, p. 50). The resulting ten-
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dency in much academic work to “pit a rotating chain of marginalized com-
munities against an unstated white or Western norm” (Shohat, 2002, p. 69) 
has dire consequences, however. On the most basic level, it simply does not 
do justice to the complexity of contemporary processes of transnational cul-
tural influence— to globalization’s “jagged contours” (Hegde, 2011a, p. 2). 
It problematically tends to locate issues of marginalization, poverty, or even 
nationalism outside of “the West”— as if “Western” nations were comfort-
ably installed in postmodernity and free from the process of (re)defining their 
own cultural, racial, gender, class, and/or national identities (Dov, 1996). It 
obscures the fact that powerful “Western” nations negotiate their hegemonic 
global position in relationship to each other as well as to “the Rest” (Stam and 
Shohat, 2012). Finally, by putting the focus on East/West power dynamics, 
this conceptual binarism marginalizes the experiences of individuals experi-
encing prejudice and discrimination within the West.
A more critical engagement with what it means to be “Western” (particu-
larly in the “non- U.S. West”) is clearly needed, both in considerations of global 
dynamics and in the often heated debates about the politics of representation 
in academic work surrounding issues of who can speak for whom and in what 
context(s). The politics of translation of non- English language “Western” 
intellectual work in academic production are yet to be fully explored. How 
might the experience of a Greek scholar, for instance, be different from that 
of a French intellectual attempting to enter the canon of “Western” academic 
texts? How might the marginalization of the non- English- language intel-
lectual work of “Western” scholars (a large number of whom are, after all, 
non- native English speakers) help secure the United States’s/Britain’s posi-
tion as the sole/most significant representative of “the West”? In what ways 
does it serve to conceal the presence of a “Western” intellectual conversation 
taking place outside of the United States and Britain— an alternative to Anglo 
“Westernism”?
This is not to suggest that the critique of U.S. and/or European imperial-
ism has become irrelevant, or that “the West” is an entirely empty concept— 
many European nations and the United States do share some cultural/racial/
ideological biases as well as the historical culpability of imperialism. To put 
it differently, like Eurocentricism, “the West” is best understood as a histori-
cally significant discursive- ideological concept, an “implicit positioning” 
(Stam and Shohat, 2012, p. 62) taking its roots in colonialism rather than as 
an actual geographic space. In contemporary times, however, “the shifting 
fault lines of economic and cultural power” also result in “new forms of ar-
ticulations and disarticulations, new configurations of power, and new planes 
of dis/empowerment” (Shome and Hegde, 2002, p. 175). This is particularly 
true when considering cultural dynamics that are considerably more difficult 
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to trace than flows of capital. Under such conditions, terms such as “West-
ern,” “non- Western,” “postcolonial,” or even “subaltern” must be used (self- )
consciously.
A critical deconstruction of “the West” requires a parallel engagement with 
the common association of globalization with “Western” modes of cultural, 
political, and economic organization— with, in other words, “Western- style” 
modernity. Noting that Westernization is not the only path to modernity, 
scholars have suggested that we theorize globalization “as a set of regionally 
differentiated patterns of modernization” (Straubhaar, 2007, p. 28). Rather 
than conceptualize modernization as a linear chronological process— from 
“developing” to “modern” to, potentially, “postmodern”— drawing from the 
historical experiences of an essentialized “West,” they propose that we think, 
instead, of modernities (plural). This “specter of different modernities” (Pieterse, 
2003/2009, p. 46, emphasis in original), of “modernization without western-
ization” helps complicate our understanding of globalization— or, more pre-
cisely, of globalizations (plural).
Scholars have started to explore these multiple modernities and have ex-
amined the trails cultural globalization takes in their wake (see, for example, 
Kraidy, 2009a). By drawing comparisons between two (very different) “West-
ern” nations and a “non- Western” (yet highly economically powerful) one, 
this book continues on this intellectual path. Its translocal approach aims to 
illustrate the ways in which the East/West divide may be used as an essential-
izing tool on both sides of the axis. It proposes, in turn, to develop a more nu-
anced understanding of how this process of strategic positioning intersects 
with other dimensions of transnational and transcultural dynamics and of 
individuals’ identities under conditions of globalization. These more theo-
retical considerations will be taken up toward the end of the book as a way 
to reflect on what scholars can learn from applying a translocal approach to 
global media studies. Like the observations made in other chapters, however, 
these theoretical reflections will be based on empirical evidence drawn from 
the comparison between the three sites’ engagement with global media.
Gendered Hybridities and the Politics of Representation
One particularly problematic characteristic of the essentialized division of 
the world along East/West lines is its intersection with issues of gender, race, 
and class. Scholars have noted how opposing “Western” nations to “the Rest” 
frequently serves to strategically locate class, racial, or gender oppression 
outside “the West” and, conversely, to position the latter as the champion of 
equality, justice, progressive sexual politics, cosmopolitanism, and progress 
(see, for example, Dov, 1996; Hegde, 2001; Niezen, 2004). They point to the 
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fact that the United States and Europe have often historically justified their 
imperialist aggression by defining themselves as liberators of “non- Western” 
women from the particularly severe oppression of “their” men. For instance, 
when the United States opposed itself to Japan at the turn of the 20th cen-
tury, it linked Japan’s ability to “Westernize” to a successful shift in Japanese 
women’s status (Iriye, 1967). In a more contemporary context, Hegde (2011) 
discusses how the foregrounding of Afghan women as victims in media cov-
erage of the war on terror helped provide a moral justification for the United 
States’ actions.
But if “sexuality has historically played a central role in the ways in which 
dominant Western views on cultural differences are coded” (Hegde, 2011, p. 2, 
emphasis mine), discourses about “Eastern” racial purity, homogeneity, and 
appropriate gender roles have similarly drawn from the opposition between 
an allegedly racially homogeneous and Confucian- influenced “East” and a 
“West” imagined as racially mixed and “gender liberated” (Iwabuchi, 2002). 
In other words, issues of gender, race, class, and/or ethnicity remain conten-
tious both in “the West” and elsewhere, and powerfully intersect with local/
national/cultural identity formation and processes of globalization— “gender 
is, and always has been, global— whether recognized or not” (Shome, 2006b, 
p. 255; see also Durham, 2001; Enloe, 2004; Hegde, 2011b; Parameswaran, 
2009). Ethnicity is similarly produced in part through the process of imagin-
ing the global/national— as Appadurai notes, minorities under conditions of 
globalization provide “a constant reminder of the incompleteness of national 
purity” (2006, p. 84).
Women’s frequent positioning as representatives of the nation and/or 
keepers of cultural tradition has also rendered their negotiation of transna-
tional influence (and globalized media forms) particularly complex. Scholars 
have analyzed how mediated representations of femininity intersect with con-
structions of national/global/racial identities in a variety of cultural contexts 
(for recent examples see Kraidy, 2009a; Parameswaran, 2011; Parameswaran 
and Cordoza, 2009; Valdivia, 2011; Volčič and Erjavec, 2011). For instance, lo-
cating beauty pageants against the backdrop of the spread of “Western- style” 
consumerism in India, Parameswaran concludes in an examination of their 
media representation:
Newspaper and magazine stories celebrate global beauty queens’ material 
accomplishments, but also strive to ensure that readers are aware of these 
women’s loyalty to their own cultural traditions and family values. . . . Us-
ing the language of nationalism, some media reports idolize the Indian 
beauty queen for setting innovative global standards for ideal femininity. 
(2005, pp. 424– 25)
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Gender constructions may thus be negotiated simultaneously as acts of re-
sistance against foreign influence (nationalism), means to safeguard “indig-
enous” elements of culture (own cultural tradition), and as claims of member-
ship in global geopolitics (innovative global standards).
The trope of hybridity is a significant subtext of this negotiation. Offered 
as alternatives to globally dominant ideals of “Western/White” femininity 
and to “pre- modern” “local” gender dynamics, the constructions of ideal In-
dian beauty Parameswaran describes deploy hybridity as “a mutually inter-
active combination of global and national cultural images, values, and sym-
bols” (2005, p. 424). As we will see in chapter 3, scholars have observed a 
similar process in Japan where hybridized representations of ideal Japanese 
beauty are offered as acts of resistance against “Western” global hegemony 
while simultaneously feeding a self- Orientalizing discourse (Creighton, 1995; 
Darling- Wolf, 2006; Yegenoglu, 1998). These examples illustrate the need to 
continue to explore the intersection of gender, race, class, and nation with the 
construction of hybridized cultural forms under conditions of globalization.
Because of the tendency, identified above, to focus on how “the Rest” re-
sists, imitates, or appropriates “the West,” this intersection has been most as-
sertively addressed in “non- Western” contexts. As feminist scholar Chandra 
Talpade Mohanty reminds us, however, “the interwoven processes of sexism, 
racism, misogyny, and heterosexism are an integral part of our social fabric 
wherever in the world we might be” (2003, p. 3, emphasis mine). This book conse-
quently pays particular critical attention to these matters in the development 
of its translocal approach. It responds to the call for “situated and empirically 
driven research on globalization” with a critical eye on “how globalized media 
practices articulate gender” (Shome, 2006b, p. 181, emphasis mine). The empiri-
cal examples provided here will indeed demonstrate that gender, race, and 
class are constant— and at times eerily similar— elements of the imagination 
of the global regardless of the context and of the angle of analysis used to ap-
proach it.
“The Global” and the Media
As Shome’s quote above suggests, the notion of the global would not exist, at 
least not in its current form, without the media. Because relatively few people 
are able to acquire the extensive first- hand knowledge of different cultural en-
vironments needed to develop “a primarily global identity” (Strauhbaar, 2007, 
p. 6) the media become a crucial site on which impressions of “the global” are 
formed and negotiated (Rantanen, 2005). As Argentinian- Mexican cultural 
critic Néstor García Canclini puts it, “we construct what is ours with greater 
intensity against the backdrop of what we imagine about others” (2001, p. 62).
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By blurring “the lines between the ‘realistic’ and fictional landscape” 
the “mediascapes” formed by flows of information and images provide the 
scripts through which individuals create “imagined worlds” and “constitute 
narratives of the ‘other’” (Appadurai, 1990, p. 299). The media are, in other 
words, a central component of the imagination of the global that, according 
to Appadurai (1996, p. 31), “is now central to all forms of agency.” As cultural 
critic Radha Hegde explains:
In the global context, questions of culture, subjectivity, and everyday life 
have to be situated against the ubiquitous presence and proliferation of 
communication technologies and their ability to transcend time and 
space. Increasingly embedded in the circuits of social life, media forms 
collide with established cultural practices, forcing reconfigurations of 
categories such as private/public, tradition/modernity, and global/local. 
(2011a, pp. 5– 6)
Thus, examining globally distributed media “provides a point of departure 
for elaborating the production of the transnational imaginary” (Shome and 
Hegde, 2002, p. 182).
The empirical materials used in this book to explore this process are cul-
tural products that are noteworthy for the extent to which they intersect on the 
global, national, and local levels with the three sites that are its central focus. 
These are globally distributed texts, genres, and formats that are (and have 
long been) adapted to (and negotiated in) a wide variety of cultural environ-
ments, forming a useful basis for comparison. As noted, they allow us to look 
at dynamics rarely considered and thus help us address new dimensions of the 
global/national/local intersection. They also allow us to draw connections be-
tween contexts rarely considered in relationship to each other. In a sense, they 
are examples of what Condry (2006, p. 90) terms “genba globalization.”5 Genba 
(literally, “scene” or “actual place” in Japanese, as in “the scene of a crime”) 
are sites of cultural production where global, local, and national identities and 
representations intersect and that “actualize . . . the global and the local simul-
taneously” (Condry, 2006, p. 90). These are texts that allow us to explore, in 
other words, the multiple “tonalities” (Geertz, 1983) of global culture.
The rise of digital communication, the Internet, and/or social media has 
recently received much scholarly attention. The texts discussed in this book, 
however, further demonstrate that the time- space compression (Castells, 
2003; Giddens, 1999; Harvey, 1989) that results from individuals’ engagement 
with global media predates these recent developments. A number of schol-
ars have warned against the tendency to dismiss “old” theories in the face of 
rapid technological change as if new technologies did not share a historical 
14  •  imagining the global
link with earlier media forms and automatically rendered previous insights 
obsolete (see, for example, Livingstone, 2004; Morley, 2006; Sterne, 2007). 
Digital media scholar Kelly Gates suggests that rather than uncritically “cel-
ebrating recent innovations as radically different and inherently better” we 
must strive “to recognize the deeply embedded ways that the past is still with 
us in the present” (2013, p. 7). Back in 1996, Appadurai already noted that the 
new forces at work in the development of the global imagination were built 
on technological changes taking place “over the past century or so” (1996, p. 5, 
emphasis mine). The texts included in this book represent this relatively lon-
ger view. While, as we will see, the rise of digital communication may have 
accelerated and expanded their global spread (allowing, in particular, non- 
English- language texts to reach U.S. audiences in greater numbers), these 
were highly globally influential cultural products long before the Internet or 
YouTube.
Some of the specific programs or artists mentioned in the following chap-
ters may not be familiar to U.S. readers. Additional information (in English) 
about each of these texts and/or genres is readily available through a quick 
Internet search. The texts themselves (episodes of animated series, songs 
and their lyrics, magazines) are also easily accessible online— illustrating the 
point above about the role of digital media— if the reader wants to get a sense 
of their texture.
This book, however, goes beyond the study of texts. While examining 
media can help us develop a sense of how the local/national/global are rhe-
torically negotiated, local identities cannot be fully accessed through textual 
analysis (García Canclini, 2001). As Murphy and Kraidy note, “While glo-
balization may be discursively situated in terms of broad economic, political 
and cultural trends, media consumption is . . . perhaps the most immediate, 
consistent and pervasive way in which ‘globality’ is experienced” (2003, p. 
7). Appadurai proposes that scholars find new ways to explore the increas-
ingly global and deterritorialized link between the imagination and social life 
through an ethnography “that is not so resolutely localizing” (1996, p. 55). In 
response to these suggestions, the insights provided here are also based on 
countless informal discussions, extensive participant observation, and more 
than 80 formal interviews with some 160 media consumers (and, occasion-
ally, producers) in Japan, France, and the United States conducted over the 
course of several years of fieldwork. These informants’ enthusiastic responses 
to the various texts discussed and their insightful comments on the nature of 
globalization provide a rich terrain through which to explore the imagination 
of the global. They provide us with the thick descriptions necessary to start 
answering the question of how hybridity matters.
In addition to their importance as global cultural producers and to the 
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multidimensional nature of their historical relationships, the three sites that 
constitute the focus of this book were chosen because they are sites that have 
shaped my identity as a scholar and on which I can claim some level of exper-
tise. Born and raised in France, I have spent most of my adult life in the United 
States where I currently teach. I am also engaged in an ongoing relationship 
with Japan where I moved for the first time as an English teacher more than 
18 years ago, and which became the main focus of my research (and my eth-
nographic field- site) shortly thereafter. In addition to spending several years 
on the island of Shikoku and returning to my field- site on a regular basis, I 
frequently spend my summers teaching in Tokyo. French is my native lan-
guage and I can function in Japanese (even though I typically conduct formal 
interviews in Japan with the help of my wonderful interpreter, Yasumi Okame, 
who also more generally serves as my research assistant). The interviews with 
Japanese informants cited throughout this book were conducted in 1998– 99, 
2009, and 2011. Some of the media consumers cited were interviewed in each 
of these time periods, allowing me to develop a “longer view” on their en-
gagement with global media— several were still in high school when I started 
my research in the community.
The bulk of this book was, however, written from a small village in South-
ern France not far from where I grew up, and where I own a home. My interac-
tions with the local community there over the course of several years starting 
in 2006— including a one- year stay (from August 2009 to August 2010) spe-
cifically focused on gathering data for this work— provided a useful backdrop 
to many of the insights developed here. The majority of the formal interviews 
with French informants cited in this work were conducted in 2010, but I also 
returned to the village in the summers of 2011, 2012, and 2013 and conducted 
further participant observation and informal interviews.
Interviews with U.S. consumers were conducted in 2011 and 2012 in the 
Philadelphia area. While attempts were made to include individuals of all ages 
and of different socio- economic backgrounds in all three cultural contexts, it 
is important to note that the U.S. media consumers who participated in my 
research tended to be more urban (even though they were not all originally 
from Philadelphia) and somewhat more highly educated than their French 
and Japanese counterparts. The U.S. sample also tended to be relatively more 
racially and ethnically diverse. I believe the data will demonstrate that this dis-
crepancy does not invalidate the comparison, but it is something the reader 
should keep in mind when considering the comments included in this book.
Finally, it is also important to note that the “chosen transnationality” that 
affords me the luxury to compare these three cultural contexts is significantly 
different from the forced translocality of migrant workers, of immigration as a 
result of political strife or intense economic hardship, or of postcolonial expe-
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rience. For most people, transnationality or hybridity is not a choice, but “re-
sults from having to satisfy basic needs by participating in a system of produc-
tion and consumption not of one’s choosing” (Yúdice, 2001, p. xv). Keeping 
these caveats in mind, this book is intended as one voice in a larger conversa-
tion on global media between scholars in different disciplines and represent-
ing different areas of the world— a conversation hopefully based on “mutual 
engagement rather than theoretical chauvinism” (Kraidy, 2009b, p. 90).
Mapping the Book
As noted, this book builds an empirically informed theory of translocalism 
by considering how the process of imagining the global takes place through 
the negotiation of globally distributed hybrid cultural forms on three sites: 
France, Japan, and the United States. Because of the complexity of transna-
tional dynamics, it is necessarily partial. Far from proposing to “represent” 
the entire world— at best an exercise in futility, at worst one in stereotyping— it 
concentrates on these three central sites as a means to explore interrelations 
and links within a broader global context. Drawing from specific examples, it 
considers how the process of imagining the global intersects with construc-
tions of local, national, racial, and gendered identities in each of these sites as 
they engage with global culture, including each other’s media. Each empirical 
example serves as a starting point for a reflection on what we can learn, both 
empirically and theoretically, from the similarities and differences within and 
between these economically powerful global cultural producers. This means 
that some relationships and dynamics will not be fully explored here. I re-
alize, for instance, that the various cultural references mentioned in the vi-
gnette opening this chapter do not all have the same connotations in terms 
of the politics of transcultural borrowing. Sporting an Indian sari or Native 
American dress is not the same as dressing up like a Disney princess— even 
if French media consumers’ awareness of these different sartorial choices 
may come from the same global sources (such as, for instance, Hollywood). A 
thorough engagement with the remaining legacy of colonialism/orientalism 
that permeates French consumers’ relationship to India or with the ways in 
which less privileged individuals in cultural contexts marked by a history of 
colonial violence might negotiate global cultural references differently would 
fall, however, beyond the scope of this book.
The reasons behind the choice of specific texts will be briefly addressed at 
the beginning of each chapter. Each site will be considered in different config-
urations throughout the chapters— as producer, receptor, or mediator of cul-
tural flows. Because of the complexity of contemporary transnational cultural 
exchange, however, we will soon see that these roles frequently overlap and/
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or merge. Finally, the term “transnational” will be used throughout the book 
to refer to relations between the sites in which the national level is ostensibly 
(and, often, discursively) emphasized— as in the case, for instance, of global 
news. I chose the term “transnational” rather than “international” because it 
suggests a more fluid movement through spaces and borders beyond official 
state relations. The term “transcultural” will be used to reflect the more com-
plex mix of cultural influences taking place on multiple levels characteristic of 
our hybrid contemporary condition.
Chapter 1, “Un- American Idols: How the Global/National/Local Inter-
sect,” empirically explores the most basic argument of this book: the idea that 
the global, national, and local are mutually constituted in contemporary pop-
ular culture. The genre of reality television, predicated on the “local” adapta-
tion of highly “global” formats, provides a useful starting point for this explo-
ration. Scholars have demonstrated how format adaptation creates a cultural 
space where local, national, and gendered identities are actively debated, con-
tested, and negotiated (Kraidy, 2009a; Kraidy and Murphy, 2008). Reality TV’s 
active engagement with communication technologies in its construction of 
“the real” also serves to heighten viewers’ awareness of our worldwide con-
nectedness. The chapter more specifically explores this global/national/local 
nexus through an examination of the adaptation of one global format to the 
French national television market. In keeping with the book’s intent, it also 
considers how the show’s construction of local, national, and global identi-
ties intersected with its narratives about race and culture to demonstrate how 
these different dynamics are all mutually constitutive, and often contentious, 
elements of contemporary cultural forms.
Having illustrated how the global/national/local are mutually constituted 
in contemporary media, the book goes on to apply a broader translocal lens to 
this process and to its intersection with racial and cultural dynamics. Chapter 
2, “Holier- than- Thou: Representing the “Other” and Vindicating Ourselves 
in International News,” explores how all three sites negotiated the global/
national/local nexus in relationship to each other in their coverage of dramatic 
news events. Focusing on events that generated debates about racial and/
or cultural dynamics in each of these sites (Hurricane Katrina, the race riots 
that shook France in 2005, and the March 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsu-
nami), it draws parallels between the ways in which the French, Japanese, 
and U.S. press negotiated these issues both “at home” and in “international” 
news. The choice of news provides opportunities to reflect on the ideologi-
cal nature of a medium whose claims to “represent” reality, if not always un-
questionably accepted, are generally taken more seriously than those of more 
“popular” cultural forms, such as reality television. The chapter shows that 
the three sites all engaged in a very similar process of employing translocal 
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comparisons to downplay the implications of crises “at home,” particularly 
as they related to racial tensions. It also illustrates, however, how the French 
and U.S. discourse about the Japanese disaster further engaged in a process of 
“othering” Japan by interpreting Japanese reactions to the event as illustrative 
of distinctive cultural/racial traits contrasted to those of “Western” nations.
Building on this last conclusion, chapter 3, “Talking about non- no: (Re)
fashioning Race and Gender in Global Magazines,” turns to Japan as a site of 
reception to investigate how its status as a “non- Western/non- majority white” 
social context might shape its relationship to “the global” and to the other 
sites considered in the book. This chapter also adds a more careful consider-
ation of gender and class into the mix, by examining how the Japanese nego-
tiation of race interlocks with that of gender and class in globalized cultural 
forms. Finally, it considers how these dynamics take shape not only discur-
sively, but also in individuals’ experiences. Employing global fashion maga-
zines as its empirical starting point, the chapter first examines the multiple 
ways in which culture, race, gender, and the global are invoked in Japanese 
texts. It then moves beyond textual representations to explore how Japanese 
women negotiate these constructions through their media consumption. The 
chapter demonstrates how individuals’ imagination of “the global” and their 
negotiation of both transnational influence and national/cultural identity can-
not be separated from their experience of gender, race, and class. It also il-
lustrates how the local/national/global are mutually constituted not only in 
globalized media but also in individuals’ daily lives.
Having demonstrated the often- political nature of processes of represen-
tation and positioning against the backdrop of an imagined global commu-
nity in popular cultural forms, the book turns to the examination of a similarly 
myopic process of positioning in academic work about globalized media. The 
next two chapters build connections between empirical examinations of the 
local/national/global intersection to address the problematic consequences 
of biases commonly found in academic discourse. They employ translocal ex-
aminations of two globalized genres— hip- hop and Japanese animation— to 
illustrate the need to develop new theoretical models that move beyond essen-
tialized characterizations of large areas of the world.
Chapter 4, “Disjuncture and Difference from the Banlieue to the Ganba: 
Embracing Hip- hop as a Global Genre,” considers what applying a translo-
cal lens to hip- hop as a global phenomenon can teach us about the politics of 
representation of race, class, and gender not only in hip- hop itself but also in 
academic discussions surrounding its contested definitions of cultural, racial, 
ethnic, and gender identities. Considering hip- hop through a translocal lens, 
it demonstrates how the positioning of hip- hop as an African/Latino/a Amer-
ican genre and the focus on limiting definitions of authenticity in academic 
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discourse lead to problematic characterizations of hip- hop’s global dynam-
ics. It also considers how discussions of hip- hop’s global dimensions are yet 
to fully address the genre’s misogynist subtext. The chapter illustrates the 
productive potential of developing a more translocal approach to these ques-
tions, and the need to decentralize the United States in our examinations of 
global processes.
In response to this last argument, chapter 5, “What West Is It? Anime and 
Manga according to Candy and Goldorak,” turns to Japan as a site of produc-
tion and to a genre (Japanese animation) frequently identified as challeng-
ing U.S. cultural hegemony. The chapter demonstrates, however, that while 
intending to point to Japan’s growing influence and to a concomitant decline 
in U.S. power, the academic and popular discourse in the United States about 
Japanese animation’s “global” popularity has paradoxically resulted in the 
re- centralizing of the United States as both a global cultural producer and 
a consumer of globalized cultural forms. The chapter points to the ways in 
which this discourse is problematic by contrasting the genre’s trajectory into 
the French cultural context to its influence in the United States. Drawing from 
interviews with French consumers as well as historical evidence, it illustrates 
the cultural significance of the Japanese genre in France. It also demonstrates 
how analyses too narrowly focused on a U.S./Japan axis result in dangerously 
essentializing characterizations of both “the West” and “Japan.” The chap-
ter concludes that this “global” genre was negotiated quite differently in the 
United States than it was in other areas of the world, due, in large part, to the 
United States’ historical dominance of global cultural markets.
The consequences of the United States’ history of (and possibly continu-
ing) transnational cultural influence are further taken up in chapter 6, “Imag-
ining the Global: Transnational Media and Global Audiences.” Building on 
what we have learned so far in the book about the nature of globalized cultural 
forms and on additional conversation with media consumers in France, Ja-
pan, and the United States, the chapter provides a broader final reflection on 
individuals’ experiences of “the global.” Drawing parallels between the three 
sites, it considers how French and Japanese media consumers’ imagination 
of the global was similarly shaped by the historical omnipresence of U.S. cul-
tural products on their respective cultural landscapes. The chapter points to 
the need to keep in mind the imagined nature of individuals’ engagement with 
different cultural contexts through the media, and, in particular, the imagined 
nature of their relationship with “America.” It also demonstrates how the dif-
ferent histories of transnational influence in the three sites that constitute the 
focus of this book have resulted in U.S. media consumers having a different 
relationship to “global” texts than their Japanese and French counterparts. It 
concludes that this, again, points to the need to decentralize the U.S. cultural 
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experience in our analyses of global processes and deconstruct “the West” as 
well as “the Rest.”
The final chapter of the book, “Lessons from a Translocal Approach— or, 
Reflections on Contemporary Glocamalgamation,” reflects on what we can 
draw theoretically from the translocal mosaic charted in its different chapters. 
Reflecting on the recurring dynamics found throughout the book, it returns 
to the central question of how hybridity matters— both empirically and theo-
retically. It emphasizes how hybridity results in a normalization of the global 
in individuals’ daily lives, in an increased awareness of our inescapable en-
gagement in it. It further reflects on the often- contentious nature of global-
ized hybridity, particularly as it intersects with racial and gender dynamics 
and explores its productive potential. Noting the dearth of adequate vocabu-
lary available to describe the mutual transformations of cultural forms that 
characterize the imagination of the global, it proposes that we think about the 
messiness of global culture’s intersection with local subjectivities as a form 
of “glocamalgamation.” It concludes that glocamalgamation, as explored 
through the translocal approach of this book, forces us to move beyond nar-
row conceptualizations of the world and to decentralize the United States’ 
cultural experience in our considerations of global processes while keeping 
an eye on its continuing economic power.
The book closes with a brief discussion of the productive potential of a 
critical theory of translocalism for future research and of the challenges in-
volved in developing such an approach. It concludes that an empirically driven 
translocal perspective can help overcome the “fateful optical illusion” (War-
nier, 2004, p. 91) created by the socio- cultural context surrounding us (includ-
ing that of academia), and that French anthropologist Jean- Pierre Warnier ar-
gues is characteristic of contemporary discourses about globalization.
Noting that “an ill- formulated injunction suggests that we should not 
compare apples and oranges,” Stam and Shohat argue that “in fact one can 
pursue comparison in many directions and for different ends” (2009, p. 481). 
Taking this suggestion seriously, the following chapters will draw connec-
tions between and within different “locals.” Each will employ empirical evi-
dence to reflect on different yet interlinked dimensions of the imagination of 
the global and how it intersects with constructions of local, national, racial, 
and gendered identities. Each will add a piece of the puzzle to our understand-
ing of broader processes of transnational cultural exchange. Taken together, 
the chapters propose to sketch a theory of translocalism that might “serve as a 
trampoline for epistemological leaps” (Stam and Shohat, 2009, p. 489) allow-
ing us to identify the blind spots in our own academic work and, ultimately, to 
develop a more multidimensional understanding of contemporary processes 
of cultural globalization.
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The next chapter begins this translocal journey by empirically illustrating 
one of the theoretical starting points of the book: the idea that the global, na-
tional, and local are mutually constituted in contemporary popular culture. 
The chapter explores this process through the genre of reality television, with 
a specific focus on the adaptation of a widely globally distributed reality televi-
sion format, Star Academy, to the French national television market.
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Un- American Idols: How the Global/
National/Local Intersect
Reality TV has come to permeate the popular zeitgeist, occupying lucrative 
time slots across the globe and a prominent place in the cultural imaginary.
— Ouellette and Murray, 2004, p. 2
The product of a combination of deregulation policies, the growing globaliza-
tion and simultaneous fragmentation of television audiences spurred by ca-
ble’s constant search for niche markets, efforts on the part of traditional net-
works to reclaim their audience, and across- the- board increased commercial 
pressures, reality TV emerges as a perfect exemplar of 21st- century transna-
tional capitalism. With its success predicated on its ability to combine “a local 
cast and local viewer participation with a customizable transnational format” 
(Andrejevic, 2004, p. 12) the genre stands at the intersection of the “global” 
and the “local.” Scholars have demonstrated that the process of adapting 
globally owned and distributed formats to an array of “local” contexts cre-
ates a privileged cultural space where local, national, and gendered identities 
are actively debated, contested, and negotiated in relationship to the global 
(Kraidy, 2009a; Kraidy and Murphy, 2008). The genre consequently offers a 
fertile terrain on which to explore one of the basic premises of this book: the 
notion that the local/national/global are mutually constituted in globalized 
cultural forms.
While reality TV is not the only cultural space where this process takes 
place, the genre’s obvious entanglement in the global/national/local nexus 
provides a good empirical starting point to the development of a translocal 
perspective. This chapter starts with a brief description of the ways in which 
reality television has transformed global/local dynamics. It then turns to the 
case of the adaptation of one highly global format, Star Academy, into the 
French national market to illustrate how the process of localization gener-
ated specific constructions of French national identity in the show’s narrative. 
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Moving beyond localization, it demonstrates how these constructions were 
developed in a symbiotic relationship with the show’s engagement with an 
imagined global community. It closes with a short examination of the specific 
power dynamics permeating this relationship.
Reality TV’s Entanglement with the Global/Local Nexus
The rise of format adaptation as a preferred form of transnational exchange— 
what global media scholar Joseph Straubhaar calls “genre imperialism” 
(2007, p. 68)— has inserted important new dynamics into global processes of 
transnational influence and their local negotiation.
On the broadest economic level, the extreme success of reality television 
starting in the first decade of the 21st century has engendered a subtle shift in 
global power relations. The move from selling “finished” and, consequently, 
significantly culturally marked media products— think of the global impact 
of Happy Days, Dallas, or Sex and the City— to selling more “culturally neutral” 
formats has eroded the relative economic advantage of powerful countries 
with the capital to develop extensive production facilities supported by a vast 
national market. As former head of Israeli television Yair Stern put it when 
describing the audiovisual landscape in his country in a personal conversa-
tion, “it used to be all American TV series, like Dallas or the hospital show  . . . 
ER. Now it’s all reality TV formats” (October 21, 2008). The rise of the small 
Dutch company Endemol to the status of reality TV giant is illustrative of this 
shift. It indicates that the low production cost of reality TV formats has al-
lowed smaller players to start competing on the global market at a level pre-
viously unattainable to them (Kilborn, 2003). Today, Endemol has become a 
truly global company with subsidiaries and joint ventures in 23 countries, and 
has “forced Hollywood producers to take an increasing interest in imported 
programming formats” (Andrejevic, 2004, pp. 11– 12).
The relationship of large format exporters to the various cultural envi-
ronments in which they conduct business is different, however, than that of 
earlier global production giants, such as Hollywood, with stronger ties to 
an easily identifiable national culture. While yielding significant economic re-
turns, the relatively culturally neutral nature of formats diminishes their cul-
tural influence and allows for greater negotiation at the national level— which, 
as Straubhaar reminds us, is the level at which formats are typically adapted. 
Thus, format adaptation results in a “hybrid production in which imported 
elements, genres, and formats are adapted into national media systems and 
given national spins or interpretations. The outcome is neither national au-
tonomy, nor cultural imperialism” (Straubhaar, 2007, pp. 167– 68). The fact 
that formats may be exported to a wide array of national environments further 
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complicates this picture by creating translocal relationships that may become 
more culturally significant than the “local” text’s connection to its original 
format (Kraidy and Murphy, 2008). In other words, format adaptation power-
fully illustrates the increased complexity of globalization in the 21st century.
The cultural discourse surrounding reality television is often couched, 
however, in quasi- anthropological language that, ironically, serves to position 
the genre as a microcosm of the “local” societies into which its global formats 
are adapted. French television scholar François Jost notes, for instance, that 
the intense debates generated by the first season of Loft Story (France’s equiva-
lent of Big Brother) centered on what could be learned from its teenaged par-
ticipants about the character of younger generations, as if the program pro-
vided an “in vivo observation of French youth” (2002/2007, p. 63). Such claims 
are interesting in light of the fact that the owner of the format retains a high 
level of control over the various incarnations of the text. Elements interpreted 
as “local” may in fact be part of the format’s global communication strat-
egy. Thus, reality TV’s engagement with the local is never fully divorced from 
the global context of production and distribution surrounding the genre. If 
“the global” is not always ostensibly represented in its local narratives, these 
narratives are nevertheless constructed against the backdrop of this broader 
framework.
Scholars further locate the rise of reality television as a popular genre in 
relationship to a historical and cultural moment in which our discomfort with 
surveillance technologies has been dulled by the age of interactive media and 
its incursion on individuals’ personal privacies (Androjevic, 2004; Le Guay, 
2005). An age, in other words, epitomized by the increased dual awareness 
of watching and being watched (Jost, 2002/2007). Indeed, as Chinese boys in 
a dorm room, cranky old ladies crossing the street, or talking kitties become 
instant transcultural YouTube phenomena, the presence of a global watching 
audience is more and more difficult to ignore. Reality television’s active en-
gagement with our contemporary hypermediated environment— 24- hour web 
presence, ability for audiences to use their phone or the Internet to influence 
the outcome of a show— and its link to processes of global surveillance ul-
timately contribute to the awareness of the global symptomatic of our contem-
porary condition. They powerfully intersect with the construction of what 
globalization scholar Manfred Steger describes as “a rising global imaginary” 
(2009, p. 10).
This complex nexus of local/national/global linkages is an important 
broader context to keep in mind when examining the adaptation of reality 
television formats to various cultural environments. It helps us recognize that 
the local and the global do not exist “in suspended opposition” (Kraidy and 
Murphy, 2008, p. 339) but are constitutive parts of the same process of nego-
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tiation of socio- cultural and national identities under conditions of globaliza-
tion. The rest of this chapter empirically explores how this negotiation took 
place in the adaptation of one reality TV format to the French national televi-
sion market. It also considers how the show’s construction of local, national, 
and global identities intersected with its narratives about race and culture to 
illustrate how these different dynamics are all mutually constitutive, and often 
contentious, elements of contemporary cultural forms.
Star Academy in Context
Owned by the Spanish branch of Endemol— to whom we also owe such suc-
cesses as Big Brother, Deal or No Deal, and Fear Factor— Star Academy’s status as 
one of the most globally successful reality television formats to date makes it 
a logical choice for this investigation. Started in France in October 2001, the 
show’s format has since been exported to some 50 different cultural environ-
ments ranging from Africa to Quebec through Lebanon and Russia. The show, 
however, was never successfully brought to the United States— even though it 
was initially inspired by the 1980 film Fame, featuring students at the New York 
City High School for the Performing Arts. While Star Academy experienced its 
popularity peak in France in the mid- 2000s— it stopped broadcasting because 
of a decline in ratings after its 2008 season and the rights to the format were 
sold to a different channel in 2011— its influence on the reality TV genre is still 
strongly felt, and many of its other global incarnations, most notably its Arab 
World version (Kraidy, 2009a), are still running today.
Star Academy’s huge success rests in part on its ingenious merging of two 
extremely popular reality television formats. The show combines Big Brother– 
like 45- minute daily broadcasts from the “academy,” the school for music and 
dance where candidates live, with weekly two and a half hour “primes”— in 
the vein of Pop- Idol in Britain or American Idol in the United States— broadcast, 
as their name suggests, during prime time. During the primes, students per-
form live in front of judges and an international audience. In the case of the 
French adaptation of the format, the official website for the program and a 
pay channel further provided live footage of life at the academy for 22 hours 
out of every 24- hour period. The French version of the show was originally 
broadcast on TF1, France’s oldest television channel and one of its only two 
free private non- digital channels.1
An important backdrop to understanding the popularity of Star Acad-
emy— or Star Ac’ as it is generally referred to in France— is the country’s long 
history of game and variety shows. The early “radio crochets,” the singing ra-
dio competitions that led to the discovery of some of France’s most celebrated 
popular singers, can be considered one of Star Academy’s earliest precursors. 
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The fact that France has a long history of highly popular variety shows, often 
broadcast in prime time, is also relevant. In other words, while the current 
popularity of reality television might, at first sight, be interpreted as a rela-
tively recent development, the reality TV phenomenon is not without histori-
cal precedent. Incidentally, Star Ac’ itself has now spurred the development of 
other similar shows, such as Nouvelle Star initially broadcast on M6 (France’s 
other analog private channel), which consists of a weekly prime (also lasting 
two and a half hours) that mixes the candidates’ live performances with short 
humorous “behind the scenes” edited segments.
Particularly significant to the issues at hand is the fact that many of these 
game and variety shows have historically provided a space for national and 
cultural identity construction and representation. For instance, the Eurovision 
song contest, famously won by ABBA in 1974 and broadcast throughout Eu-
rope without interruption since 1956, pits European countries against each 
other in its annual one- day competition. Similarly, the game show Jeux Sans 
Frontières (Games Without Borders), broadcast for nine weeks every summer 
from 1965 to 1999, featured teams from different countries competing in out-
landish costumes and crowned one nation its ultimate winner. The articula-
tion of the global, national, and local in more recent reality television may be 
more subtle than in these earlier shows born out of a upbeat postwar effort 
to promote European unity through friendly competition,2 but reality TV con-
tinues to serve as a terrain on which national and cultural identities are ne-
gotiated and constructed in relationship to the global. A closer look at Star 
Academy indicates that this complex negotiation takes place on several levels.
World Citizens “à la française”: Localizing Star Ac’ and 
Reconciling the French Nation
Most obviously, the French version of Star Academy beautifully illustrates the 
process of localization that global reality formats undergo when adapted 
to local cultural environments. Participants’ daily life at the academy was 
steeped in references to what the audience was encouraged to interpret as 
“traditional” aspects of French culture. This was particularly apparent in the 
shows’ daily broadcasts that followed the candidates’ every move as they stud-
ied, ate, and slept together (pun intended).
The organization of the school itself was modeled after the French edu-
cational system. The complex process of selection of candidates for possible 
elimination on the Friday night prime orchestrated by professors through-
out the week closely resembled, with its system of averages and “repêchage” 
(retest), the process of evaluation for the baccalauréat— the national exam 
French students have to take when exiting high school. The way classes were 
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organized around a set schedule that all students were to abide by, the grad-
ing system on a 20- point scale, the emphasis on strong discipline, all referred 
to elements of life in a French lycée— elements the young audience and their 
parents were likely to be intimately (and at times painfully) familiar with. Star 
Academy’s version of French education was, however, clearly idealized. As Jost 
explains,
To parents who deplore the abdication of educational responsibility on 
the part of professors and to children who condemn the school system for 
teaching boring subjects, Star Academy offers the image of a reconciled 
school, where adults and adolescents work together to reach a common 
goal. (2007, p. 107)
Star Academy similarly offered the image of a reconciled French cultural 
context constructed across regional and generational barriers. The world of 
Star Academy was one in which adult professors and the diverse casts of ado-
lescents they taught were portrayed as sharing a common “French” cultural 
heritage celebrated throughout the daily broadcasts. This was accomplished 
by the physical presence on the show of French cultural icons ranging from 
older artists (Renaud, Michel Sardou, Johnny Hallyday) to relatively newer 
arrivals (Florent Pagny, Benabar), who served as the “patrons” of different 
seasons or came to perform with candidates during the weekly primes. This 
shared cultural heritage was further emphasized in the selection of songs to 
be interpreted by candidates, often drawn from the repertoire of celebrated 
French singer/songwriters such as Gilbert Bécaud, Hughes Aufray, and Yves 
Montand.
References to various French customs used to invigorate the otherwise 
rather dull reality of daily life at the academy served a similar purpose. When, 
in the show’s seventh season, the mother of one of the candidates was invited 
to visit in February to make the traditional crèpes in celebration of the Cath-
olic Candlemas, her exceptional intrusion into the otherwise autarkic life of 
the candidates not only helped break the monotony of schoolwork but also 
reminded viewers of this tradition.3 Because each season of Star Academy ran 
for several months,4 such allusions to “traditional” aspects of French culture 
could be made repeatedly.
The show’s careful selection of candidates from various areas of France, 
despite the fact that media production in France is typically highly concen-
trated in the capital and rarely otherwise includes “the province” (the totality 
of France’s other regions), extended the reach of this French imagined com-
munity to the country’s entire map. As the candidates’ regional diversity was 
made obvious in their online biographies, through allusions on the show to 
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their hometowns or regions, and through regionally accented speech, audi-
ences were reminded of the richness of France’s diverse local cultures. Claims 
of geographic specificity quickly receded, however, once the candidates en-
tered the academy, against the show’s assertions of commonalities across re-
gional differences and of shared national culture.
While an emphasis on “traditional” aspects of French culture suggests a 
nostalgic lens, the show also acknowledged— and reconciled the audience 
with— more contemporary cultural developments. French rap and French 
rock were mixed in with the famous folk songs of singer- songwriters. New 
fads were alluded to and discussed. Younger singers and newer genres were 
recognized as symbols of France’s continuing engagement in popular cultural 
production— as the new generation of significant contributors to France’s 
cultural identity. The show itself became such a symbol, as the winners from 
previous seasons, several of whom have gone on to successful singing ca-
reers, were invited to come back as instructors or guests. Their CD releases 
were heavily advertised during the show’s commercial breaks. This bridging 
between young candidates and older professors, celebrated icons and newest 
fads served to reassure viewers that a new cohort of cultural producers aware 
of the debt they owe earlier generations were being groomed to assure their 
masters’ succession— that “French” culture is alive and well.
Perhaps more significantly, Star Ac’ reconciled its audience with the chang-
ing nature of the French socio- cultural and ethnic landscape. Candidates and 
professors on the show were clearly selected to represent the diverse racial, 
ethnic, and cultural makeup of the French population. In other words, the 
dynamics of race and ethnicity were a significant subtext of the show’s con-
struction of “French identity.” Each season’s cast of characters included sev-
eral “minority” aspiring artists, most frequently black and/or North African, 
whose favored musical style was typically hip- hop, jazz, or R&B.5 The show’s 
host, Nikos Aliagas, was of Greek origin; Kamel Ouali, the show’s artistic di-
rector, of Algerian descent. This mixing of races and ethnicities is typical of 
reality programs intent on creating drama by bringing together individuals of 
very different backgrounds.
The way Star Academy dealt with race, however, differed significantly from 
the strategies used to address the issue in similar U.S. texts. Scholars have 
demonstrated that instances of racial tension in the U.S. versions of Big Brother 
or The Real World become occasions to suggest that friendship and discussion 
can alleviate racism. This serves to conceal racism’s structural nature by sug-
gesting that “as long as some ‘bad whites’ can be fixed and brought to task, 
everything will be all right” (Shome, 2000, p. 369). In contrast, race was sim-
ply not addressed in Star Academy’s narrative beyond the obvious visual clues 
provided by the candidates’ physical selves. If, in the United States, The Real 
Un-American Idols  •  29
World “constructs a reality that frees the audience of any implications in rac-
ism by blaming rural conservatives for the problem” (Kraszewski, 2004, p. 
182) Star Academy constructed a reality in which racism simply did not exist.
This narrative intersects with France’s official position of “color blindness” 
where “any recognition of ethnic particularity is presumed to dilute the force 
of the transcendental principle of ‘equality before the law’” (Stam and Shohat, 
2012, p. 145). Indeed, article 1 of the current French constitution essentially 
eliminates discussions of racial discrimination from official discourse (Sab-
bagh, 2003).6 In keeping with this position, the show’s narrative simply de-
fined all candidates as (non- hyphenated) “French.” One had to search beyond 
the confines of the show’s official texts, including the official website that pro-
vided the 22- hour feed to the academy’s daily life, to find more detailed elab-
orations on the candidates’ racial or ethnic identities. So, for instance, while 
Yvane— a rapper known as Irie Kane in the French underground hip- hop scene 
who participated in the show’s eighth season— moved to metropolitan France 
from his native Martinique7 in 1998, his online profile on the show’s website 
only stated that he was from Bourg- la- Reine in the department of Hauts- de- 
Seine. The website also failed to identify his work as a rapper.
Similarly, it is difficult to assess whether racial tensions emerged among 
candidates in their daily life at the academy. If they did, the show typically 
failed (or refused) to capitalize on them as dramatic elements of its narrative 
structure. Instead, everyone on the show, regardless of ethnic, cultural, or ra-
cial identity, was portrayed as equally sharing and enjoying the “French” cul-
tural heritage described above, even if candidates were generally allowed to 
bring their own creative twist to these common cultural markers. Individuals 
whose “non- French” cultural origin was known due to their involvement in 
the broader French popular cultural scene, including Aliagas and Ouali, were 
portrayed as safely “integrated.”
This reality TV– style reality stands in sharp contrast to the intense racial 
tensions that permeate the French socio- cultural landscape, as evidenced by 
the brutal riots that spread through the suburbs of France’s major cities in the 
fall of 2005 following the death of two youths of African descent fleeing the 
police (to be further discussed in chapter 2). As we will see in chapter 4, it also 
stands in sharp contrast to the works of French rappers who, while asserting 
their French identity, also work to question, deconstruct, and possibly rede-
fine what such an identity might mean in an increasingly hybridized cultural 
context marked by the legacy of postcolonial immigration.
Star Academy’s construction of a space in which urban and rural youths 
of varied ethnicities and races can not only adequately function as a group, 
but can do so while embracing the values of tradition, hard work, and trans- 
generational respect, served, however, to safely reconcile white audiences 
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with the increased diversity of French society. It also served to reassure mem-
bers of ethnic and/or racial minority groups that they, too, could become cele-
brated contributors to the French popular cultural scene— if they were willing 
enough to comply with the rules of French cultural integration.
Beyond Localization: The Local/National/Global as Mutually 
Constitutive Elements
The above discussion illustrates how a global format can be localized to reso-
nate with local audiences and even reconcile viewers with contested aspects of 
the socio- cultural landscape into which it is adapted. Focusing solely on this 
process of “localization of the global,” as most studies of transnational media 
tend to do, only provides, however, a limited outlook on the negotiation of the 
local/global nexus in globalized cultural texts such as the one examined here. 
Identifying the defining lines along which a global format was turned into a 
“French” text (as I endeavored to do in the section above) is a necessary first 
step in recognizing the political nature of processes of localization. The next 
step, if we are to better understand the mutually constitutive nature of the lo-
cal/national/global nexus, requires us to further locate this process within the 
larger context of the awareness of the global that characterizes our contempo-
rary condition.
First of all, one must understand that the process of “localization” de-
scribed above was actually one of “nationalization.” While the show’s nar-
rative nodded at regional differences, these were brought together under 
the broader umbrella of a hegemonically defined national French identity 
constructed through the celebration of a “shared” cultural heritage— French 
songs, cultural icons, Catholicism, and so forth. Like any hegemonic defini-
tion, it had to be negotiated to integrate potentially contentious elements into 
its naturalization of the status quo. Thus, the French version of Star Academy 
sketched an idealized version of France as a nation in touch with its traditions 
yet open to new forms of cultural production (even ones arising as expres-
sions of racial or ethnic difference), as long as these were safely integrated 
within an acceptable vision of French national unity. The “fiction réelle” 
[real fiction] (Jost, 2002/2007, p. 9) constructed in the show was one where 
France’s policies of color blindness actually worked.
Perhaps more significantly, at least in terms of this chapter’s main argu-
ment, this idealized vision of French national identity was constructed in rela-
tionship to the show’s active engagement with an imagined global community. 
Despite its emphasis on various elements of “French” culture, a sharp aware-
ness of this broader global framework permeated the entire discourse of the 
show. These transnational links were made particularly evident on the Friday 
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night “primes,” ostensibly marketed as transcending national borders. As one 
French television magazine put it, “On the nights of the prime, Star Academy 
welcomes stars from around the world and becomes one of Europe’s larg-
est variety shows” (Roque, December 15, 2007, p. 19). As MC Nikos Aliagas 
started the prime with greetings to the show’s “international audience” or to 
“those who watch us from abroad,” as he welcomed international stars onto 
the set as if he had always known them, and easily conversed with them (in 
five different languages) against a visual background of hybrid (trans)cultural 
references— gangsters in U.S. streets, samurai in full gear, Latin dancers— the 
show’s narrative actively engaged the global. Just as the candidates (re)pre-
sented themselves to the viewers who would ultimately have a chance to “vote 
them off the island” (or, in this case, the academy), Star Academy (re)presented 
French national/cultural identity to an imagined global audience.
This reality TV version of “French” identity served to position France not 
only as a country reconciled with potentially contentious elements of its socio- 
cultural context but also as a significant and benevolent global player. The em-
phasis on the global nature of the primes in the larger cultural discourse sur-
rounding Star Academy, as illustrated in the quote above, positioned the show 
itself as a prized transnational cultural product. The often- mentioned fact 
that the show was able to attract celebrated international stars highlighted 
France’s global cultural influence. If the likes of Madonna, Mariah Carey, 
Sting, and Ray Charles took time out of their busy schedules to perform in 
Star Ac’, France must have been on these artists’ cultural radar. Star Academy’s 
idealized version of smoothly integrated French identity was portrayed as the 
subject of justified global admiration. For example, when Colombian rock 
star Juanes expressed his love for French culture and Star Academy in a short 
conversation in Spanish with Aliagas after performing with candidates, the 
host proceeded to translate as: “he says he loves France, can you blame him?” 
This exchange managed to simultaneously flaunt the “global” admiration for 
French culture (“he loves France”) and secure Greek- born Aliagas’ status as 
safely integrated (“can you blame him?”).
Similarly, the show’s narrative managed to simultaneously position its 
young candidates as French and global citizens equally at ease with iconic 
elements of French culture and with a vast array of globalized hybrid cul-
tural forms. They could rap with 50 Cent and Passi,8 rock with (Colombian) 
Juanes, (Australian) Kylie Minogue, and (French) Johnny Hallyday, sing du-
ets with (Canadian) Celine Dion, (American) Beyoncé, (Barbadian) Rihanna, 
and (French) Michel Sardou. They wrote and performed their own songs in 
multiple languages and multiple genres and casually chatted with interna-
tional stars. They emerged as perfect examples of 21st- century cosmopoli-
tanism at its best. In fact, they were simultaneously producing “French” cul-
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ture— as noted, Star Ac’ candidates frequently go on to have successful singing 
careers9— and positioning it as global. In a culture insecure about its position in 
the world where every hint of continuing transnational influence is noted and 
celebrated,10 Star Academy (re)assured its audience that France is not only alive 
and well, but also globally influential. Ultimately, it served to reconcile view-
ers with various contested arenas of France’s contemporary socio- cultural en-
vironment and with globalization— all at the same time.
Jost (2007) argues that reality television claims to abolish the distinction 
between the “régions antérieures”— the “front stage” where social represen-
tation takes place— and the “régions postérieures”— the “back stage” where 
social actors would normally be protected from judgment. When inviting 
viewers into the back stage of popular music production in its daily broad-
casts, Star Ac’ also invited them into the back stage of “French” culture. Just as 
it constructed life at the academy as an “authentic” depiction of what goes on 
in show business and offered the candidates’ everyday behavior as a reflection 
of their “authentic” selves— as opposed to the primes during which they were 
ostensibly asked to perform— Star Academy constructed the daily broadcasts as 
“authentic” representations of French culture. Viewers familiar with the “in-
digenous” practices and cultural heritage it celebrated were invited to enjoy 
them as insiders. The “front stage” of the weekly primes transposed these 
representations onto the global stage where “French culture” was performed 
through the candidates’ interactions with the global and was ultimately of-
fered for global consumption.
The show’s distinction between the two— just as reality TV’s claim to take 
viewers behind the curtain of celebrity construction— was, however, illusory. 
Star Academy’s idealized version of local/national “French” identity was not 
developed in opposition to the global. It was engaged in a symbiotic relation-
ship with it. The front stage/global and the back stage/local are two sides of 
the same coin— one cannot exist without the other.
What Hybridity? Deconstructing the “Real”
The specific dynamics of this symbiotic relationship are worth briefly explor-
ing before closing this chapter. In addition to illustrating the ways in which 
the local, national, and global are mutually constituted in contemporary cul-
tural forms, the case of Star Academy in France points to the strategic nature 
of these constructions. As noted, Star Academy’s handling of race relations 
served to support an idealized vision of France as a color- blind nation where 
all citizens are treated as equally “French.” This version of “reality,” which 
powerfully contrasts with the racial tensions that permeate the French social- 
cultural landscape, served to suggest (to both local/national and global audi-
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ences) that France was living up to its promise of racial integration. The na-
ture of the candidates’ racial and ethnic identities was, however, frequently 
actively discussed in the larger cultural discourse surrounding the show. The 
Lebanese origin of one of the candidates generated intense online debate in 
the show’s seventh season. Viewers sometimes supported a particular candi-
date because of her/his racial/ethnic makeup, or geographic origin. These dis-
cussions were neither denied nor confirmed (nor even acknowledged) by the 
show’s producers or the candidates, but they illustrate the constructed and 
contested nature of Star Academy’s representations.
Similarly, because the show featured an equal number of male and fe-
male participants, it necessarily dabbled in gender constructions. In fact, 
Star Academy’s portrayal of male and female performers drew heavily on com-
mon gender (and racial) stereotypes. For instance, while the show’s official 
website described Alice, one of the finalists of the eighth season, as “a pretty 
and graceful princess,” Mickels, her male adversary who beat her in the last 
prime, was deemed “a good friend who knows how to help everyone get 
along” and who “easily adapts to communal life despite his assertive style.” 
Yvane (aka Irie Kane), who is of mixed racial makeup, was characterized as 
“virile and with a real physical presence.” However, just as there wasn’t much 
talk about race in Star Ac, there wasn’t much talk about what it means to be 
male or female— despite the fact that the show clearly provided some possible 
clues. This interestingly contrasts with the storm of controversies generated 
by the pan- Arab version of Star Academy (a dedicated fatwa was issued against 
it in Saudi Arabia) surrounding its representations of gender— which scholars 
argue served as a catalyst for public discussions of national identity, cultural 
authenticity, and the meaning of modernity (Kraidy, 2009a). The comparative 
lack of controversy in the French version of the show served, in contrast, to 
position France as a nation comfortably installed in the “posts”— postracial, 
postfeminist, postdiscrimination, postmodern.
Securing this position meant that Star Academy had to engage with the 
global rather selectively. For example, the show tended to position France 
as the leader of a (imagined) global francophone community defined almost 
exclusively in relationship to Quebec. This exclusion of much of the actual 
worldwide French- speaking population served to conveniently evade France’s 
colonial past, the legacy of which is highlighted in the continuing influence 
of the French language in much of North and West Africa and parts of the 
Middle East. It also (over)emphasized France’s influence in the francophone 
community by putting the focus on a relationship defined by a clear power 
differential, especially when considered in the context of the music industry 
where Quebecois artists are faced with the challenge of operating in a much 
smaller national market than their French counterparts.
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This partial construction of the global francophone community is par-
ticularly interesting in light of the fact that the Star Academy format has been 
adapted with extreme success in the Arab world and Africa, often as a direct 
consequence of the success of the “original” French version (Kraidy and Mur-
phy, 2008). One might think that producers could find an economic advan-
tage in more assertively linking the French show to these varied global incar-
nations, especially since a large segment of France’s viewing audience has 
strong cultural ties to the areas of the world they represent. The performances 
of Tunisian Nader Quirat and Saudi Arabian Abdul Aziz Abduhamid, respec-
tive winners of the fifth and sixth seasons of Star Academy in the Arab world, 
or that of Moroccan Hajar Hadnan who triumphed in Star Academy Maghreb in 
2007, remained, however, outside the frame of the French version’s imagined 
reality. Not all hybridity, in other words, was treated equally on the show.
This process of strategic negotiating of the local/national/global nexus is 
not unique to the French context. Kraidy’s study of Star Academy’s pan- Arab 
version as a text that “confounds the boundaries between the ‘domestic’ and 
the ‘foreign,’ between what is ‘Arab’ or ‘Islamic’ and what is alien” (2009a, p. 
111) points to equally contentious dynamics. A similar process is also at work 
in much Japanese popular culture (Ivy, 1995), particularly in television with its 
heavy emphasis on allegedly unscripted “live”11 shows. When the five mem-
bers of the popular all- male band SMAP perform (in different languages) on 
the stage of their variety show’s studio with the most popular international 
star of the moment (as they have been doing every Monday night since 1996), 
when they sit down afterward for a short casual chat with their guest (through 
the intermediary of an interpreter), their performance is certainly reminiscent 
of that of Star Academy’s candidates on prime night.
Scholars have noted that the genre of reality television complicates the no-
tion of reality by actively engaging viewers in its negotiation. Rather than sim-
ply pretending to straightforwardly “represent” reality, reality TV proposes to 
take viewers behind the curtain of its construction to create a “more ‘know-
ing’ relationship” with its audience (Kilborn, 2003, p. 60; see also Ouellette 
and Murray, 2004). They point to the audience’s ability to deconstruct what 
is presented by producers as “real” through the recognition of processes of 
mise- en- scène, editing, and other forms of manipulation. They note that the 
search for “authentic” or emotional moments that escape producers’ con-
trol— as when candidates fail to perform in accordance with the mediated 
selves they (and/or the producers) have carefully crafted— is an important 
and pleasurable subtext of the genre. Thus, it is important to keep in mind 
that viewers might actively engage with reality television and deconstruct its 
representations.
Scholars also argue, however, that reality TV’s questioning and commodi-
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fication of the real contribute to a decline in symbolic efficiency— in our abil-
ity to relate to things we cannot see with our own eyes— and to a trivializa-
tion of the banal, which “surfs on the idea that anything is possible, that the 
choices of some are as valid as those of others” (Jost, 2007, p. 100). The case 
of Star Academy in France demonstrates that there is danger in such relativism. 
Not all forms of hybridity are positioned as equally valid in globalized cultural 
forms. In fact, the show’s active engagement with the global resulted in very 
specific, and political, characterizations of local, national, and global identi-
ties. In this particular case of the “local” adaptation of a “global” format, “lo-
cal” differences— geography, race, gender— were actually quickly assimilated 
into an idealized version of a putative national identity constructed against the 
backdrop of a selectively envisioned “global” order. In this sense, the adapta-
tion of Star Academy to the French market might be better described as a pro-
cess of nationalization and assimilation— in line with French policies of racial 
integration— than one of localization. Whether or not viewers “bought” these 
constructions is beyond the scope of this chapter (the online discussions 
briefly mentioned above surrounding issues of race and ethnicity suggest that 
not all were sold on the show’s characterizations).
At the very least, however, the case of Star Academy illustrates the dangers 
of conceptualizing globalized cultural forms solely in terms of how they inter-
sect with reified “local” contexts. It encourages us to consider, instead, how 
local, national, and global dynamics are articulated in relationship to each 
other— as mutually constitutive elements— under specific conditions. This 
case study points, in particular, to the need to more assertively consider how 
the negotiation of the global/national/local nexus intersects with the con-
struction of race, ethnicity, and trans- cultural relations in a contemporary era 
characterized by increased virtual interactions and permeated with a height-
ened awareness of processes of globalization— how these dynamics shape, in 
other words, the imagination of the global.
The next chapter further addresses this question. Employing a more 
broadly translocal lens as its analytical tool, it focuses on the news coverage 
of events that generated intense debate about race, ethnicity, and cultural/
national identity in each of the sites that constitute the focus of this book. It 
further explores how the three sites negotiated these particular dynamics in 
relationship to each other and to a broader imagined global community.
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Holier- than- Thou: Representing the  
“Other” and Vindicating Ourselves  
in International News
All nations are, in the end, transnations, indelibly marked by the presence 
of the other nations for and against which they have diacritically defined 
themselves.
— Stam and Shohat, 2012, p. xiv
Unlike reality television, whose engagement with both the global and “the 
real” is often a point of contention, news ostensibly engages in an effort 
to “accurately represent” the global. It proposes to “bring the world” to its 
audiences— think of the “world” section of the New York Times, or the BBC’s 
“world service.” Thus, global news openly and necessarily engages in trans-
national comparisons. Chapter 1 began to explore the multidimensional ways 
in which the global/national/local are mutually constituted in contemporary 
globalized cultural forms, and pointed to the need to further address “the in-
tersecting power lines” (Condry, 2006, p. 2) of this symbiotic relationship. 
This chapter continues this exploration through an examination of how the 
French, Japanese, and U.S. press negotiated the global/national/local nexus 
in relationship to each other in their coverage of dramatic global news events. It 
focuses on three events that generated heated debates about racial and/or cul-
tural dynamics on each of these sites: Hurricane Katrina, the civil unrest that 
shook France in the fall of 2005, and the March 2011 Japanese earthquake and 
tsunami.
Considering how the press covered all three events in all three sites, this 
chapter reflects on how their engagement with “the global” intersected with 
these dynamics. Keeping in mind that “all national comparisons take place on 
transnational territory” (Stam and Shohat, 2009, p. 497), the chapter develops 
a broader reflection on how international news may contribute to a process 
through which “nation- states define themselves with and against other na-
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tions in a diacritical process of identity formation” (Stam and Shohat, 2009, 
p. 475).
Most of the coverage discussed here was drawn from major French, Jap-
anese, and U.S. national newspapers— in particular, the New York Times, Le 
Monde, and Yomiuri Shimbun, even though others were also consulted and will 
occasionally be cited. These newspapers were chosen in part because of their 
similarities despite their different cultural origins: they are national “news-
papers of record” of wide circulation with similar target audiences, and all 
adhere to ideals of objectivity, balance, and fairness. While, certainly, in an 
age of instant online communication these are not the only sources of infor-
mation available to media consumers— and while the relative ability of these 
historically influential news organizations to influence an event’s “prime defi-
nition” (Van Ginneken, 1998, p. 113) may be declining— they nevertheless en-
joy significant name recognition. They also have the resources to send their 
own reporters to the scene of international events, and their websites tend to 
serve as aggregates of citizen footage and, occasionally, news from other or-
ganizations. Conversely, their pieces are frequently reprinted or reposted by 
other media outlets. Each consequently remains a significant and respected 
voice in the global cacophony that inevitably follows events of international 
magnitude.
Both opinion pieces and “hard” news stories were included in the analy-
sis because I was interested in assessing the character of these newspapers’ 
overall discourse about the events examined here. While the majority of articles 
mentioned were drawn from the international/national news sections of these 
publications— and were consequently presented to readers as “objective” 
works of journalism— more analytical pieces also contributed to the broader 
vision of the global/national constructed in their pages. The works of colum-
nists, particularly high- profile individuals— for instance, Nicholas Kristof of 
the New York Times who frequently writes about global issues— cannot easily be 
removed from the larger framework in which they appear. They provide im-
portant additional context to the coverage of national and international events 
and influence the nature of the media’s contribution to the global imaginary.
The next section provides contextual information on global news produc-
tion and justification for the choice of this medium for a translocal/transna-
tional analysis. The chapter then draws a series of parallels between the ways 
in which the three dramatic events were covered in the French, Japanese, and 
U.S. press. It illustrates how the three sites all engaged in a very similar pro-
cess of employing transnational comparisons to downplay the implications of 
crises “at home,” particularly as they related to racial tensions. It also demon-
strates, however, that the French and U.S. discourse about the Japanese disas-
ter further engaged in a process of “othering” Japan by consistently interpret-
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ing Japanese reactions to the event as illustrative of distinctive cultural/racial 
traits. A final section explores how the awareness of the global permeated the 
“local” coverage in all three sites.
News in a Global Context
Concerns over inequalities in global flows of news have historically generated 
much debate. In the 1970s, discussions within the United Nations Economic 
and Cultural Organization pointed to the disproportionate influence of the 
United States and European nations on transnational networks of news pro-
duction and distribution. For a moment, these debates offered a glimpse at 
what a New World Information and Communication Order might look like if 
member nations were to agree to protect all nations’ ability to develop their 
media organizations and cultural production. The United States and Britain’s 
withdrawal from the organization in the mid- 1980s after the release of the 
1980 McBride Commission report, interpreted as an attack on freedom of the 
press and as a threat to these powerful nations’ global business interests, put 
an end to the discussion. The era of extreme deregulation that followed even-
tually reached even those nations (including France) originally most opposed 
to treating news and other cultural products like any other commodities to be 
exchanged on the global market— and consequently more amenable to trade 
restrictions and/or government subsidies (McPhail, 2010). While Western 
European nations still tend to boast stronger public media than the United 
States, their media systems are undeniably commercial, and the relative influ-
ence of publically funded news organizations, whose continuing existence is 
often under question, is eroding.
As a consequence of these historical developments, U.S.- style commercial 
news is often taunted today as an admittedly imperfect yet worthy of emula-
tion model of a relatively functional “free press.” In a global context, news is 
typically not seen as a particularly problematic medium. Its claims of veracity 
are more easily accepted than those of, say, reality television. U.S. scholar Wil-
liam Hachten celebrates, for instance, the “growing acceptance of American 
news” (2005, p. 20) as a positive side effect of globalization. Similarly, while 
David Demers recognizes that global media “generally promote Western 
values,” he does not see this as a problem, concluding that “the new global 
media order will be more liberating than disabling” (1999, pp. 166, 169). Or-
ganizations such as the Freedom Forum, which releases an annual survey of 
press freedom around the world, similarly tend to be more concerned with 
state control than with concentration of ownership or heightened commer-
cialism, resulting in an overly positive assessment of “Western- style” com-
mercial news.
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Furthermore, even the most assertive efforts to critically consider the 
power dynamics of global news have tended to remain focused on issues of 
production, ownership, and distribution rather than on its significance as a 
cultural product. Early studies of transnational power struggles, whether sup-
porting or critiquing the “cultural imperialism” thesis, have tended to focus 
on popular cultural texts as a more obvious site of U.S. ideological hegemony. 
Compared to Disney comics (Dorfman and Mattelart, 1971) or Dallas (Ang, 
1985; Liebes and Katz, 1990), news has appeared relatively less problematic.
Finally, the crisis of identity brought about by the Internet and the devel-
opment of blogging, “citizen journalism,” and an increasingly fast- paced 24- 
hour news cycle has more recently led scholars to ponder whether journalism 
is still relevant. Faced with the decline of the most prestigious news organiza-
tions and with experts heralding the death of the newspaper, concerns over 
the survival of the press as an institution have taken precedence over trans-
national power struggles. Besides, the rise of Al Jazeera as a global player 
and the role of social media in the Arab world revolutions seem to suggest 
that a New World Communication and Information Order has indeed been 
achieved. How, specifically, this new order might function is, however, worthy 
of attention.
First of all, it is important to keep in mind that despite the often trans-
national ownership of news organizations, most news content is produced 
with a national or local audience in mind (Tunstall, 2008). Even the BBC World 
Service or the International Herald Tribune— which represent the exception rather 
than the norm in terms of the amount of resources they are able to allocate to 
international coverage— localize their content. National and local newspapers 
may be moving online, they may look less and less like the print publications 
we used to know, but they still exist— at least for the moment. On the other 
hand, the Internet’s space- compressing abilities mean that even the most “hy-
perlocal” content has the potential to reach a broad international audience. 
The relationship between the global and the local in the production and distri-
bution of news has acquired dimensions those involved in the NWICO debate 
could not have anticipated.
Celebratory accounts of the increased diversity of transnational news 
flows— whether originating from national institutions, multinational corpo-
rations, or local citizens— tend to downplay the negative impact of the spread 
of a commercial model of news production that financially benefits the most 
powerful global players. They also serve to distract from continuing questions 
of ideological biases at the national, regional, and global levels. Even the work 
of bloggers or citizen journalists is significantly influenced by the ideological 
context in which it is produced and distributed, if we are to accept Hall’s defi-
nition of ideology as “those images, concepts and premises which provide the 
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frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand, and ‘make 
sense’ of some aspect of social existence” (Hall, 2011, p. 81).
Research suggests that such biases are likely to take on greater proportions 
when considered in a transnational context. Because international events are 
less likely to fit definitions of newsworthiness because of their geographical 
distance (de Beer and Merrill, 2008) and because they are more difficult and 
expensive to access, their reporting is particularly vulnerable to institutional 
and organizational pressures. Reporters struggling to make sense of a foreign 
environment in the limited time allotted to cover a story are also more likely to 
draw on familiar paradigms to interpret what they are witnessing. Studies of 
war coverage have shown, for instance, that reporting often loses all pretense 
of objectivity to separate the world into “us” vs. “them” camps regardless of 
the complex underlying nature of the conflict at hand (de Beer and Merrill, 
2008).
Relatively recent events taking place in the three nations that constitute 
the focus of this book offered interesting opportunities to examine the pro-
cess of ideological construction in news production. First, the coverage of 
Hurricane Katrina (which took a disproportionately heavy toll on African 
American victims in the southern United States in September 2005) and the 
racial unrest that shook France just a few weeks later following the deaths of 
two youths of African descent (electrocuted when they entered a voltage trans-
former while fleeing the police) provided a unique perspective on the internal 
negotiation of racial dynamics in relationship to the global. Aside from taking 
place within months of each other, these two events engendered similar de-
bates over the structural inequalities of race and poverty on the socio- cultural 
landscape of the two nations in which they took place as well as in the heavy 
international coverage they received. More recently, the earthquake and tsu-
nami that struck Japan’s Northwestern region in March 2011, and the major 
nuclear disaster that followed, propelled Japan to the forefront of the inter-
national news scene, generating discussions over the nature of Japanese na-
tional and cultural identity both locally and globally. Considering how these 
events were covered in all three cultural contexts in relationship to each other 
gives us a chance to further explore the symbiotic relationship between the 
global, national, and local discussed in chapter 1 and how it intersects with 
the negotiation of racial and cultural dynamics.
General Patterns of Global News Coverage
It is clear that the protests that rocked France in the fall of 2005 were not as 
much of a “disaster” (except, perhaps for the political figures who had to deal 
with the situation) as a category 3 hurricane, or one of the most powerful 
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earthquakes ever recorded— followed by a tsunami and a major nuclear ac-
cident. A number of common themes, however, quickly evolved in the cover-
age of these events, pointing to the standardized nature of news production 
and globally accepted definitions of newsworthiness. Early coverage focused 
on grim descriptions of the situation and on the rising estimated number of 
deaths or injured in all newspapers, regardless of where they were published 
and what event they described. Business reporters soon moved on to reflect on 
the possible economic implications of the situation. Critiques of the respec-
tive governments and institutions involved in trying to deal with these differ-
ent crises naturally followed. More positive stories focused on the heroic acts 
of firefighters, doctors, military personnel, and private citizens in the face of 
adversity provided relief from the otherwise somber narrative and helped bal-
ance the newspapers’ editorial mix.
Even the coverage of the unrest in the French banlieue (disadvantaged 
suburbs) was often eerily similar to descriptions of New Orleans in Katrina’s 
aftermath. For instance, while Le Monde described New Orleans as a city “un-
der siege” where “faced with looters, the national guards have received the 
order to shoot and kill” (Chaos en Louisiane, September 3, 2005), the New York 
Times noted that “a police station was ransacked, a garage was set on fire and a 
shopping center and two schools were vandalized” and that “Riot police have 
used tear gas and rubber bullets to repel the attacks” (Smith, November 5, 
2005) after clashes near Paris.
Differences also quickly emerged, however, in the discourses the French, 
Japanese, and U.S. press constructed in reaction to these different events. On 
the most general level, and despite the heart- wrenching tales of devastation, 
death, and violence, the coverage of these tragedies tended to be proportion-
ally more positive when the event took place “at home” than abroad. Thus, 
while tales of heroism were present in all the newspapers, they appeared most 
frequently in the New York Times’ coverage of Katrina and in Yomiuri’s coverage 
of the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident. Within this theme, the na-
ture of the coverage was also different.
For example, an account in Le Monde of the struggle at New Orleans’ 
Charity Hospital positively portrayed doctors keeping patients alive without 
electricity or water, but its portrayal of the police and military forces that ul-
timately came to their rescue was much less flattering. The article spoke of 
police boats and helicopters patrolling near the hospital who did not “seem 
to have any interest” in those inside: “I was wondering what they had to do 
that was more urgent than coming to get us. I would like to know who de-
termined the emergency workers’ priorities,” said one of the doctors inter-
viewed (Eudes, September 18, 2005). The article further noted that when a 
National Guard helicopter did arrive three days later, the soldiers’ first ac-
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tion was to threaten to shoot doctors whom they had mistaken for looters. 
The report closed with three paragraphs on how the state subsequently tried 
to shut down Charity, described as the only hospital in New Orleans to treat 
uninsured and poor patients. In contrast, the New York Times offered an up-
beat account of the same situation, noting that “morale was good” and that 
there was “plenty of peanut butter and cornflakes to go around” (Abelson 
and Feuer, September 1, 2005, 16A). The National Guard’s rescue efforts were 
depicted as proceeding smoothly. A later follow- up story described doctors’ 
heroic cleanup efforts and struggles with state legislators to keep the facility 
open (Nossiter, December 17, 2005).
Along the same lines, Le Monde described the New Orleans police depart-
ment as made up of “some heroes . . . some people overwhelmed by the situ-
ation and some deserters” in an article headlined “The New Orleans Police: 
Between Devotion and Falling Apart” (Leser, September 4, 2005). The report 
portrayed the NOPD in such a state of disarray that it led officers to quit, com-
mit suicide, or engage in violence and crime: “Journalists who witnessed vi-
olence against looters were threatened, and some photographers’ materials 
were taken and destroyed. According to unverifiable rumors, some members 
of the NOPD would have become looters themselves and fled in vehicles full 
of their plunder.” In contrast, while acknowledging the suicides and high 
number of officers who “simply walked off the job,” the New York Times pro-
vided a more upbeat personal account of a sergeant who, “unlike some other 
officers who have succumbed to the pressure . . . said he was not going any-
where except into the streets to do his job” (Treaster and DeSantis, September 
6, 2005, p. 21A).
Overall, the French and Japanese press provided a much more somber de-
scription of the situation in New Orleans— “There were bodies floating in riv-
ers or abandoned on city streets. Makeshift refugee centers overflowed with 
people, yet there was no food, water or personnel to help them. Looting broke 
out as desperate people struggled to stay alive. A major city in the richest 
country in the world descended into anarchy,” wrote the Japan Times shortly 
after the disaster (Katrina’s Grim Reminder, September 7, 2005)— than the 
American newspapers where gloomy accounts of death and destruction were 
mitigated by these more positive descriptions of heroic acts.
A similar pattern was found in the Japanese press following the earth-
quake and tsunami, where less than a month after the disaster, numerous 
articles already focused on life returning to normal— from evacuees return-
ing home (Final Miyakejima Evacuees Return Home, April 2, 2011) to the re-
opening of a tsunami- hit soy sauce factory (Mizuno, April 3, 2011) or of a local 
mall (Aeon Store Reopens in Disaster- hit City, April 1, 2011). Tales of sorrow 
were also more frequently mitigated by upbeat accounts with such headlines 
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as “Giving kids something to smile about” (Yako, April 9, 2011) or “Hospital 
emerges as center of hope” (Takakura and Hinatani, March 28, 2011), tales of 
miraculous rescues— “Survivors fete miraculous return to life” (Uesugi et al., 
March 30, 2011), “‘My grandma is inside!’ Teen escapes rubble after 9 days” 
(March 22, 2011), “Miracle rescue, 9 days later” (March 22, 2011)— and tear-
ful reunions— “Mother smiles again after being reunited with son” (Inoshita, 
April 16, 2011). A series of stories even detailed the miraculous rescue of a dog 
(Dog Rescued from Debris, April 3, 2011) and the process of reuniting him 
with his owner (Rescued Dog Reunites with Owner, April 6, 2011). A short 16 
days after the disaster, an article already assured readers that eventually “the 
kids (and parents) will be all right,” concluding that “with extra effort and 
care, a stressed child can be dancing and singing again for no other reason 
than feeling like it” (Mark, March 27, 2011).
Furthermore, while all newspapers questioned the response of their na-
tional government and/or institutions to the dramatic events taking place lo-
cally, the intensity of these critiques did not match the negative judgment they 
reserved for foreign officials: “Officials at every level of government— from 
the mayor of New Orleans to the president of the U.S.— bickered and stum-
bled from one moment to the next. The natural disaster was compounded by 
human failure. Although the storm’s path was plain, New Orleans officials 
did not order the evacuation early enough; nor did they provide sufficient at-
tention to the fate of those too poor to leave. State officials did not deploy the 
National Guard in time,” wrote the Japan Times in the wake of Katrina (Ka-
trina’s Grim Reminder, September 7, 2005; see also Leser, September 4, 
2005).
A few years later, the New York Times and Le Monde would similarly discuss 
the failures of the Japanese government’s handling of its own crisis, with such 
headlines as “A political response without a compass” (Pons, March 17, 2011), 
“The tsunami forces Japan to rethink its political response” (Souyri, March 15, 
2011), “Experts had long criticized potential weakness in design of stricken 
reactor” (Zeller, March 16, 2011), or “In Tokyo, a dearth of candor” (Tabuchi, 
Belson, and Onishi, March 17, 2011). One French report claimed that “the 
authorities offered confusing reports and avoided providing any details” and 
added that “the government shares responsibility for this indecisive commu-
nication with Tokyo’s electric company” (Mesmer, March 16, 2011). Or, as one 
New York Times article simply concluded: “While national news media and op-
position politicians have been quick to criticize Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s 
handling of [the crisis], at least some residents said they had low expectations of 
the central government to begin with” (Fackler and Inoue, March 19, 2011, empha-
sis mine). French and American newspapers also occasionally critiqued the 
Japanese media coverage of the disaster, particularly as it related to the nuclear 
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accident at the Fukushima power plant (see, for example, Bouthier, March 21, 
2011; Onishi, June 25, 2011), suggesting in the process that they were doing a 
better job at providing detailed and accurate information.
In other words, no matter where it originated, the press tended to do a 
better job at identifying other nations’ failures than at recognizing such fail-
ures “at home.” While, certainly, all newspapers were at times critical of 
their national institutions— including the Japanese press (notwithstanding 
the French and U.S. newspapers’ assertions otherwise)— these critiques did 
not reach the intensity they reserved for their assessment of tragic situations 
abroad. Most importantly, their interpretation of the nature and meaning of 
these failures significantly differed, a point to which I now turn.
What a Disaster! International Coverage and National Failure
In a nutshell, if press coverage of national events tended to blame individu-
als and/or institutions— George W. Bush, Nicolas Sarkozy, Naoto Kan, FEMA, 
TEPCO— for inadequately handling the situation, international coverage of 
these crises interpreted them as national failures.
For instance, Japanese and French newspapers portrayed the extreme 
damage caused by Katrina as an embarrassing reminder of the United States’ 
declining global influence, a shameful indication of the failure of its outdated 
social system made obvious to the rest of the world by the international at-
tention the disaster garnered. Noting that several commentators deemed the 
situation a national shame (Lesnes, September 4, 2005; Salle, September 8, 
2005), Le Monde described the United States as a humiliated (Lesnes, Septem-
ber 4, 2005), humbled, and vulnerable nation (Vernet, September 9, 2005) 
forced to face its internal “social fractures” and loss of global power (Lesnes, 
September 3, 2005). As one article concluded a mere four days after the hur-
ricane hit: “Americans witness with consternation this new demonstration of 
the vulnerability of their superpower. They also rediscover the growing pres-
ence of inequalities and misery in the United States” (Chaos en Louisiane, 
September 3, 2005). A few days later, another story bore the headline: “After 
Katrina, America wonders about the failures of its model” (Salles, September 
8, 2005). The Yomiuri Shimbun suggested that the United States was “humbled 
by nature” and that “the hurricane highlighted the weak points of the super-
power” (A Year of Natural Violence, December 29, 2005).
The U.S. and (to a lesser extent) Japanese coverage of the riots in France 
and the U.S. and French coverage of the Japanese disaster followed a simi-
lar pattern. For instance, fighting in the Paris suburbs led the New York Times 
to conclude that, “the civil unrest shakes the foundation of the French republican 
ideal” (Sciolino, November 10, 2005, emphasis mine). Noting that “France 
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has been grappling for years with growing unrest among its second- and 
third- generation immigrants” (Smith, November 5, 2005, p. 1A), highlight-
ing “France’s failure to integrate immigrants into the country’s broader so-
ciety” (Smith, November 3, 2005, p. 11A), commenting on the “feelings of 
betrayal” experienced by generations of immigrants (Sciolino, December 12, 
2005, p. 1A) or on the “scandalously high unemployment rate” in France’s 
“crime- ridden housing projects” resulting from its “failed integration model” 
(While Paris Burns, November 8, 2005, p. 26A), the U.S. newspaper presented 
the riots as indicative of the demise of a clearly flawed system.
Likewise, the French and U.S. press portrayed disaster- struck Japan as a 
nation punished for its arrogant refusal to seek international help and in the 
process of receiving a lesson in humility— “The early disarray alarmed the 
United States government enough that it increasingly urged the Japanese to 
take more decisive action, and to be more forthcoming in sharing informa-
tion. Making matters worse was Mr. Kan’s initial reluctance to accept the help 
of the United States, which offered pump trucks, unmanned drones and the 
advice of American nuclear crisis experts,” wrote the New York Times (Onishi 
and Fackler, June 13, 2011; see also Caramel, March 20, 2011). As an official 
interviewed in a New York Times article titled “For Japanese, learning to receive” 
put it, “It is very good for Japanese people to realize that Japan is not alone on 
the Earth” (Haberman, March 15, 2011). As suggested above, the crisis at the 
Fukushima power plant also led the French and U.S. press to reflect on the 
overall failure of Japan’s political system: “Under Japan’s electoral system, in 
which a significant percentage of legislators is chosen indirectly, parties re-
ward institutional backers with seats in Parliament,” wrote the New York Times 
(Onishi and Belson, April 27, 2011; for examples in Le Monde, see Pons, March 
17, 2011; Souyri, March 15, 2011). Again, the “culture of complicity” (Onishi 
and Belson, April 27, 2011, p. A1) the U.S. and French press saw as charac-
teristic of the Japanese context was not simply interpreted as indicative of a 
failure of Japanese business culture, but as a national deficiency— or, as Onishi 
and Belson put it, the result of an overly uncritical national psyche (2011, p. A1, 
emphasis mine).
This bleak assessment of other nations’ total system failures powerfully 
contrasted with the portrayal these newspapers reserved for their own na-
tion’s reaction to disasters abroad. Whether pointing to the support of their 
national government and/or military (see, for example, Fackler, April 14, 
2011; Fackler and McDonald, March 13, 2011, March 15, 2011; Fackler and 
Tabuchi, August 24, 2011), or the benevolent help of various private indi-
viduals and institutions— U.S. athletes (Clarey, March 20, 2011; Shpigel and 
Sandomir, March 12, 2011), “Japantown” restaurateurs (Gordinier, March 30, 
2011)— their efforts to “localize” the story resulted in a highly positive assess-
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ment of their nation’s willingness to pitch in in times of international crises. 
As the New York Times wrote:
In Napa, Calif., residents planned a fund- raiser for Iwanuma, Japan, after 
seeing photographs of the damage caused when the tsunami swept over it. 
In Galveston, Tex., a group stitched blankets for the residents of Niigata to 
protect them against radiation that could fall with the snow and rain there. 
In Tuscaloosa, Ala., residents gathered money for Narashino, a city in To-
kyo Bay. . . . It was an effort repeated across the United States, as towns 
big and small responded to the destruction and lives lost in their Japanese 
sister cities. (Wollan, March 20, 2011, p. 23A)
A few years earlier, article after article had similarly detailed the multiple 
ways in which Japan and France helped the struggling United States in the 
wake of Katrina (see, for example, Coles, September 29, 2005; Government 
to Send Researchers to Louisiana, September 6, 2005; Japan Government, 
Firms Join Relief Effort, September 2, 2005; Japan Ready to Double Hurricane 
Aid, September 7, 2005; Locals [sic] Musicians Support “Big Easy,” Novem-
ber 21, 2005). Stories providing long lists of corporations donating goods 
and services (see, for example, More Japanese Firms, September 5, 2005), or 
highlighting the efforts of volunteers ranging from the Japanese self- defense 
forces to French members of Médecins sans Frontières (Goué, March 20, 
2011; Japan NGO Members to Visit Houston, September 12, 2005) empha-
sized the generosity of local government agencies, corporations, and institu-
tions against the backdrop of other nations’ failures.
Recipients of this generosity were, naturally, portrayed as grateful. Shortly 
after Katrina, a U.S. envoy quoted in the Japanese press described Japan’s 
“tremendous outpouring of support,” adding that “it is very touching for an 
American to receive that kind of support because it just epitomizes the friend-
ship that Japan and the United States enjoy” (U.S. Envoy Schieffer Thanks Ja-
pan for Hurricane Aid, September 9, 2005). An op- ed piece in Le Monde written 
by a U.S. citizen living in France noted that “Americans, once again, found the 
French on their side” and added that “Americans thank their French friends 
for their expressions of compassion and their help” (Stapleton, September 11, 
2005). The New York Times would get its turn six years later to quote a Japa-
nese official assuring the U.S. audience that “Everybody is very much touched 
by the sympathy and generosity of American people” (Haberman, March 15, 
2011). Such coverage not only helped position other nations as struggling and 
humbled— as a French headline put it “After Katrina, the world holds out a 
helping hand to a humiliated America” (Lesnes, September 4, 2005)— but 
also served to position the giving nations as benevolent global citizens.
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Holier than Thou: Racial Tensions at Home and Abroad
The presence of the kind of coverage described above is not particularly sur-
prising considering the tendency across news organizations to attempt to 
localize international news stories and, perhaps, the natural human need to 
feel like one (or one’s nation) is helping alleviate extreme misery in the face 
of disaster. The positioning of these powerful nations in relationship to each 
other through the reporting of tragic events also engendered, however, a 
more subtle and insidious discourse about race and culture both “at home” 
and “abroad.” The issue of race arose most directly in the coverage of Ka-
trina and of the riots in the French banlieues— which happened to take place 
within months of each other. The discourse surrounding the Japanese disas-
ter ostensibly focused on cultural rather than racial issues. However, because 
definitions of Japanese cultural and racial identity are tightly intertwined both 
internally (Kondo, 1990) and globally— think of the “yellow peril”— questions 
of race remained close to the surface, particularly in international press 
coverage.
Race was undoubtedly a significant subtext of Katrina’s global coverage. 
The French and Japanese press clearly characterized the hurricane’s dispro-
portionately heavy toll on the African American community as a racial issue— 
“The majority of the hurricane victims were poor African- Americans . . . The 
disaster areas became lawless and racial discrimination surfaced,” wrote the 
Yomiuri (A Year of Natural Violence, December 29, 2005). They described how 
whites managed to leave while a vast majority of blacks remained behind 
(Eudes, September 4, 2005; Katrina’s Grim Reminder, September 7, 2005; 
Leser, September 4, 2005). They suggested that the government’s slow re-
action had much to do with the color of victims’ skin (Vernet, September 9, 
2005). They included reports of race- related police brutality (Lesnes, January 
18, 2006a), and spoke of accentuating racial tensions (Eudes, September 6, 
2005; Lesnes, January 18, 2006b). As the Yomiuri Shimbun concluded in a re-
port reflecting on the year’s major events, “African- Americans suffered most 
as they lived in the hardest- hit areas. Some people say this highlighted the 
country’s racial divisions and rich- poor gap” (Disasters Top This Year’s News, 
December 30, 2005).
In contrast, only four New York Times articles in the sample of more than 
500 read in detail for this analysis actually exhibited the kind of introspec-
tion America was, according to Le Monde, allegedly drawn into by the disaster 
(Salles, September 8, 2005). One column reflected on the “worsening poverty 
problem” caused by the Bush administration (Kristof, September 6, 2005, 
p. 27A). Another, in the sports section, used the advancement of two Ameri-
cans to the U.S. open semi- finals to ponder the meaning of being American: 
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“Horrifying images since the storm have underscored the reality that there 
are multiple tiers of America and Americans. The images of death, despera-
tion, hopelessness and poverty, flushed into full view, have made many of us 
wonder where this America was hiding” (Rhoden, September 10, 2005, p. 
1D). An article titled “Across U.S., Outrage at Response” similarly reflected on 
the “deep collective national disbelief that the world’s sole remaining super-
power could not— or at least had not— responded faster” to the disaster and 
wondered about its impact on America’s image abroad (Purdum, September 
3, 2005, p. 21A).
These articles, however, fell short of directly addressing the issue of race 
as a contributing factor to the inequalities they recognized as a disturbing 
element of the American social fabric. While Kristof acknowledged that “an 
African- American baby in Washington has less of a chance of surviving its first 
year than a baby born in urban parts of the state of Kerala in India” (2005, 
p. 27A, emphasis mine), poverty’s connection to race was not otherwise ad-
dressed in his column. Rhoden similarly failed to recognize that the “multi-
ple tiers of America and Americans” (September 10, 2005, p. 1D) are, by and 
large, color- coded. Only one report, a collection of reactions from African 
American leaders, noted that “the disaster’s impact underscores the intersec-
tion of race and class” (Gonzalez, September 2, 2005, p. 1A).
If race was the (often unspoken) subtext of stories about New Orleans 
neighborhoods, such articles tended to ostensibly address the issue of urban 
poverty rather than racial discrimination. Scholars have demonstrated that the 
issues of poverty and race are tightly interconnected in the U.S. news media, 
as black urban poor have come to dominate public images of poverty, unem-
ployment, and welfare (Gilens, 1996). In this case, the focus on urban poverty 
allowed the New York Times to avoid directly confronting the issue of racism in 
U.S. society, despite the fact that its photographs of victims demonstrated that 
race certainly had something to do with how much individuals were impacted 
by the disaster. In addition, poverty could more easily be reduced to a personal 
rather than structural problem.
Indeed, a number of New York Times articles painted a rather negative pic-
ture of New Orleans prior to the hurricane as a crime- ridden (Dwyer and Drew, 
September 29, 2005; Herbert, September 8, 2005; Nossiter, November 10, 
2005), corrupt (Dwyer and Drew, September 29, 2005), and chronically dys-
functional (Nossiter, November 4, 2005) city whose poor inhabitants lacked 
proper social skills and exhibited “extraordinary low expectations” (Herbert, 
September 8, 2005, p. A29). These articles implied that Katrina’s poor victims 
were struggling not so much because of structural inequalities in education or 
wages, but because of personal and cultural deficiencies. As Brooks explained 
in an editorial,
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In those cultural zones, many people dropped out of high school, so it 
seemed normal to drop out of high school. Many teenage girls had babies, 
so it seemed normal to become a teenaged mother. It was hard for men to 
get stable jobs, so it was not abnormal for them to commit crimes and hop 
from one relationship to another. (September 8, 2005, p. 29A)
Not surprisingly, Brooks’ suggested solution was also a personal one: “cultur-
ally integrate . . . people who lack middle- class skills into neighborhoods who 
possess these skills and who insist on certain standards of behavior” (September 8, 
2005, p. 29A, emphasis mine).
This discourse resonated with profiles of poor black victims, particularly 
those coming from the hard- hit Lower Ninth Ward. For example, a series of 
three stories published in the New York Times followed the trajectory of one 
family, the Jackson- Browns, from the New Orleans airport as they were being 
evacuated shortly after the storm, to the home of a couple in Pollock, Loui-
siana, who “embraced [them] as family” (Wilgoren, December 13, 2005, p. 
1A), to a shack in a rundown section of Baton Rouge. After explaining that 
the Jackson- Browns’ relationship with the “church going” Pollock couple 
had quickly soured after they asked to buy beer, and that the family was later 
tossed out of a shelter because Mr. Brown had yelled at a volunteer, the final 
article concludes: “This troubled, directionless odyssey is one of opportuni-
ties missed and squandered, of government money and charitable donations 
spent partly on a stack of DVD’s and costume jewelry  . . . of many days doing 
little more than waiting for someone to help” (p. 1A). A relatively more posi-
tive portrayal of another former Lower Ninth Ward resident nevertheless de-
scribed how her mother abandoned her to her grandparents as a toddler and 
portrayed the family’s attachment to a neighborhood “undermined by poverty 
and crime” as somewhat pathological (Sontag, November 5, 2005, p. 9A).
The frequent suggestion in the New York Times that a number of victims 
stubbornly attached to their community simply refused to leave despite orders 
to evacuate further reinforced this subtle rhetoric. As one article concluded, 
victims “refused to leave because they had survived earlier hurricanes, were 
worried about their property or pets, or were simply obstinate” (Dewan and 
Roberts, December 18, 2005, p. 1A, emphasis mine). Coupled with articles 
on white middle- class victims who had evacuated and on white middle- class 
neighborhoods allegedly ignored by the media— such as St. Bernard Parish 
whose citizens complained that they were “as hard hit as New Orleans  . . . 
but got less attention” (Purnick, September 14, 2005, p. 21A)— this discourse 
ultimately implied that victimization was in part due to personal behavior. Af-
ter all, as one headline put it, “The misery is spread equally” (Dao, August 31, 
2005, p. 12A).
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Thus, while the French and Japanese coverage of the hurricane presented 
its disproportionately heavy toll on African American populations as an indi-
cation of the (structural) failure of the American approach to race relations, 
the New York Times portrayed it as having much to do with the specific circum-
stances of the city of New Orleans and the personal life decisions of its in-
habitants. In a pattern frequently observed by scholars (see, for example, van 
Dijk, 1991), the U.S. newspaper avoided directly addressing the larger struc-
tural dynamics of the racial tensions stirred by Katrina’s destruction.
A similar pattern emerged in the coverage of France’s racial tensions— 
except, this time, the roles were reversed. For example (and in stark contrast 
to its Katrina coverage), the New York Times dedicated its largest number of ar-
ticles to racial issues in its strongly worded assessment of the French crisis. 
This led the U.S. newspaper to the same kind of conclusions about the fail-
ures of French society as those drawn about the United States by the French 
and Japanese press in the wake of Katrina. Noting that “France has been grap-
pling for years with growing unrest among its second- and third- generation 
immigrants” (Smith, November 5, 2005, 1A), commenting on the “feelings of 
betrayal” experienced by generations of immigrants (Sciolino, December 12, 
2005, p. 1A) and on the “scandalously high unemployment rate” in France’s 
“crime- ridden housing projects” resulting from its “failed integration model” 
(While Paris Burns, November 8, 2005, p. 26A), the U.S. newspaper inter-
preted the riots as illustrating the fact that France had been wrong all along. 
As one article concluded:
France clings to its cherished approach to immigration, which has been 
to declare that once in France, everyone is French and therefore equal, and 
that’s that. The truth is that everyone is not French, nor equal, especially 
in an era of soaring immigration. (In Paris, Tough Talk Isn’t Enough, No-
vember 4, 2005, p. 26A)
In a similar vein, the Japanese Asahi Shimbun concluded that the “shocking 
scenes of rioting in France showing shattered shop windows and cars on fire 
leave us wondering if all this can be happening in an industrialized and democratic coun-
try” (Shocking Scenes of Rioting, November 11, 2005, emphasis mine).
In an interesting rhetorical twist, this indictment of France’s approach to 
immigration also served to shed a positive light on the United States’ han-
dling of racial tensions— much in need of positive reassessment in the wake 
of Katrina. Criticizing France’s harsh denunciation of racism in the United 
States, the New York Times quickly moved to suggest that France’s racial prob-
lem was even greater than that of the United States. As one article titled 
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“French lesson: Taunts about race can boomerang” defensively suggested: 
“The French news media were captivated by Hurricane Katrina, pointing out 
how the American government’s faltering response brought into plain view 
the sad lot of black Americans. But this time the French, who have long criti-
cized America’s racism, could not overlook the parallels at home” (Tagliabue, 
September 21, 2005, p. 4A). The article goes on to describe France’s failure to 
integrate black immigrants, adding that many “strike off for Britain, Canada 
and the United States, where they think they will find greater opportunities” (p. 4A, 
emphasis mine).
Descriptions of France’s position on assimilation similarly suggested that 
American- style multiculturalism and affirmative action— rendered illegal by 
France’s policy of color blindness discussed in chapter 1— were ultimately 
better, even if imperfect, solutions. A report comparing the British and French 
positions on immigration painted a positive picture of Britain’s handling of 
racial crises, “that in some ways echoes America’s response to its own urban 
racial disturbances,” and which encourages Britons to “embrace ethnic di-
versity” (Cowell, November 20, 2005, p. 4D). As one article concluded, “In 
general, Europe, which has never developed an immigration culture, seems to 
have been less successful than the United States at integrating foreigners and 
giving them a stake in a new national identity” (Bernstein, November 8, 2005, 
p. 7A).1
In contrast (but in a move reminiscent of the U.S. coverage of Katrina), the 
French press focused on individual rather than structural issues in its cover-
age. The blame was placed on then minister of interior Nicolas Sarkozy for 
intensifying the violence with incendiary remarks and for creating tensions 
by supporting an increased police presence in poor neighborhoods (Bron-
ner and Simon, November 2, 2005). The French government was criticized 
for failing to fully implement its integration policies. An article reflecting on 
Jacques Chirac’s proclamation that “children of difficult neighborhoods” are 
“all daughters and sons of the republic” commented: “the problem is that the 
words and the actions of the government largely refute this beautiful procla-
mation” (Bernard, November 19, 2005).
Again, when addressing the problems of unemployment and poverty, Le 
Monde’s writers offered political reforms or personal solutions— such as Sar-
kozy’s resignation (Blum, November 11, 2005), new urban and employment 
programs (Bronner and Kessous, March 23, 2006; Delberghe, November 
6, 2005), and voter registration drives (Kessous, November 20, 2005)— but 
failed to consider an overall (re)assessment of France’s approach to immi-
gration and race relations. Even police brutality, widely discussed in both 
newspapers as a contributing factor to the violence, could, according to Le 
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Monde, be remedied with better training: “police officers [are] too young, 
without professional experience, and ill- equipped to deal with the problems 
faced by youths,” stated one report arguing for reforms (Chaillou, January 
17, 2006).
Furthermore, in a rhetorical turn similar to that taken just a few months 
earlier by the New York Times in its Katrina coverage, the French press ad-
dressed racial discrimination through descriptive and personal profiles rather 
than in broader analytical pieces considering its social and historical roots. 
While overall sympathetic to the protesters— as when portraying the pain of 
the two families who lost loved ones (Smolar, November 11, 2005) or deeming 
the disenfranchised youths’ anger at the police and government largely justi-
fied (Bordenave and Kessous, November 8, 2005; Ceaux, November 4, 2005; 
Davet and Lhomme, November 11, 2005)— it nevertheless brought the issue 
of race back to a more personal level.
For example, while a profile featuring the family of a young man beaten 
by the police after he threw rocks at firefighters described the difficulties of 
integration encountered by his parents— “the condition of Algerian was not 
always easy to bear,” the report notes (Chemin, November 16, 2005)— it also 
tells the more successful story of the young man’s sister who “passed her 
baccalaureate at the Lycée Jacques- Brel in La Courneuve before registering 
at Paris- VIII University in Saint- Denis, where she is pursuing a bachelor’s in 
communication,” suggesting that integration, if difficult, is not impossible. 
Another report that focused on a group of youths condemning the violence 
quoted a Muslim leader as stating: “We have more rights here than in our 
country of origin” (Kessous, November 6, 2005), while other sources in the 
story blamed the unrest on children’s failed education and parents’ lack of 
care— “When a neighborhood is burning and you know that your kid who is 
11, 12, even 15 isn’t at home, what the heck is he doing outside?” Thus, in 
contrast to the U.S. and Japanese press’s interpretation of the crisis as indica-
tive of the failure of the French Republic’s ability to adhere to its much- touted 
egalitarian (and, allegedly, color- blind) model, the French newspaper sug-
gested that the ideals of liberté, égalité, and fraternité could be saved with a few 
political reforms and a healthy dose of personal determination.
Reflections on the Japanese National Psyche— or, How Those 
Japanese Are Not Like “Us”
Because of Japan’s alleged racial homogeneity— which, as we will see later 
in this book, is actually a point of contention— the discourse surrounding Ja-
pan’s natural disaster and the ensuing nuclear crisis focused less ostensibly 
on issues of race. The international coverage of the event quickly morphed, 
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however, into a discussion of various aspects of Japanese cultural/national iden-
tity that eventually followed a pattern similar to that found in the coverage of 
the French and U.S. contexts. If reports of workers risking their lives to save 
the Fukushima plant were reminiscent of the coverage of Katrina’s “heroes” 
a few years earlier, they differed in that the French and U.S. press character-
ized the behavior of these “heroes” as a prototypical Japanese cultural trait— 
notwithstanding much evidence suggesting that individuals in a different 
cultural environment would probably have done the same thing. In an article 
describing 50 workers who chose to stay at the Fukushima facility the New York 
Times noted, for instance, that “jobs in Japan confer identity, command loy-
alty and inspire a particularly fervent kind of dedication.” Even after quoting 
a former senior operator at three U.S. power plants as saying that “he had no 
doubt that in an identical accident in the United States, 50 volunteers could be 
found to stay behind after everyone else evacuated from an extremely hazard-
ous environment,” the newspaper concluded: “But Japanese are raised to be-
lieve that individuals sacrifice for the good of the group” (Bradsher and Tabu-
chi, March 16, 2011, p. A1). One Paris Match front- page report even compared 
the plant operators to World War II kamikaze, quoting one of them as saying 
that he chose to stay behind for the good of his country (Byrka, April 8, 2011).
Scenes of life in shelters and individual profiles of victims were similarly 
replete with references to Japanese national and cultural identity. Titles such 
as “The Striking Self- Control of the Japanese” (Pons, March 15, 2011), “The 
Poignant Heroism of the Japanese” (Lachaud, March 17, 2011), or “The Jap-
anese Could Teach Us a Thing or Two” (Kristof, March 20, 2011) suggested 
that there was something quintessentially Japanese about victims’ responses 
to the disaster. Articles spoke of “the stoicism and self- sacrifice; the quiet 
bravery in the face of tragedy that seems almost woven into the national character” 
(Wines, March 26, 2011, p. A1, emphasis mine), of a “national obsession with 
self- restraint” (Belson and Onishi, March 28, 2011, p. A13), of a “national 
honor code” (Kristof, March 20, 2011), of “Japan’s communal spirit,” “tidy 
perfectionism,” “proud cooperative spirit,” and “strong sense of community” 
(Fackler, March 17, 2011, p. A12; March 24, 2011, p. A13). After characteriz-
ing pre- disaster Japan as “a country lulled by the reassuring rhythms of order 
and predictability” one New York Times report concluded that “the Japanese” 
were now “trying to uphold the ethic that they are taught from childhood: to 
do their best, persevere and suppress their own feelings for the sake of the 
group” (Belson, March 16, 2011, p. A1). As Le Monde put it: “The Japanese do 
not express pain or rebel against the inexorable. They suffer silently” (Pons, 
March 15, 2011).
While these reports were (initially) generally positive, at least when com-
pared to the vitriolic assessments of the failures of the U.S. and French na-
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tional systems described above, their sweeping generalizations about the 
nature of “the Japanese” deserve critical consideration. On the most obvious 
level, this focus on nebulous notions of an archetypal “Japanese spirit” is 
highly essentializing. It feeds common stereotypical visions of the Japanese 
population as homogeneous and of Japanese culture as both highly conform-
ist and exotic— the New York Times just had to focus an entire front- page story 
on the fate of an 84- year- old geisha who escaped the tsunami (Onishi, April 
5, 2011). Perhaps more disturbingly, this discourse powerfully resonates with 
common prejudiced characterizations of Asian racial identity as disciplined, 
conformist, traditionalist, submissive, and dreadfully non- assertive when 
compared to their “Western” counterparts— as when Kristof describes a Japa-
nese game of musical chairs as “the most polite, most apologetic, and least 
competitive game of musical chairs in the history of the world” (March 20, 
2011, p. 11) in an article titled “The Japanese could teach us a thing or two.”
Indeed, behind the praise of the Japanese national spirit and the amaze-
ment at victims’ ability to stoically endure lies the thinly veiled suggestion that 
the Japanese are fundamentally different from “us,” the imagined (presum-
ably majority white) “Western” audiences of these French and U.S. national 
newspapers. In other words, by emphasizing Japanese difference, the dis-
course of the French and U.S. press contributed to the normalizing of “West-
ernness” (as an imagined construct linking the two nations) and, by exten-
sion, whiteness (with which “Westernness” is typically associated) in a global 
context.
There certainly are cultural differences between Japan and France or the 
United States. There is also a grain of truth to the assertion that Japanese so-
ciety is particularly well organized and community oriented— considering the 
population density of the country, it would be quasi- impossible to function 
otherwise. What was problematic, however, in the French and U.S. coverage 
of the disaster was the extent to which the trope of Japanese national iden-
tity/spirit became the only explanatory factor for all of the actions of tsunami 
victims— from their ability to organize themselves in order to survive (Fackler, 
March 24, 2011) to their desire to take a hot bath (Fackler, March 17, 2011; 
Wines, March 26, 2011).
In addition to feeding stereotypes about Japanese cultural/national/
racial identity, this exclusive focus resonates with strategic acts of self- 
representation on the part of Japanese proponents of a nationalistic and con-
servative discourse about Japanese purity and uniqueness— the Nihonjinron 
(theories about the Japanese) discourse— which scholars have identified as 
highly problematic (Iwabuchi, 2002; McVeigh, 2004). As cultural anthropolo-
gist Dorinne Kondo reminds us, “Collective identities like ‘the Japanese’ or 
‘Japanese concepts of self ’ no longer seem . . . to be fixed essences, but rather 
Holier-than-Thou  •  55
strategic assertions which inevitably suppress differences, tensions, and con-
tradictions within” (1990, p. 10). Incidentally, while Japanese writers some-
times contributed to such reports when those were published in the foreign 
press, sweeping generalizations about the nature of Japanese nation identity 
were virtually absent from the Japanese press, at least in the 1,200 or so articles 
examined for this analysis.2
Furthermore, as the coverage of the disaster shifted in focus from the 
tsunami and earthquake to the crisis at the Fukushima power plant, the tone 
of the French and U.S. press turned more negative. In the face of a nuclear 
breakdown requiring that extreme measures be taken to avoid a potentially 
global disaster, the alleged collectivism, self- restraint, and lack of com-
bativeness of “the Japanese” quickly became a liability. In stark contrast to 
initial reports of a highly organized nation reacting to tragedy with civility 
and discipline, efforts to avert nuclear disaster were described as “frantic,” 
“desperate measures” on the part of a nation “scrambling” to avoid a major 
meltdown “at any cost” (for examples, see Belson, Tabuchi, and Bradsher, 
March 19, 2011; Le Hir and Morin, March 19, 2011; Sanger and Wald, March 
14, 2011; Sanger and Broad, March 18, 2011; Tabuchi and Wald, March 13, 
2011, March 14, 2011). The lack of transparency on the part of the Japanese 
nuclear industry and possible breaches in safety measures were, once again, 
attributed to specifically Japanese socio- cultural traits and interpreted as na-
tional failures.
For instance, one New York Times article compared the Japanese nuclear 
industry to a Japanese village where “Just as in any Japanese village, the like- 
minded— nuclear industry officials, bureaucrats, politicians and scientists— 
have prospered by rewarding one another with construction projects, lucra-
tive positions, and political, financial and regulatory support” (Onishi and 
Belson, April 27, 2011, emphasis mine). Another story suggested that the 
highly disciplined Japanese population was easily manipulated by its au-
thorities, concluding, “As the Japanese continue to search for answers to 
the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, some are digging deep into the 
national psyche and examining a national propensity to embrace a belief now 
widely seen as irrational” (Onishi, June 25, 2011, p. A1, emphasis mine; for 
a similar example in Le Monde see Mesmer, March 19, 2011). Some reports 
more broadly addressed the negative consequences of the Japanese failure to 
challenge authority: “Japan’s ethic of uncomplaining perseverance— gaman, 
in Japanese— may  . . . explain why the country settles for third- rate leaders” 
wrote Kristof (March 20, 2011, p. WK11). Finally, in a rhetorical twist remi-
niscent of the U.S. newspaper’s coverage of the riots in France, the New York 
Times columnist went on to link racial discrimination and racially motivated 
violence to Japanese cultural traits:
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Japan’s tight- knit social fabric can lead to discrimination against those 
who don’t fit in. Bullying is a problem from elementary school to the cor-
porate suite. Ethnic Koreans and an underclass known as burakumin are 
stigmatized. Indeed, after the terrible 1923 earthquake, Japanese ram-
paged against ethnic Koreans (who were accused of setting fires or even 
somehow causing the quake) and slaughtered an estimated 6,000 of them. 
So Japan’s communitarianism has its downside. (Kristof, March 20, 2011, 
p. WK11)
From a hurricane in the United States, to riots in France, to an earthquake, 
tsunami, and nuclear disaster in Japan, the media coverage had come full 
circle.
The Whole World Is Watching: Transnational Comparisons and 
the Awareness of the Global
In their discussion of transnational comparisons Stam and Shohat (2009) 
note that nation- states tend to “project repressed historical memories onto 
the screens of other nations and to search for comparisons that flatter rather 
than those that shame or embarrass” (p. 476). This process was evident in 
the transnational coverage of the three events described here. While the cov-
erage differed at times due to the specific circumstances under which each 
event took place, its most remarkable feature was the striking similarities that 
emerged in the rhetoric employed in all three sites when discussing events 
taking place “at home” vs. those taking place “abroad.”
“Local” coverage followed patterns familiar to media scholars. In the cov-
erage of hurricane Katrina and the riot in France, this included, for instance, 
the linkage of poverty to race (Gilens, 1996), the subtle “blaming of the vic-
tim” (Meyers, 2004), the tendency to link minorities to crime and violence 
(Sommers et al., 2006), and the failure to fully address and the “explaining 
away” (Van Dijk, 1991, p. 16) of the structural underlying causes of the prob-
lems at hand. “International” coverage, on the other hand, readily identified 
other nations’ problems as indicative of a total system failure— of a failure at the 
national level.
The racial subtext of this discourse was particularly striking, supporting 
Stam and Shohat’s suggestion that “cross- national race- related comparisons 
have been instrumental in extremely diverse ways, emphasizing contrasts, 
similarities, or complementarities” (2009, p. 487). Just as Star Academy’s ac-
tive engagement with the global resulted in political characterizations of lo-
cal, national, and global identities, transnational comparisons in press cov-
erage of international events served to reconcile “local” audiences with the 
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politics of race and to strategically position each nation in a broader imagined 
global order.
Indeed, the coverage of all of these events clearly took place against the 
backdrop of a global system of news production and distribution that report-
ers in each cultural environment were obviously aware of. In addition to shar-
ing resources— as when the New York Times started streaming NHK coverage 
of the tsunami on its website— different news organizations commented on 
each other’s coverage and frequently detailed, often with much concern, how 
the international press was representing their respective nations (see, for ex-
ample, Bernstein, September 4, 2005; Leser, November 15, 2005; Purdum, 
September 3, 2005; Yamada, March 28, 2011).
While the translocal comparison provided here demonstrates how the 
three sites negotiated these dynamics in relationship to each other, it is worth 
noting that the discourse of the press also interestingly served to set these 
three powerful nations apart as a group from nations where, the coverage sug-
gested, this kind of failure might be routinely expected. A New York Times ar-
ticle contrasted, for instance, the “trained population” of Japan to “the much 
less experienced Southeast Asians, many of whom died in the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami because they lingered near the coast” (Glanz and Onishi, 
March 12, 2011, p. A1). Another report noted that “it is sobering that such ca-
lamities could so badly hurt Japan, a technologically advanced nation that puts 
great emphasis on disaster mitigation” (Japan’s Multiple Calamities, March 
15, 2011, p. A34, emphasis mine).
The coverage suggested that the scenes of dead bodies floating in New Or-
leans, of cars burning in the French banlieues, or of workers frantically at-
tempting to avert a nuclear disaster were so shocking and humiliating because 
they were reminiscent of scenes one might encounter in “less developed” 
nations— as one source put it in a New York Times report, “It really makes us 
look very much like Bangladesh or Baghdad” (Purdum, September 3, 2005, p. 
A1). Whether describing New Orleans as a city “converted into a Third World 
city” (Lesnes, September 3, 2005), or images of the refugee camps of the To-
hoku region as “not so different from those we can see in developing coun-
tries” (Caramel, March 20, 2011), the coverage of these events set up a clear 
dichotomy between powerful nations (where these kinds of things are not 
supposed to happen at all) and less powerful ones (where these kinds of thing 
are expected to happen routinely). If the comparison with less economically 
powerful nations served to illustrate that “the North . . . discovered Souths on 
its own territory” (Mattelart, 2005a, p. 104), it also served to suggest that such 
circumstances were unusual and the result of exceptional events— illustrative 
of a system failure, but of one that was potentially temporary, as opposed to 
that of a “third world” characterized as chronically defective.
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It is the comparison with other “technologically advanced” nations, how-
ever, that ultimately made the vision of the global emerging from the pages of 
these highly respected news organizations particularly powerful in its ability 
to reconcile readers with the potential failures of their own local/national sys-
tems. If even other highly economically developed nations could be shown to 
have failed to adequately respond to their respective crises, readers could be 
reassured that— no matter how badly they might think their nation was doing 
in dealing with its own issues— it was still doing better than virtually anyone 
else in the world.
This translocal comparison of news coverage illustrates the sheer com-
plexity and multidimensional nature of the representations of “the self ” and 
“the Other” in a globalized media environment. It demonstrates that the pro-
cess of localization of dramatic news events taking place “at home” served 
to move the media’s lens away from the national level to cast these events as 
the result of individual rather than structural flaws. In stark contrast, disasters 
taking place “abroad” were most frequently interpreted through a national 
prism— as a result, in other words, not only of the failure of other environ-
ments’ local institutions or political leaders, but of their failure as a nation. 
Transnational comparisons were a crucial component of both of these pro-
cesses as the French, Japanese, and U.S. press negotiated the global/national/
local nexus in relationship to each other. This case study also points (again) to 
the centrality of dynamics of race in the definition of national identities.
Finally, while the similarities between the three sites were striking in their 
swift identification of other nations’ failure and corresponding tendency to ig-
nore the structural dimensions of “local” crises, there were qualitative differ-
ences in the nature of the three sites’ relationship to each other. France and 
the United States were particularly quick to identify each other’s failures. Their 
respective newspapers of record spent much time and resources producing 
highly critical reports concentrating on the other nation’s race problem and 
inability to properly handle it. This suggests that the comparison with another 
“Western” nation was a particularly powerful means to reconcile “local” audi-
ences with the contentious dynamics of race “at home.” It also suggests, as 
noted in this book’s introduction, that we need to more carefully attend to the 
ways in which nations traditionally defined as “Western” negotiate their na-
tional identities in relationship to each other, and not just to “the Rest.”
The French and U.S. press also engaged, however, in a process of “other-
ing” Japan by consistently interpreting Japanese reactions to the 2011 earth-
quake and tsunami as illustrative of distinctive cultural/racial traits positioned 
in opposition to those of “the West.” This essentializing discourse on Japa-
nese national identity/psyche/spirit served, in turn, to subtly normalize white-
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ness in the global imaginary by emphasizing the fundamental “difference” of 
the Japanese (racial) “Other.”
The possible “on the ground” consequences of this process of position-
ing are explored in the next chapter. Employing globalized fashion magazines 
as its empirical starting point and turning to Japan as a site of reception, it 
considers how Japan’s status as a “non- Western/non- majority white” social 
context might shape its relationship to “the global.” It also develops a more 
focused critique of gender and class dynamics, by examining how the Japa-
nese negotiation of race interlocks with these dimensions in globalized cul-
tural forms and their local negotiation.
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Talking about non- no: (Re)fashioning Race 
and Gender in Global Magazines
Fashion, movies, music, we’re influenced from everything in Japan. We might 
have our own opinion or own identity, but still, we are influenced one way or 
another by these things.
— Chieko, 23
Things are fast now. Now the world has become small.  . . . now with the mass 
media, everyone knows about the new styles immediately.
— Takako, 48
Comparing to when I was young, there are many more opportunities now to 
be exposed to the media, to get information from the media. So the young 
tend to follow the ideas promoted in the media.
— Horie- san,1 47
The last time we went to Harajuku to go shopping, most of the people around 
there were from the countryside. They all had magazines and maps and were 
looking for the shops.  . . . I think that magazines have a strong effect on the 
young, like “I want this” when they’re looking at magazines.
— Oda- san, 52
[When I was young] there were magazines with white models but they were 
the magazines that were from foreign countries, like Elle or Vogue that were 
imported to Japan and I read those.
— Takako, 48
The quotes above illustrate the extent to which global media have entered 
individuals’ daily lives in an increasingly fast- paced world that “has become 
small.” We have seen, however, that the hybrid cultural forms that emerge 
from our coincident engagement with the global, national, and local are fre-
quently contentious and permeated with power struggles, particularly as they 
intersect with the dynamics of race both locally and globally. This chapter 
turns to Japan as a site of reception to investigate how the global dynamics of 
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race and culture intersect with a local context frequently positioned as a cul-
tural/racial “other” in relationship to Europe and the United States. It consid-
ers both how the global/national/local is discursively negotiated in Japanese 
textual representations and how this global imaginary might shape local sub-
jectivities. Focusing on the highly gendered and consumer- oriented medium 
of fashion magazines, it also reflects on the gendered and class dimensions of 
this negotiation.
After a brief description of the history and continuing influence of fashion 
magazines in a global context, the chapter turns to a more specific explora-
tion of the multiple ways in which culture, race, gender, and the global are 
articulated in Japanese texts. It then moves beyond textual constructions to 
explore how Japanese women negotiate these representations in their media 
consumption. The conclusions drawn in this chapter are based on insights 
gathered throughout my 18- year engagement with the small Shikoku com-
munity described earlier in this book, and particularly through ethnographic 
research specifically focused on women’s engagement with mediated repre-
sentations of beauty and fashion conducted over an 8- month period in 1998– 
99 and followed up with additional series of formal interviews and participant 
observation in 2009 and 2011.
Fashion Magazines as Global Texts
By 1915, the American Vogue already had a British edition. Its French edition 
followed ten years later and, aside from a brief interruption in production due 
to Nazi occupation (Peterson, 1964), has been published ever since. Elle, cre-
ated in 1945 by French journalists and writers Hélène Gordon Lazareff and 
Macelle Auclair, now counts 42 international editions in more than 60 coun-
tries, including Slovenia, Turkey, India, and Thailand, and reaches some 23 
million readers around the globe (Elle: About Us, n.d.). Its Japanese edition 
started in 1969 (Hafstrand, 1995). Cosmopolitan’s 58 international editions 
published in 34 languages are distributed today in more than 100 countries 
(Cosmopolitan, n.d.). It first appeared in France in 1973 and was exported to 
Japan in 1980.
Scholars have demonstrated the historical and cultural significance of 
such magazines in various cultural contexts, pointing, in particular, to their 
role in constructing and perpetuating cultural ideals of womanhood and in 
establishing a female cultural space readers are encouraged to engage in 
through consumption (see, for example, Kitch, 2000; Dollase, 2003, 2008; 
Sakamoto, 1999). Magazines’ function as global texts has not, however, yet 
been as fully explored.
This is in part due to the fact that, as Australian media scholar Jinna Tay 
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contends, “Fashion magazines are one of the most successfully ‘glocalized’ 
or adapted media in the world” (2009, p. 245)— a fact that to some extent 
serves to veil their global status. Indeed, in a manner reminiscent of reality 
television programs (but with a much longer history), globally successful 
fashion magazines heavily rely on formatted content and editorial formulae 
applied transnationally to different international editions in order to “con-
form to certain structural rules which allow their target readership to find 
them” even if their actual content “may be textually different around the 
globe” (Tay, 2009, p. 245). Like reality television, their content is, in turn, 
carefully localized. Hamid Mowlana points, for instance, to “a growing de-
mand for editorial and financial control over imported publications” in such 
places as Japan or Mexico, adding that “Japanese publishers may not only 
press for greater financial control of the imported U.S. . . . magazines, but 
insist that only 50 percent of the content of such magazines be of original 
U.S. copy” (1986/1997, p. 56).
As a result, fashion magazines’ cultural origins easily dissolve into the 
global scape of fashion, glamour, and beauty. As global media scholars Da-
vid Machin and Theo Van Leeuwen note in their comparative study of inter-
national editions of Cosmopolitan, despite differences in language and style 
between localized versions, the magazine ultimately “clearly contributes to 
increased global cultural homogeneity” (2005, p. 588). As they conclude, 
“Although local versions adopt [the Cosmo style] in their own specific ways, 
overall it is a global style. The local languages may differ, but the identities 
and values conveyed by the style do not” (2005, p. 598, emphasis in original). 
While the status of fashion magazines as heavily “glocalized” texts has long 
been recognized, the practical implications of this global homogenization of 
style— the significance of fashion magazines as global texts— are more dif-
ficult to assess. The fact that the global style promoted in magazines is influ-
enced by many magazines’ European and North American origins is particu-
larly significant, as a closer look at the Japanese context illustrates.
White Models and Hybridity in Japanese Fashion Magazines
Whenever I accompany students from the United States to Japan, their sur-
prise at seeing Caucasian faces on billboards or the covers of magazines re-
minds me of my own reaction in early January 1995 when I first stepped out 
of the ferry in the small Shikoku village that was to later become my field site. 
At the time, the face of the white woman advertising facial cream on a small 
rusted metal sign hanging, probably since sometime in the 1950s, outside a 
long- gone general store, or that of Harrison Ford on the window of the lo-
cal liquor distributor, seemed oddly out of place. Now that I have developed a 
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greater familiarity with the many Japanese celebrities used in advertising and 
spent years studying different aspects of the Japanese media, foreign faces 
seem to naturally fit into the hybrid mix that constitutes Japanese popular cul-
ture. Their presence, however, is not devoid of implications.
Of course, the large number of non- Asian models and celebrities on the 
Japanese media market can be explained in part by the global nature of fash-
ion magazines and of the advertising they carry, which constitutes a large por-
tion of their content. Thus, advertising scholars Mariko Morimoto and Susan 
Chang’s discovery, in their analysis of four magazines published in Japan, of a 
congruency “between the use of models from different cultural backgrounds 
and the origins of the publications and the advertisers” (2009, p. 184) is not 
particularly surprising. What is more interesting is their finding that while 
the Japanese editions of the French Marie- Claire (Marie- Claire Japon) and of the 
American Harper’s Bazaar (Harper’s Bazaar Japan) exhibited a higher percentage 
difference in their use of “Western” vs. “Asian” models (94 percent and 6 per-
cent respectively) than the “domestic” Japanese fashion magazines included 
in their study, the latter still featured a much higher percentage of “Western” 
models than “Asian” ones (63 percent vs. 37 percent).
I had reached a similar conclusion when I first turned to the study of Japa-
nese magazines in the late 1990s (Darling- Wolf, 2000a). At the time, I found 
that 41 percent of the models featured in advertising in the bi- monthly non- 
no— one of the oldest and most influential Japanese women’s magazines, 
launched in 1971 by the prominent publisher Shueisha (Sakamoto, 1999)— 
and 33 percent of those found in editorial content were white. The numbers 
for the equally popular an- an were 31 percent and 33 percent respectively. This 
despite the fact that both magazines, as suggested in the quotes opening this 
chapter, are generally perceived as employing fewer non- Japanese models 
than their counterparts of foreign origin.
A more recent unpublished analysis of the French, U.S., and Japanese edi-
tions of Elle conducted in 2009 revealed an even more striking pattern. Only 
about 8 percent of the models featured in the Japanese edition appeared to be 
of Asian descent, while almost 89 percent were Caucasian. These percentages 
remained higher, however, than in the other two editions of the magazine, 
where only 3 percent and 1 percent of the models appearing respectively in 
the U.S. and French versions of the magazine were of Asian descent. In other 
words, the transnational culture of beauty, fashion, and upper- class con-
sumption represented in the pages of global fashion magazines still remains 
white dominated. In addition, while Elle Japan tended to be more inclusive to-
ward the rest of Asia than its U.S. and French counterparts— it included, for 
instance, a spread on fashion in Paris, London, New York, Milan, and Seoul— 
these different geographic environments were all visually integrated into one 
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deterritorialized urban context lacking cultural specificity. Whether in Paris or 
Seoul, models were posed in similar urban scenes, consuming the same kinds 
of globally distributed products.
The equation of white “Westerners” with physical attractiveness and lux-
ury is further accentuated by the fact that “Western models tend to be featured 
more frequently in ads for product categories associated with appearances, 
while Asian models tend to be featured more in ads for services or practical 
products” (Morimoto and Chang, 2009, p. 180). This points to a situation in 
which Japanese producers and consumers find themselves negotiating their 
position as racial and cultural minorities on the global fashion scene. As cul-
tural anthropologist Dorinne Kondo suggests, “fashion provides us with an 
exemplary site for examining the constitutive contradictions of Japanese iden-
tity at a moment when Japan has assumed an acknowledged place as a global 
economic power” (1997, p. 55).
Even Japanese magazines employing relatively fewer non- Asian models 
engage in the construction of an imagined global landscape that intersects 
with racial and gendered representations. The hybrid deterritorialized con-
sumer culture they promote draws from a wide array of cultural influences. 
In a comparative study of non- no and Men’s non- no (its counterpart targeted at 
men launched in 1986) I found that Men’s non- no’s representations of mascu-
linity drew from a seemingly limitless variety of (mostly “Western”) cultural 
contexts (Darling- Wolf, 2006). Cowboys appeared in numerous fashion 
spreads and in ads (of both Japanese and U.S./European origin) for whiskey, 
jeans, cigarettes, and beauty products. (Presumably) “European” dandies 
were depicted as ideals of sophistication in Japanese advertising for French 
and Italian products— a recurring ad promoting the beauty salon “Dandy 
House” juxtaposed a clean- shaven Asian man in a tailored suit with photo-
graphs of a Caucasian model getting a facial. Androgynous (racially Asian) 
British punks posed against the Union Jack and posters of popular British 
bands. Hip- hop- inspired spreads shot in gritty urban environments featured 
gangster- like Asian models and popular Japanese DJs photographed from a 
low angle to make them look more intimidating.
Furthermore, as the same models took on multiple racial identifica-
tions— a black “gangsta” on one page might turn into a Latino lover on the 
next— racial and cultural identities were not only deterritorialized but also dis-
embodied in the magazine’s discourse. This process is facilitated by the fact 
that several of the models Men’s non- no regularly employs (they are identified 
by name and familiar to frequent readers) are of mixed racial heritage. Posed 
alongside less familiar Caucasian or black models in “culturally neutral” ur-
ban environments they serve to further integrate Japanese and gaijin (the term 
used to refer to foreigners, literally meaning “outsider”) into the same global 
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environment of capitalist consumption. This strategic integration of racially 
hybrid “Japanese” models into a symbolically constructed global fashion 
scene ultimately reduces race, ethnicity, and culture to a series of playful iden-
tifications for Japanese consumers to enjoy (Darling- Wolf, 2006).
While such racial representations disturbingly fail to acknowledge the 
global implications of the politics of race/culture by reducing them to things 
one wears or consumes they also help to complicate racial identification. In 
particular, by positioning racially hybrid models as culturally Japanese, Men’s 
non- no underscores the constructed nature of race in Japan. In a nation where 
discourses about racial purity have often historically intersected with con-
structions of national identity (Iwabuchi, 2006), this is a potentially destabi-
lizing discourse.
When Gender and Race Intersect
Interestingly, and in sharp contrast to U.S. publications targeted at a male 
readership, Men’s non- no also displays a rather playful and irreverent attitude 
toward constructions of gender. In keeping with representations of mascu-
linity found throughout the Japanese popular cultural environment (Darling- 
Wolf, 2004) Men’s non- no’s models and the celebrities it features— Gackt, 
Takuya Kimura, Yôsuke Kubozuka, Jun Matsumoto— are frequently highly 
androgynous. The magazine further minimizes gender distinctions through 
a process of “masculinization” of its female models included in fashion 
spreads, who often appear dressed in androgynous attire and posed in simi-
lar poses as their male counterparts (for specific examples, see Darling- Wolf, 
2006— or browse the magazine online at http://www.mensnonno.jp). Again, 
such representations serve to complicate and deconstruct fixed and essential-
izing constructions of gender by pointing to its socially determined and arti-
ficial nature. Just as with race, ethnicity, and culture, however, the magazine’s 
equation of gender- bending with consumption mitigates the potentially em-
powering elements of its representations, as expensive fashion becomes the 
ultimate gender equalizer.
Furthermore, Men’s non- no’s fluid constructions of race, ethnicity, and gen-
der powerfully contrast with those found in non- no, its sister publication tar-
geted at a female readership. Unlike Men’s non- no’s almost exclusively visual 
discourse (the men’s magazine offers very little textual contextualization to 
its fashion spreads) of multiple and ambiguous gendered, racial, and cultural 
identifications, non- no’s discourse is highly gendered. While men are occa-
sionally mentioned or quoted in non- no’s editorial content, they are almost 
completely visually excluded from its pages— male models never seem to ap-
pear, for instance, in fashion spreads— resulting in a discourse that, despite 
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a good amount of talk about love, sex, and boyfriends, privileges female- to- 
female relationships.
The fantasy non- no constructs is one of exclusive female friendship forged 
through the sharing of beauty, fashion, and dieting advice, or through dress-
ing up for parties or excursions in the park. This friendship is presented as 
highly pleasurable, as evidenced by the body language of the female mod-
els laughing, holding hands, or grabbing each other’s neck (Darling- Wolf, 
2006). Noting that magazines such as non- no or an- an emerged in the 1970s 
as new kinds of publications that promoted a single lifestyle— by assuming, 
for instance, that women had a room of their own to decorate— focused on 
female pleasure, Japanese media scholar Kazue Sakamoto points to the sub-
versive potential of such representations at a time when the idea of “young 
women living alone in Tokyo  . . . was quite revolutionary” (1999, p. 181).
The gender identities emerging from this discourse are, however, overall 
far less fluid than those found in the men’s magazine. In contrast to Men’s 
non- no’s vast array of possible “masculinities,” non- no’s constructions of 
femininity draw exclusively from the “cute” (kawaii) ideal of mixed innocence 
and (sexual) maturity evident throughout the Japanese popular cultural en-
vironment (McVeigh, 2000). In the issues I examined, for instance, the ideal 
woman was described as doll- like (oningyou), girly (gâri), thin (hosoi), yet ma-
ture/adult- like (otona- ppoi) and attractive/popular (moteru).
Body monitoring is also a significant subtext of the “girl culture” non- no 
constructs for its readers. In the summer months, women in bathing suits 
posed to accentuate their extreme slenderness appear in almost every spread. 
Articles offer dieting advice or toning exercises. Ads for weight loss programs 
full of “before and after” pictures are a recurring feature both in non- no and 
in other Japanese women’s magazines (Darling- Wolf, 2000a). Finally, while 
Men’s non- no’s discourse is mostly descriptive, non- no’s is highly prescriptive— 
readers are told exactly what to do to achieve the ideal look (for examples, see 
Darling- Wolf, 2006). These findings are in keeping with linguist and anthro-
pologist Miyako Inoue’s identification of early Japanese women’s magazines, 
and the advertising they carry, as instrumental in developing a “chatty” and 
“personable” speech that “came to be normalized as a generic speech style 
of modern Japanese women” and inaugurated “the birth of a new consumer 
body disciplined corporeally to respond to advertisement’s hailing” (2007, 
pp. 537, 544; see also Horioka, 1993).
Most significantly, non- no’s racial and cultural representations are much 
less diverse than those found in Men’s non- no. All models featured in non- no’s 
editorial content in the issues I examined appeared to be Asian and were posi-
tioned as culturally Japanese— even if they were frequently subtly “whitened” 
through makeup and lighting in a process commonly used in Japanese pub-
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lications (Darling- Wolf, 2000a). While female readers are encouraged to em-
brace their Japaneseness in the magazine, physical features typically associ-
ated with a Caucasian racial identity are clearly emphasized— as evidenced by 
the numerous articles explaining how to create the illusion of rounder eyes 
and whiter skin and the ads for eye glue or cosmetic surgery. All models ad-
here to the same standard of beauty: light skin, round eyes, straight nose, 
ultra- slim body. While other possible identifications can certainly be found 
elsewhere in Japanese popular culture— particularly since hip- hop gained 
popularity among young Japanese women— and while white skin has long 
been a standard of beauty in Japan, non- no’s representations of race and cul-
ture powerfully contrast in their limited scope with the racial diversity and cul-
tural hybridity of Men’s non- no’s male models.
Furthermore, whereas Men’s non- no’s hybridity rests both on the racial am-
biguity of well- known models and the assimilation of outsiders of varied eth-
nicities into its overall visual discourse, the latter strategy is missing from non-
 no. Models of different races/cultures (mostly white) are present, yet clearly 
separated from the magazine’s cast of familiar (presumably) Japanese mod-
els. The complexity of this simultaneous process of racial/cultural dichoto-
mizing and integration is particularly striking in non- no’s representations of 
female sexuality. Ideals of childlike/innocent but sexy/knowing Japanese sex-
uality (non- no’s readers are clearly assumed to be sexually active) most power-
fully contrast with the magazine’s more sexually aggressive representations 
of gaijin (foreigners/outsiders). It is also evident in non- no’s frequent portrayal 
of kimono- clad Japanese models enjoying “traditional” Japanese activities. 
While, arguably, the yukata (summer kimonos) sold today as popular fashion 
items in Tokyo’s trendiest department stores have relatively little to do with 
their original incarnation, these representations again contrast with Men’s 
non- no’s complete lack of direct references to more “traditional” elements of 
Japanese culture (despite the fact that men do frequently wear yukata to sum-
mer festivals).
Thus, while encouraging readers to engage in globalized consumption, 
non- no’s gender representations also link femininity to nostalgic definitions 
of Japanese cultural/national identity that serve “to establish national identity- 
building binaries: our cultural heritage/your practical things  . . . Japan/the 
West; and the Japanese/the rest” (McVeigh, 2000, p. 4, emphasis in original). 
More generally, non- no’s discourse illustrates gender’s powerful intersection 
with the negotiation of the global/national/local. As feminist anthropologist 
Susan Ossman puts it, “As women alter their skirts in synch with international 
fashion, their sartorial choices are also asked to stand for national or ethnic or 
religious identities” (2011, p. 21).
In her analysis of former Miss World and Bollywood superstar Rai Aish-
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warya, Parameswaran suggests that Rai’s hybrid form of Whitened/Western-
ized beauty merged with ethnic/traditional upper- class femininity serves to 
“absorb the West in a new transnational economic order” (2011, p. 78). The 
“Westernized” Japanese models in non- no are similarly portrayed as managing 
to “exceed Western standards of beauty” while simultaneously protecting their 
“native” cultural identities from “the contaminating influences of Western 
commodity and entertainment culture” (Parameswaran, 2011, p. 80). Cast in 
the role of “keepers of tradition,” expected to strive for an impossible- to- attain 
“Westernized” physical look, yet encouraged to remain “behaviorally” Japa-
nese, non- no’s female readers face a particularly complex set of expectations.
Contextualizing Magazine Reading:  
Negotiating the Global in Everyday Life
Japanese fashion magazines demonstrate how the negotiation of the local/
national in relationship to the global intersects with the politics of both race 
and gender in popular culture. Scholars have warned, however, that focusing 
solely on magazines’ discursive elements does not fully do justice to the medi-
um’s complex intertextual connection to diverse aspects of consumer culture. 
They have called for more contextualized considerations of magazine reading 
taking into account “other modes of the subject’s relation with media texts” 
(Inoue, 2007, p. 525)— for a more complete analysis, in other words, of the 
“circuit of culture” (Du Gay, 2013, p. xxxi) shaping this cultural form and of 
the ways in which it is articulated. My countless conversations on the subject 
with Japanese women validate the need for such an analysis.
First, we must keep in mind that, as numerous studies of media audiences 
have demonstrated, the act of consuming popular culture is often as impor-
tant as the content of the texts itself. In the three- generational families that 
have participated in my research I have often found that mothers, daughters, 
and sisters enjoy the opportunity to sit down with a magazine together, dis-
cuss fashion and beauty choices, or go shopping for the perfect outfit. Using 
magazines as a connecting tool, mothers might leaf through the publications 
brought home by their daughters— as Izumi, the then- 39- year- old mother of 
two high school girls, explained in 1999, “I wouldn’t buy those by myself, but 
my daughters buy them so I read them sometimes”— or enjoy reminiscing 
about their own engagement with global fashion trends: “When I look back at 
when I was young we did the same things,” she added.
Furthermore, while the younger women that constitute fashion maga-
zines’ main target audience often express feelings of alienation toward the 
glamorous culture of global consumption portrayed in their favorite publi-
cations they nevertheless display a very practical attitude toward them. They 
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might purchase a specific issue because it features a style they want to imitate 
or a particularly appetizing diet, or use them for inspiration before getting a 
haircut, or buying or making a new outfit. The publications young women fre-
quently spontaneously brought to interviews were often missing photographs 
here and there, where hair or clothing styles had been cut out. When recalling 
why they had avidly read fashion magazines in their high school years, two 
women in their 20s noted that they did it “to find out the clothes I wanted to 
wear, or for the hairstyles, I imitated the hairstyles,” or “for the small things, 
accessories, to know what I wanted.” When asked why they read magazines 
more frequently in the past, one of them responded: “I didn’t know much 
then!” The other explained: “before, I was reading them for research.” This 
conception of magazines as practical sources of information— common 
throughout the Japanese media where “how to” guides range from specific 
descriptions of how to perform dance steps in hip- hop magazines to the de-
tailing of which boots and goggles are needed to become a biker (and which 
stores to find them at)— often creates frustration toward the relatively less 
prescriptive style of the Japanese editions of U.S. and European publications. 
As one reader in her 20s put it, “Western magazines don’t give us much infor-
mation. In Japanese magazines, they have a lot of information. They have just 
regular people and give us information about them. Maybe that’s why there 
are so many people wearing these clothes, they say where to find these clothes 
in the magazines and how to wear them.”
Young rural women of relatively lower socio- economic status tend to be 
particularly resourceful in their attempts to create a fashionable identity at a 
fraction of the price of that sold in the magazines they read. After identifying 
a style they like, their next step is to try to find clothes that are similar to those 
featured in the magazine but that they “can buy.” If that proves impossible, 
they might resort to sewing or knitting the outfit or accessory they are longing 
for— or, in the case of the youngest informants, to having their mothers do it 
for them. Their favorite kinds of clothes are, as a 16- year- old explained to me 
one day, “Clothes that are cheap, but look expensive.” Women old enough to 
have a credit card might employ it to make clothing purchases— as a woman 
in her 20s explained: “If it’s too expensive, I just give up, but if I feel that I can 
save the money in about two or three months, then I charge it and pay later.”
Thus, as Oda- san’s quote opening this chapter illustrates, fashion maga-
zines serve as cultural maps guiding their young readers through the complex 
maze of physical self- definition— “I don’t want to be a dope about fashion, 
or many other things, so [magazines are] my information source” explained 
one reader. Also illustrated in the quotes above is the fact that these guides 
are particularly precious to young rural women who otherwise feel removed 
from the urban culture of beauty and fashion promoted throughout the Japa-
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nese media: “The young in the countryside often imitate the fashions in the 
magazines,” noted Oda- san who was 52 years old when I interviewed her in 
1999. As an older women recalled, “When I was young, only the young who 
lived in the city, in Tokyo, would have that kind of fashion. So the only way I 
could know about new fashion was by seeing people from Tokyo when they 
came back here. Otherwise, I couldn’t know what was popular in urban ar-
eas,” to which her daughter- in- law added, “When I was young, for example, 
it took one or two years for the fashion and clothing from Tokyo to reach this 
area.” In other words, for rural readers, fashion magazines serve as a source 
of global cultural capital that helps reduce the cultural gap they experience 
toward more urban settings where forms of globalized consumption are more 
readily available.
But if this increased and faster access to globalized information is of-
ten appreciated— especially by younger readers of relatively higher socio- 
economic status who feel particularly pressured to conform to the upper- class 
ideals of urban sophistication promoted in the magazines— it can also be 
interpreted as encouraging young rural women to engage in homogenized 
less- than- desirable cultural practices: “the young in the countryside start to 
imitate [urban fashion styles] all at once,” noted one older woman “Now, 
it seems that most of the women on television have the same personality,” 
commented another. Deeming urbanites “entirely different,” her friend con-
cluded: “They’re scary!”
In either case, while they may still occasionally consult magazines when 
needing a haircut or a special outfit (or in an effort to bond with their daugh-
ters), older women tend to exhibit a much more detached attitude toward the 
culture of fashion and luxury they promote. As Izumi explained, “If I were 
younger I might be interested in these  . . . but now I can’t find anything I 
would really wear.” Or, as 44- year- old Abe- san more forcefully put it, “I don’t 
like to read these kinds of magazines. . . . They’re all about diets or fortune 
telling and all about what celebrities wear, so I’m fed up with them. That’s 
all they have in there, diets!” Similarly, while Izumi’s daughter Mie and her 
best friend Madoka avidly read Cutie or Zipper (Japanese fashion magazines 
targeted at a younger audience) when they first started participating in my re-
search as high school students, the two young women, now mothers them-
selves and in their late 20s, told me in a 2009 interview that they read Orange 
Page— a cooking and homemaking magazine that, incidentally, they had 
deemed a publication for “obaasan” (slightly pejorative term used to refer to 
middle- aged women) when 16. They still cared about fashion, however, and 
displayed the same kind of ingenuity in finding alternative ways to engage in 
the global culture of consumption promoted in magazines that they had 10 
years earlier. When I commented in 2009 on the small Louis Vuitton bag Mie 
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carried around (which I knew she could not afford on her salary as an “office 
lady”), she responded, clearly admiringly, that her mother- in- law had man-
aged to find a used one and given it to her as a gift. It is also important to note 
that despite the rise of the Internet in this 10 year period, these young women 
still read print magazines, even if different ones (the continuing strength of 
the Japanese magazine industry suggests that they are not the only ones).
These examples illustrate the importance of keeping in mind the ways 
in which media consumption intersects with various aspects of the socio- 
cultural context— class, geography, age, race, gender— in which it takes 
place. This does not mean, however, that media consumers’ negotiation of 
global and/or globalized cultural forms is impervious to the realities of global 
power dynamics. In the case of fashion magazines, their racial and class- 
specific subtexts are particularly crucial elements of this negotiation.
White Models Just Look Better in the Picture
When asked about the evolution of cultural perceptions of female attractive-
ness in Japan, the women I interviewed quickly identified globalization as 
a significant factor in their construction (Takako’s “the world has become 
small”). They pointed to a shift in cultural ideals of beauty coinciding with 
“the time when women changed from kimono to Western clothing” (Izumi, 
39). As 81- year- old Toyoda- san explained, “Before the war there weren’t any 
white models, but after the war we started to think that American things were 
better than Japanese things, we got the media, these kinds of things.” They 
generally recognized and critiqued the historical legacy of “Western”2 me-
dia influence on contemporary Japanese culture— a legacy 24- year- old Mako 
characterized as “the Western thing” still haunting the Japanese and resulting 
in a situation in which, as she put it, “Western movies, Western culture, West-
ern anything, it’s all good.”
Older women reminisced about the postwar invasion of “Western” ac-
tors (Audrey Hepburn, Gregory Peck, Grace Kelly, Alain Delon, Danielle Dar-
rieux, John Wayne), movies (Casablanca, King Kong, Planet of the Apes, Roman 
Holiday), singers (Elvis Presley, The Beatles, Paul Anka), and models on the 
Japanese popular culture scene: “When I was young ‘Twiggy,’ do you know? 
the model . . . Twiggy, she had come to Japan, she wore a mini skirt, that kind 
of thing . . . This Twiggy, this model was very popular among young people. 
She was very thin and I wanted to be like that” (Takako, 48). Forty- seven- year- 
old Horie- san fondly recalled watching French and American films on televi-
sion as a child “because of the different lifestyles, the different clothes, and 
[because] people admire the way of thought of Westerners.” Toyoda- san re-
membered the time when “a teacher told us students that it was OK to have a 
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hairstyle like Audrey Hepburn,” adding that “the hairstyles and makeup styles 
were very popular.”
Younger women admitted not having given much thought to the presence 
of white models in Japanese publications, which, as a group of 16- year- olds 
put it, they were “accustomed to seeing” and found “natural.” As 23- year- old 
Chieko explained, “For us, we’ve always seen these things, it’s been natural 
to see Western movies and listen to Western music since we were children.” 
The global nature of magazines outlined above combined with the popularity 
of “Western styles” were frequently offered as a possible explanation for U.S. 
and European models’ popularity: “I think some magazines are originally 
made in Paris or New York. Like Frau, Elle, that’s originally in France, that’s 
one reason. The other reason is like I said before  . . . we want to be like West-
ern people,” explained 24- year- old Mako.
Japanese media consumers also pointed to the exoticized subtext of rep-
resentations such as those found in non- no, which they often found pleasur-
able: “I can enjoy a different world without leaving Japan, a different culture” 
(Takako, 48), “We can see people in a different world” (Kiyomi, 23), “They 
are people living in a different world” (Mako, 24). As 68- year- old Tanaka- san 
concluded, “Maybe we admire foreign culture or foreign ways of thought be-
cause we are different from that in Japan.” They recognized, in other words, 
that such imagery was part of the broader process of imagining the global in 
Japan— a pleasurable fantasy of globalized engagement readers could “long 
for” and “dream about”: “There is a kind of admiration. Maybe these are not 
about being close or familiar, these are a little ‘high class’ [in English]. They 
represent the kind of image of what we want to be, it’s a kind of admiration” 
(Kiyomi, 23). Or, as Mako put it:
Things like this magazine [picking up the Japanese magazine Spring], this 
is not real life. We want to be like this stuff, but this is actually not our life, 
it’s kind of apart from our real life. In that kind of thing, we don’t want to 
see real life, like, you know, some short fat girl wearing these clothes, that 
doesn’t look good, right? And we keep thinking that . . . and then . . . we 
are not Western people but it’s OK, because this is not our real life.
The women I interviewed nevertheless expressed ambiguous feelings 
of combined distancing and yearning toward exoticized representations of 
(mostly white) “Western”3 models. Comments such as “They look good, but 
they are difficult to be close to, to marry, or to be good friends with. . . . it’s 
difficult to be good friends with them, but we want to be good friends” (Miko, 
24) and “They look so good, but they are not . . . maybe close in feelings. They 
are just out there. They are the people who are living in a different world, but 
they look good. We don’t feel familiar with them” (Mako, 24) illustrate the 
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mixture of admiration, longing, and alienation this imagery generated. Partly 
as a result of such feelings, young women often strongly asserted their per-
sonal preference for Japanese models they could feel “closer to”— “there are 
too many Westerners in the Japanese media” (Emiko, 28)— and noted that 
they did not “like the way the society is [admiring Westerners]” (Takie, 28).
Deeming efforts to imitate Caucasian models a painful exercise in futil-
ity— as 44- year- old Abe- san noted, “Japanese women might think that they 
can look nice in these kinds of things, but they can’t”— they rebelled against 
the alienating nature of their presence in Japanese publications: “If I wear the 
same clothes, I’m not going to be like them!” (Mako, 24); “I personally think 
that it’s funny that they would have white models in [Japanese magazines]. 
It is Japanese women who read these magazines, and Japanese women try to 
wear those clothes.  . . . Mostly they don’t give me good advice about fashion 
or makeup” (Horie- san, 47); “Westerners and Japanese have completely differ-
ent [body] styles, so if I try to wear these kinds of clothes, they generally don’t 
fit me, so I feel angry. I feel like I’m being deceived” (Chieko, 23). As a result, 
they frequently called for the inclusion of easier- to- emulate Japanese models in 
Japanese magazines. As 23- year- old Kumiko put it, “[White models] look nice 
and they have good styles, so they’re beautiful. But I want the magazines to 
have Japanese models. Japanese models have a different style from these white 
models. I just can’t imagine myself wearing these kinds of clothes.”
If they frequently disapproved of the use of Caucasian models, the women 
who participated in my research also ultimately argued, however, that their 
presence in Japanese publications made business sense because they are more 
beautiful than their Japanese counterparts. As Horie- san explained: “They have 
good appearance, good [body] style. They are nicer than Japanese, they are 
more beautiful than Japanese, they have better styles than Japanese, so they 
look nice in the new fashion and makeup.”
In interview after interview they expressed their admiration for “Western 
bodies”— that is, physical traits most commonly associated in Japan with a 
Caucasian racial identity: “Westerners have a very nice [body] style, they look 
good, their fashion is neat. So basically, many Japanese people admire Western 
styles of fashion. Westerners look better, they have longer legs, they are taller” 
(Takako, 48); “They have a good [body] style, they’re pretty” (Sachiko, 68); 
“They are tall, so they look good” (Fujida- san, 64); “They have good appear-
ance, big eyes, high noses” (Reiko, 16); “Westerners are more beautiful, they 
are tall, have high noses, big eyes, and a good sense of style” (Nishimura- san, 
46); “Compared to Japanese women, they are more elegant, they look more ex-
cellent than the Japanese” (Chieko, 23); “We admire Western people, it’s true, 
I think. The one reason is that they are tall, they are taller than we are” (Aya, 
16); “They have good [body] style, you know, compared to Japanese models, 
they have nice breasts, nice hips, longer legs” (Abe- san, 44); “Compared to 
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the Japanese, they have better style and better appearance, they have smaller 
faces, they’re taller” (Takako, in a different interview); “They have good body 
styles, good proportions of the body. Maybe we like the way white people look” 
(Miko, 24); “They represent the kind of image that we want to be, it’s a kind 
of admiration” (Chieko); “They have everything that Japanese people want to 
have” (Madoka, 16); “They’re beautiful, that’s the kind of beauty we pursue” 
(Toyoda- san, 81). Or, as Izumi (39) concluded, “When we were young, we ad-
mired [white Westerners], because they have what we don’t have.”4
Some ultimately came up with a racial taxonomy placing whites at the 
top, Japanese at the bottom, and “halves”— individuals of mixed Asian and 
Caucasian ethnicity— in between. For instance, talking about the evolution 
of models’ racial origin in Japanese women’s magazines, Horie- san ex-
plained in 1999: “When I was young, an- an used lots of halves. Non- no had 
only Japanese models. Maybe at the beginning, when they started to be pub-
lished, these magazines, like an- an or non- no, they couldn’t get many white 
models, so they used halves instead. They were more beautiful than the Japa-
nese so they were used as models.” Attempting to explain the popularity of 
Hollywood in Japan, Abe- san similarly noted, “The Japanese feel inferior to 
the white, so Japanese tend to follow or imitate what is popular in America.5 
And the Japanese feel superiority to the blacks and to the South East Asians, 
so even though there are black or Asian movies, they don’t become popular 
in Japan.”
Hip- hop’s spread through mainstream Japanese popular culture has 
since then further complicated this racial hierarchy and raised the status of 
blackness as an object of admiration— hence the greater racial diversity in 
Men’s non- no’s more recent issues. However, as the comparison with non- no 
demonstrated, hip- hop has generally had a stronger impact on mainstream 
representations of masculinity than femininity.6 If hip- hop- inspired maga-
zines such as Woofin’ Girl have started to tap the female market and stars like 
Amuro Namie have made identification with blackness more popular among 
women,7 mainstream Japanese women’s magazines remain, as Morimoto and 
Chang (2009) have recently shown, largely white- dominated.
Furthermore while informants interviewed both in 1999 and in 2009– 11 
recognized hip- hop’s influence on Japanese popular culture and often ex-
pressed admiration for African American stars— Mariah Carey frequently 
came up— their dichotomized categorization of Japanese/Asian vs. Western/
White- Black and the combined feeling of admiration and alienation occa-
sioned by representations of “Westerners” (be they white or black) in the Jap-
anese media remained largely unchanged. Asked about her image of “West-
erners,” Mie commented in a 2009 interview, “I feel admiration,” to which 
Madoka immediately added, “it’s an unknown world.”
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Gender and Race and Female Beauty in a Global Order
The ambiguities in readers’ reactions to the (omni)presence of white (and, to a 
lesser extent, black) models in Japanese fashion magazines point to the com-
plexity of individuals’ local engagement with a patriarchal, white- dominated, 
global capitalist order. Constructions of feminine beauty in Japan are caught 
in the multifaceted interplay between gender, globalization, nationalism, 
race, and class to a greater extent than constructions of male attractiveness.
Women around the globe confront the difficult task of negotiating their 
gendered identities in the face of media standards of attractiveness increas-
ingly removed from the biological realities of actual female bodies (for a de-
tailed discussion of this process see Darling- Wolf, 2000b). This task, how-
ever, takes on an additional dimension for “non- white” (please pardon the 
short- cut in this description) media consumers as they contend with “beau-
ty’s asymmetrical relations with differently raced bodies” (Parameswaran, 
2011, p. 75).
Despite their frequent rebellion against the presence of “Westerners” in 
Japanese magazines, despite their requests for more racially appropriate 
models, and despite the feelings of alienation this imagery frequently occa-
sioned, the Japanese media consumers that I interviewed did not challenge 
the validity of global standards of feminine beauty modeled— at least initially 
(Leslie, 1995)— after a Caucasian ideal. While they generally recognized the 
potentially harmful nature of admiring physical attributes characteristic of 
a different race and forcefully called for healthier representations, they did 
not question whether such traits were actually worthy of admiration. Despite 
their insightful critiques of U.S. and European media’s historical influence on 
their own popular cultural environment, they failed to identify the equation of 
“Western/white” (and, occasionally, black) femininity with globalized glam-
our, beauty, and success as a racist legacy (Moeran, 2010). As Mako— whose 
assessment of such representations as a pleasurable fantasy was quoted 
earlier— concluded shortly after deeming the presence of white models in 
Japanese magazines problematic: “I just think that white people are greatly 
beautiful. Just to see the white women, they are so beautiful. Not just the face, 
but the [body] style. We are short, our legs are short. But they have long legs 
and . . . that’s much better in the picture.”
The Japanese women who participate in my research are no more cul-
tural dopes than their counterparts in other parts of the world— who resort 
to cosmetic surgery, dieting, and other painful practices to fit media ideals 
of beauty at an equally disturbing rate (Worldwide Plastic Surgery Statistics, 
2010). Their specific situation, however, provides a valuable illustration of the 
multidimensional ways in which dynamics of race, gender, class, geography, 
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and national identity formation interlock with the awareness of the global 
that characterizes globalization. My informants’ engagement with “global 
culture” shapes not only how they imagine the “Other,” but also how they 
imagine what it means to be Japanese- rural- lower/upper- class- Asian- female8 
(and vice versa)— how they experience, in other words, their own locality. For 
them, the process of imagining the global is mired in particularly complex 
identity politics. It illustrates how, in a globalized world, the production of lo-
cality is “more than ever shot through with contradictions” (Appadurai, 1996, 
p. 198). While this process is not unique to women in their position, their ex-
perience does significantly differ from that of individuals whose (white) racial 
identity is more easily “naturalized” in a global context or that of individuals 
whose experience of race is shaped by their status as “minorities” at the local/
national level. It also differs from that of their male counterparts. It demon-
strates how the local/national/global are mutually constituted not only in glo-
balized popular cultural forms but also in individuals’ media consumption. It 
points to the extent to which the imagination has become “a form of negotia-
tion between sites of agency (individuals) and globally defined fields of pos-
sibility” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 31).
The different empirical examples examined so far in this book illustrate 
the complex interplay of “the global” with various local and national dynam-
ics. They point to the often- political nature of processes of representation and 
positioning against the backdrop of an imagined global community and to 
their possible consequences on individuals’ daily lives. The similarities and 
differences between the ways in which these processes take shape in the 
French, Japanese, and U.S. media also point to the need to develop new theo-
retical models that move beyond essentialized characterizations of large areas 
of the world to more carefully tease out globalization’s intersecting and con-
stantly shifting power lines. Developing such a model is made difficult, how-
ever, by the fact that a myopic process of positioning similar to that found in 
reality television, news, or magazines permeates much academic work on glo-
balized cultural forms. The next two chapters address the problematic conse-
quences of this positioning in intellectual discourses, which, just like popular 
cultural texts, “are never insulated from the national and global environment 
in which they develop” (Kraidy, 2005, p. 17).
Having established the centrality of dynamics of gender, race, and class in 
the negotiation of the local/national/global nexus, we now turn to a genre in 
which these dynamics are particularly contentious. The next chapter explores 
what turning a translocal lens to hip- hop as a global phenomenon can teach us 
about the politics of representation of race, class, and gender not only in hip- 
hop itself but also in the heated scholarly debates surrounding it.
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Disjuncture and Difference from the 
Banlieue to the Ganba: Embracing  
Hip- hop as a Global Genre
As a global phenomenon, hip- hop illustrates the transoceanic crossings of 
diasporic cultures. As an international lingua franca, rap is performed not 
only in French and Portuguese but also in Hindi, Chinese, Arabic, Amymara, 
and Yoruba.
— Stam and Shohat, 2012, p. 146
Hip- hop’s mixing of musical influences from a variety of cultural contexts, its 
simultaneous assertions of global universality and local authenticity, its intri-
cate articulation of multiple identities, and its extreme commercial success 
(ironically built upon claims to represent subaltern voices) powerfully illus-
trate the complex nature of the global “mediascapes” that Appadurai (1990) 
claims are built upon the disjunctures between globalization’s different di-
mensions. Approaching hip- hop from a translocal perspective, this chapter 
considers what we can learn from the genre’s global popularity about the pol-
itics of representation of gender, race, and class not only in the genre itself, 
but also in academic discussions surrounding its contested definitions of au-
thenticity and of cultural, racial, ethnic, and gender identities. In keeping with 
this book’s focus, the examples employed throughout the chapter will most 
heavily draw from the French and Japanese hip- hop scenes.1 The chapter will 
demonstrate how these two environments can productively be compared to 
each other and to the way hip- hop is approached in the United States. The 
French context provides a particularly relevant example, as France stands as 
the second largest consumer and producer of rap music in the world after the 
United States (Molinero, 2009).
The next section explores the ways in which the global and the local are 
mutually constitutive elements of hip- hop’s multiple incarnations. The chapter 
then illustrates how the complexity of hip- hop’s engagement in the local/na-
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tional/global nexus is not always fully addressed in academic discourse about 
the genre. It starts with a discussion of how the frequent positioning of hip- 
hop as an African/Latino/a American genre in U.S. scholarship leads to prob-
lematic characterizations of hip- hop’s global dynamics. It also considers how 
a focus on U.S.- style race relations may not do justice to the global politics of 
race permeating the genre in a transnational context. It then turns to an exami-
nation of how definitions of authenticity/in- authenticity along issues of com-
mercialism and integration within mainstream society serve to perpetuate the 
cycle of oppression that rappers are challenging in their artistic productions. 
Finally, it addresses how academic discourse about hip- hop, as a global phe-
nomenon, has yet to fully address the genre’s contentious gender dynamics.
Rapping in Local Languages:  
Hip- hop’s Global/Local Articulations
“Hip- hop has the ability to live on legends maintained by all its members,” 
writes French sociologist Hughes Bazin (1998, p. 14). As U.S. cultural anthro-
pologist Ian Condry puts it in his study of the Japanese context, the genre pro-
vides “a way for hip- hoppers to imagine themselves as part of a global cultural 
movement” (2006, p. 217).
Thanks to Afrika Bambaata’s Zulu Nation, to the popularity of break- 
dancing (which often preceded other elements of hip- hop culture in its 
transnational reach), and to the increased interconnectedness of cultural 
forms that characterizes globalization, hip- hop started to spread through-
out the world sometime in the 1980s. While the movement was initially fre-
quently dismissed as a passing fad emanating from U.S. transnational power 
(Boucher, 1998; Condry, 2006; Marti, 2005), history shows that Zulu Nation’s 
influence quickly receded, and rap promptly morphed into varied (sub)cul-
turally specific forms with impressive lasting power (Boucher, 1998). Today 
hip- hop is widely recognized as a global movement (see, for example, Dyson, 
2007; Rose, 2008).
Hip- hop’s continuing influence rests in part on its ability to shape indi-
viduals’ imagination of the global by drawing transnational connections that 
give producers and amateurs of the genre a sense of belonging to “a mythi-
cal, utopian, and idealized world” (Boucher, 1998, p. 306). This symbolic 
community is maintained through cultural practices shared transnationally 
and through transnational and/or transcultural intertextuality. References to 
the practice of “the dozens” (in which two individuals insult each other un-
til one of them gives up) might serve, for instance, to link French rappers to 
their counterparts in the United States while creating a feeling of community 
among amateurs who catch the references. As French cultural critics George 
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Lapassade and Philippe Rousselot explain, for instance, in reference to the 
French group NTM: “While it is true that NTM means ‘The North transmits 
the message’ [le Nord Transmet le Message] (where North refers to Department 
number 93), all French B- boys know that NTM also means ‘Nique ta Mère’ 
[fuck your mother]. This polysemy  . . . is allusive, and only the initiated know 
that it is the fraternal echo of the American motherfucker” (1990, p. 22). Simi-
larly, rap’s symbolic connection to African American street culture is perpetu-
ated in the works of international rap artists— as when French rappers speak 
of French “ghetto culture” (Prévos, 1998, p. 68). The practice of sampling 
huge international hits further establishes the genre’s global intertextual-
ity. Audiences’ enjoyment of the music rests, in turn, on their possession of 
enough global cultural capital to “get” these intertextual allusions.
Hip- hop’s symbolic connections are also enacted through the sharing of a 
stated set of “universal” values (Zulu Nation’s love, peace, and unity, “keeping 
it real”) and of a tradition of social activism. African American studies scholar 
Halifu Osumare speaks of “Hip- hop’s connective marginalities,” that she de-
fines as “social resonances between black expressive culture within its con-
textual political history and similar dynamics in other nations” (2001, p. 172). 
The fact that black rappers living in France “claim a tradition of activism (tra-
dition revendicatrice) linked to black American culture” (Bazin, 1998, p. 14) and 
that Japanese hip- hop “draws inspiration from African American struggles 
while generating distinctive approaches to race and protest in Japan” (Condry, 
2006, p. 29) illustrate this process.
These connective marginalities, however, are not solely constructed in 
solidarity with impoverished African Americans who are often credited (at 
least by French and Japanese rappers) with having “given birth” to the genre 
in the U.S. ghetto. They are both recontextualized in each “local” environment 
where hip- hop develops, and “(re)universalized” to be applied transnation-
ally across racial and/or ethnic differences to create “a new cultural politics 
of affiliation  . . . that eschews national distinctions in favor of thinking about 
transnational connectedness among different groups” (Condry, 2006, p. 47).
Finally, on a more basic level, hip- hop’s ability to participate “in a sym-
bolic network that circulates globally” (Tickner, 2008, p. 121) is predicated 
on the availability of transnational networks of cultural production and dis-
tribution. These include major multinational corporations that have learned 
to capitalize on rap’s commercial potential and are now dominating the mu-
sic market— allowing, for instance, French rapper MC Solaar to sell 250,000 
copies of his double platinum second album outside of France (Beau, 1996). 
They also take the form of more informal networks of independent producers 
that, while previously available, developed an immediate global reach with the 
growth of the Internet starting in the mid- 1990s. As one Japanese producer 
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put it in a personal conversation about the influence of social networking sites 
on the Japanese hip- hop scene: “before  . . . it was very difficult to promote 
Japanese music to the world because we are isolated  . . . but now it’s very 
easy, now I find it’s very easy to connect with music business people so I find 
that maybe we can promote Japanese artists” (personal conversation, June 6, 
2009).
The potentially immediate global reach of the Internet may, in turn, feed 
into the symbolic vision of a global hip- hop culture both originated and 
spread throughout the world beyond and above national and ethnic bound-
aries. As the Japanese producer continued, “So what I do is maybe not focus 
on nationality or identity but I do the label to enjoy seeing that global dyna-
mism changing and to connect global people in all edges of the world.” Or as 
Coma- chi, a popular Japanese female rapper, put it, “I can connect globally, 
anywhere in the world. I can quickly update my music, express directly how 
I feel right now” (personal conversation, June 10, 2009). Thus, hip- hop is a 
significant contributor to the process of imagining the global that character-
izes globalization.
Hip- hop’s success also rests, however, on its asserted link (actual or imag-
ined) to highly local contexts. It is a genre, in other words, where the mutually 
constitutive nature of the global (hip- hop as a transnational movement) and 
the local (hip- hop as “authentic representative” of individuals’ experiences of 
oppression) is ostensibly recognized. As ethnomusicologist and cultural an-
thropologist Thomas Solomon explains in his study of hip- hop in Istanbul:
Istanbul hip- hoppers adopt and adapt the widely circulating discourses 
of rap and hip- hop and use them as resources for constructing locally 
specific meanings. Through their own study of the internationally circu-
lating media texts of hip- hop  . . . originating outside of Turkey, Istanbul 
hip- hoppers understand that the discourse of rap characteristically in-
cludes the practice of representing  . . . one’s place. (2005, p. 8, emphasis in 
original)2
In the case of French rap, this process of local representation takes place 
in conversation with the strong lyrical tradition of the French chansonniers (Liu, 
1997)— the much- celebrated singer- songwriters who provide political and so-
cial commentary often drawing inspiration from current events. Thus, while 
recognized as an adaptation of “a musical current born in the Bronx,”3 French 
rap is also seen as engaging in a process through which it “measures itself 
against the model of French song” (Pecqueux, 2007, p. 46; see also Boucher, 
1998; Molinero, 2009).
French rap artists frequently point to the legacy (and at times sample the 
Disjuncture and Difference from the Banlieue to the Ganba  •  81
works) of such cultural icons as George Brassens, Jean Ferrat, Maxime le For-
estier, and Serge Gainsbourg4 to frame their anti- establishment lyrics within 
the context of a larger French tradition of socially engaged artistic expression. 
In 2000, some of France’s best- known rappers released an album covering 
the songs of Charles Aznavour, Francis Cabrel, Serge Gainsbourg, Renaud, 
George Brassens, Jacques Brel, and other celebrated singers (L’Hip- Hopée, 
2000). Hip- hop artist (and actor) Oxmo Puccino’s rendition of Brel’s Ces gens 
là even earned him for a moment the nickname of the “Black Jack Brel.” A 
year later, an anthology titled Hexagone 2001, Rien N’a Changé [Hexagon (i.e., 
France)5 2001, nothing has changed] offered rap versions of Renaud’s6 most 
socially engaged titles. The album’s title referred to the highly popular singer- 
songwriter’s 1975 song “Hexagone” that bitingly critiqued France’s cultural 
arrogance. In a similar vein, the title song of French rapper Joey Starr’s7 
(2006) first solo album Gare au Jaguarr [Watch for the jaguar(r)] humorously 
transposed the events described in Brassens’ famous song “Gare au gorille” 
[Watch for the gorilla] from an urban zoo to the street culture of French hous-
ing projects.8
French rap is indeed further geographically and symbolically localized in 
the culture of the French banlieue— the suburban areas of Paris and other ma-
jor cities (particularly Marseilles) that “have come to symbolize the excesses in 
violence, drug consumption, social dislocation, and delinquency encountered 
in financially strapped urban neighborhoods” (Prévos, 1998, p. 67). While 
not all French rappers actually grew up in such neighborhoods (just as not all 
U.S. rappers grew up on the streets of the Bronx or LA), the banlieue serves 
as a symbolic space that rappers propose to “represent.” As French historian 
Pierre- Antoine Marti puts it, “[Rappers] are all inhabitants of this imaginary 
banlieue that haunts the national consciousness” (2005, p. 96; see also Stam 
and Shohat, 2012, p. 147).
References to the RER (Paris’ suburban rail system), stores such as Tati 
where low- income families shop, or to specific zip codes— as when the group 
Ministère AMER rap about the 95200 zip code (of Garges- Sarcelles in the 
northern banlieues of Paris)— clearly establish this geographical and cultural 
anchorage in the cités (low- income housing projects). “I lived the banlieue ver-
sion [of hip- hop] [moi j’l’ai vécu version banlieue]” rap the group Sniper (2006) 
in a song titled “Retour aux racines” [Back to the roots]. Through allusions 
to the Front National extreme- right party or to various politicians— as in 
La Fouine’s Jacques Chirac, titled after the former French president and Paris 
mayor (released online in 2012)— rappers assertively engage in local and na-
tional politics. For instance, in 2004 Rohff, a rapper who immigrated to the 
Paris suburbs from the Union of the Comoros as a child, responded to then 
minister of interior Nicolas Sarkozy’s characterization of banlieue youths as 
82  •  imagining the global
“scum” (racaille) with a song titled “Méssage à la racaille” [message to the 
scum] (Montaigne, 2006).
Finally, French rap is more generally steeped in references to the broader 
French popular cultural context ranging from television shows such as the 
Club Dorothée that most children growing up in France in the late 1980s and 
1990s spent their Wednesdays9 watching, to famous television commercials 
or literary texts— “Gavroche is back, it’s not Voltaire’s fault” [Gavroche est de 
retour, c’est pas la faute à Voltaire] rap the group IAM in their song “Achevez- les,” 
referring both to Victor Hugo’s famed novel Les Misérables and to the musi-
cal of the same name.10 Because of the globalized nature of contemporary 
popular culture, these references naturally include “imported” elements. 
Thus, American television series such as Starsky and Hutch, Dallas, The A- Team, 
or MacGyver regularly come up in the works of French rappers— “I show up 
quick like Starsky” [J’débaque sec à la Starsky] rap IAM (2003). So does Japanese 
animation, which, as we will see in chapter 5, has been hugely culturally in-
fluential in France since the late 1970s. One popular group is even called the 
Saïan Supa Crew after the “super Saiyan” fighters of Dragon Ball. Bollywood 
has more recently made its entry into rappers’ large repertoire of globalized 
references (Sniper, 2012).
Once again, however, these references to elements of the “global” cannot 
be fully understood without taking into account their intersection with “the 
local.” For instance, the generation that watched the Club Dorothée on Wednes-
days also remembers watching Starsky and Hutch every Sunday afternoon 
on TF1 (the same channel that broadcast Star Academy) at a time when most 
French TV viewers only had access to four channels (one of which was local). 
The series happened to be scheduled after a program focusing on hip- hop 
(Marti, 2005). Similarly, when Saïan Supa Crew mention Dragon Ball, Captain 
Tsubasa, or San Ku Kai (all Japanese texts) in their song “J’avais” (2001), what 
they nostalgically recall is getting up to watch these shows on Wednesday 
mornings (a French practice): “It’s the time . . . when on Wednesday you wake 
up for Dragon Ball” [C’est l’époque . . . Ou l’mercredi tu t’réveilles pour Dragon Ball]. 
When mentioning these global texts, French rappers simultaneously point to 
French cultural practices.
These examples illustrate how hip- hop’s significance cannot be fully cap-
tured with a lens too broadly fitted to its global dimensions or too narrowly 
focused on its localized incarnations. Unfortunately, scholars’ (and, to some 
extent rappers’ and consumers’) ability to clearly articulate the multiple ways 
in which the global and the local are mutually constitutive elements of hip- 
hop’s (trans)cultural influence is often limited by the politics of representa-
tion permeating hip- hop’s discourse (and discourses about hip- hop), and, 
more generally, by the politics of academic production. The limitations of cur-
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rent academic work on hip- hop when considering the genre as a global phe-
nomenon are further explored in the following section. A discussion of how a 
translocal perspective might help overcome these limitations is also provided 
when appropriate.
Rap as an (African) American Genre
While scholars often recognize hip- hop’s hybrid transcultural roots and the 
significance of both African American and Latin American influences on the 
genre, academic work on hip- hop in the United States has historically focused 
on the politics of race as they relate to African American experiences in a U.S. 
context. This results in a situation in which “rap music and black culture be-
come entwined and mutually construct each other” (Condry, 2006, p. 31). 
For instance, in her widely acclaimed study of hip- hop in the United States, 
professor of Africana studies Tricia Rose (1994) defines hip- hop as “an Afro- 
centric cultural form which attempts to negotiate the experiences of marginal-
ization, brutally truncated opportunity and oppression within the cultural imper-
atives of African American and Caribbean history” (p. 21, emphasis mine; for other 
examples see Dawson, 1999; Holmes- Smith, 1997; Krims, 2000). Similarly, 
editors Murray Forman and Mark Anthony Neal note in their introduction to 
That’s the Joint! The Hip- Hop Studies Reader that among “a growing number of 
progressive black thinkers  . . . there is general concurrence that hip- hop rep-
resents an extension of specifically African American cultural tradition” even 
if it “also poses challenges and introduces ruptures to prevailing notions of an 
unbroken cultural continuum” (2004, p. 3). Certainly, considering the crucial 
importance of African American cultural production in the United States, the 
complex politics of its negotiation must be critically examined. Rose’s (and 
others’) work usefully contributes to this task. Defining hip- hop as solely or, at 
least, most significantly, a black American11 (emphasis on both terms) genre (or 
even as a black American/Latina/o/Caribbean genre) becomes problematic, 
however, when applied to the study of hip- hop as a global phenomenon— a 
fact that, incidentally, Rose (2008) aptly recognizes in her more recent work.
On the most basic level, the historical fact of hip- hop’s spread to other 
cultural and/or linguistic contexts frequently remains unnoticed. For exam-
ple, when professor of Black and Puerto Rican studies Juan Flores notes in 
an essay on the development of Puerto Rican rap in the United States that “by 
the early 1990s hip- hop had finally broken the language barrier” (2004, p. 
69), he fails to acknowledge that French rapper Dee Nasty released his first 
French- language album Paname City Rappin’ in 1984, or that Japanese DJs such 
as Crazy A or DJ Krush were performing in Japanese every Sunday in Yoyogi 
park around the same time. When writer David Samuels describes rap’s early 
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spread “from New York to Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston, and other cities 
with substantial black populations” (2004, p. 148), he similarly fails to recog-
nize that the genre quickly spread transnationally as well (and simultaneously 
reinforces hip- hop’s position as an African American genre).
Even when this history is acknowledged, however, viewing hip- hop as es-
sentially an “American” cultural practice results in an oversimplification of 
transcultural dynamics along U.S. vs. “the Rest” lines, in which the study of 
the genre’s global incarnations involves “studying the appropriation of rap 
and hip- hop as an essentialized, endemically African American cultural form” 
(Mitchell, 2000, p. 5). For instance, in an article on global hip- hop, Osumare 
describes rap as “the most invading of black music,” a homogenizing force 
that has “affected nearly every country on the map” (2001, p. 171). After a dis-
cussion of Senegalese rap, she concludes that “an age of increasing complex-
ity has been created by juxtapositions of local cultures and exported postmo-
dernity from the primary global power, the continental United States” (2001, p. 174, 
emphasis mine).
This positioning frequently translates into a summary dismissal of all 
forms of hip- hop generated outside the context of African American/Latino/a 
culture as necessarily inauthentic. In an article titled “Getting real about 
global hip- hop” U.S. cultural critic Yvonne Bynoe (2002) concludes, for in-
stance, that foreigners simply do not (and cannot) “get it.” Making racial 
emulation the central argument of her discussion of Japanese rap, Osumare 
similarly portrays the latter as a bad copy of the American original, noting that 
“Global commodification promotes a vacuous ‘jigger- like’12 cultural appro-
priation that can only be termed imitation though conspicuous consumption” 
(2001, p. 177). Even less critical analyses of hip- hop in different parts of the 
world tend to position hip- hop’s global spread as a fairly straightforward pro-
cess of localization of an African American cultural form (see, for example, 
Bennett, 2004; Mitchell, 2001).
In his ethnographic analysis of the Tokyo hip- hop scene, cultural anthro-
pologist Ian Condry demonstrates, however, that the politics of race in Japa-
nese hip- hop are much more complex than might appear at first sight and 
must be considered within Japan’s “differently configured racial context” 
(Condry, 2006, p. 39; see also Condry, 2000, 2001) where notions of “black” 
and “white” are entangled in Japan’s relationship to the foreign Other and, 
more, generally, its imaginary of “the West.” As he warns, “we in the United 
States may need to rethink a common American ethnocentrism that tends to 
equate foreign interest in U.S. popular culture with a desire to be American or, 
by analogy, Japanese interest in black culture with a desire to be black” (Con-
dry, 2006, p. 47).
Conceptions of “the global” as a U.S.- dominated totalizing whole to be 
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opposed to local environments are not particularly useful heuristic devices 
when considering hip- hop as a transnational phenomenon. Its translo-
cal connections are much more complex and interesting than that. Scholars 
have pointed, for instance, to the significance of postcolonial relationships 
in rap’s transnational spread (Davies and Bantahila, 2006). Thus, Senegalese 
rappers may arguably be more influenced by such figures as MC Solaar, one 
of France’s most famous and internationally known rappers,13 who was born 
in Senegal (a former French colony that gained its independence in 1960) of 
Chadian parents, than by U.S. artists. Solaar and other French rappers more 
generally exert a powerful influence on the francophone hip- hop community 
that, again, at times supersedes that of their U.S. counterparts (Low, Sarkar, 
and Winer, 2009). As one Montreal rapper explained, “When I heard Solaar 
do it in French I said, ‘Damn! A’right!’” [Quand j’ai entendu Solaar le faire en fran-
çais j’ai dit, ‘Damn! A’right!’”]. Another Quebecois rapper described the “declic 
IAM” [the IAM turn on] as a significant turning point in francophone rap: 
“Everyone sounded like [IAM lead rapper] Akhénaton” [Tout le monde sonnait 
comme Akhénaton] (cited in Low, Sarkar, and Winer, 2009, p. 66).
When the French group IAM choose to title their song “Do the raï thing” 
(2003) they are making translocal references not only to Spike Lee’s globally 
distributed film of U.S. origin Do the Right Thing, but also to French rap’s con-
nection to a form of Algerian popular music— raï finds its roots in Western 
Algeria in Bedouin music, and its contemporary form is “a mixture of me-
lodic traditional Algerian melodies and coarse French pop” (Orlando, 2003, 
p. 401)— from which it draws inspiration and, more generally, to the signifi-
cance of North African postcolonial identities in the French hip- hop scene. 
References that dynamics considered solely on a local vs. global axis (in which 
American rap stands for the global) cannot easily address.
Thinking translocally helps us realize that hip- hop has taken multiple and 
unexpected paths in its global voyage, including ones that may not necessarily 
lead back to the United States. Approaching hip- hop from a different point 
of entry, scholars conducting research on non- U.S. cultural environments 
tend to portray the genre differently than their U.S.- focused counterparts. 
While generally positioning the movement as having African American ori-
gins, they see it as quickly evolving beyond this cultural context into multiple 
and equally “authentic” culturally diversified forms drawing “from almost all 
musical horizons” (Marti, 2005, p. 20; see also Barrer, 2009; Condry, 2006; 
Mitchell, 2000)— Low, Sarkar, and Winer (2009) speak of rap’s histories (plu-
ral). As Bazin puts it, “while it is possible to describe the cultural roots and so-
cial anchorage of its beginnings, hip- hop cannot be reduced to fixed cultural 
traits, or to a unique social membership  . . . it’s a constantly evolving form” 
(1998, p. 10).
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Moving away from characterizations of the United States as hip- hop’s 
most globally significant cultural center, Pecqueux questions the “constant 
genealogy” that interprets French rap as the natural godchild of American 
rap. Noting that it is hard to imagine that “the rappers are more familiar with 
the griots and the dozens than Brassens or Aznavour,” he challenges what he 
calls the “crossing of the Atlantic” version of French rap’s history that inter-
prets early French rap as an imitation of an American form “as if nothing in 
French cultural history could prefigure the particular development of this ar-
tistic practice.” “While one cannot seriously deny the fact that French rap is 
linked to a musical practice born in the Bronx,” he concludes, “we still must 
problematize its Crossing of the Atlantic” (2007, pp. 34, 35, 35, 34, 42).
Rap as a transnational phenomenon becomes “a narrative tool which 
complements and merges with localized social discourses concerning in-
equality and critical political reflection” (Barrer, 2009, p. 252). It moves 
definitions of authenticity away from the question of whether foreigners can 
“get” hip- hop’s meaning in an African American context to the necessity of 
developing culturally specific texts that meaningfully relate to “local” issues 
and power relations (Clarke and Hischock, 2009; Mitchell, 2000). From such 
a perspective, U.S. rap may even— in an interesting reversal of Bynoe’s (2002) 
characterization— be regarded as “less authentic” than rap in other cultural 
contexts (by scholars and rappers alike) because its commercial success and 
widespread global distribution move it further away from its original context 
of production (Boucher, 1998; Marti, 2005; Molinero, 2009). Reflecting with 
nostalgia on the development of the genre, Rose (2008) recognizes this pos-
sibility in the introduction to her biting critique of contemporary commercial-
ized hip- hop in the United States: “A few artists elsewhere around the globe, along 
with some who have slipped into American radio rotation and others in the 
so- called underground, reflect the extraordinary life force that remains” (p. x, 
emphasis mine).
In a similar vein, rapping in English may be considered an impediment to 
developing “authentic” (i.e., culturally specific) rap because of the transna-
tional dominance of English- language U.S. hip- hop— as when French soci-
ologist Manuel Boucher suggests that British rap has had difficulties finding 
its own voice because of the “handicap” of “using the same language as those 
from hip- hop’s birth place” (1998, p. 37).
In a global context, hip- hop’s local incarnations may even be developed 
in opposition to U.S. cultural production: “I have nothing to do with American 
rap” [Je n’ai rien à voir avec le rap Américain] raps MC Solaar in his 1998 hit La vie 
n’est qu’un moment [Life is but a moment]. Rap’s development in France was 
ironically aided by the country’s transcultural power struggle with the United 
States. Because it is in the French language, French rap benefits from France’s 
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protectionist cultural policies that require radio stations to include 40 percent 
(35 percent in the case of radios targeted at a youth audience) of francophone 
production in their music programming.14 As former DJ and program director 
of Paris’ Radio Nova, Loïc Dury explains, “We started playing rap in 88, but 
today, they force you to blast [bastonner] French rap, because of the quotas” 
(cited in Bocquet and Pierre- Adolphe, 1997).
More generally, French rap is frequently positioned both as a local anti-
dote to American “cultural imperialism” and as an important vector of French 
global influence. Solaar has been acknowledged as “one of the important 
figures in the exportation of French culture” (Liu, 1997, p. 329, emphasis mine).15 
Rap artists have received some of France’s most prestigious music awards, in-
cluding the “Victoires de la musique.” A 1996 Nouvel Observateur article titled 
“Le Rap? Il parle la France” [Rap? It speaks of France] placed Solaar along other 
internationally prominent French icons including Jacques Derrida, Phillipe 
Starck, and Pierre Boulez (Loupias, March 1996).16 Ten years later, the same 
news magazine deemed French rappers “the children of hip- hop and of Der-
rida” (Vigoureux, May 18, 2006).
Thus, we must resist the temptation to position the United States as hip- 
hop’s sole “authentic” cultural representative— or hip- hop as a symptom of 
U.S. cultural imperialism. A translocal perspective demonstrates that hip- hop 
spreads through different points of entry. It helps us come to terms with the 
facts that Cuban rappers pursue their careers in France (Fernandes, 2003) and 
that Turkish rap “started not in Turkey, but in Germany, practised by mem-
bers of the Turkish ‘guestworker’ [Gastarbeiter] community especially in, but 
not limited to, the cities of Berlin and Frankfurt” (Solomon, 2005, p. 3). It 
encourages us to see how the processes of cultural production that Condry 
(2006) describes in the context of the Japanese genba— the actual place of cul-
tural production— may be more similar to those taking place in the French 
banlieue than in the American ghetto (and vice versa). It severs the easy cor-
relation of the United States with “the global” and even “the West.” It also 
complicates our understanding of the politics of race in a global context.
U.S.- Style Racial Dynamics in a Global Context
U.S. hip- hop, which is frequently positioned as the voice of an oppressed 
racial minority, cannot easily be dissociated from the politics of race in the 
United States. Thus, analyses taking U.S. hip- hop as their point of entry tend 
to be couched in U.S.- influenced conceptualizations of race relations where 
transnational hip- hop intersects with critiques of the global commodification 
of “black culture” (Bynoe, 2002, p. 83). Scholars have pointed to the essential-
izing nature of the suggestion that there is such a thing as a unified “black 
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culture” and to the danger of positioning hip- hop as its global representative 
(Rose, 2008). More generally, such interpretations fail to fully problematize 
the politics of race in a global context. As Shome notes, “rarely is the con-
nection between the production and management of the domestic ‘ethnic’ in-
side the U.S. and larger globalized racial politics addressed in ‘domestic’ race 
research. Rarely is it acknowledged that minorities within the U.S., when we 
consider a larger global scale, make up a ‘privileged’ minority” (2006c, p. 8).
Indeed, as U.S. citizens, U.S. rappers hold a relatively privileged global po-
sition. At the very least, this position gives them access to transnational net-
works of production and distribution not available to all. In his analysis of 
rap in Zimbabwe, Australian cultural critic Tony Mitchell notes, for instance, 
that African rap, which developed in part “in opposition to a perceived U.S. 
cultural imperialism in rap and hip- hop” (2000, p. 42), has found it difficult 
to successfully break into the global market. Pointing to the fact that non- 
American African rappers are generally marginalized in the United States, he 
suggests that the global dominance of African American rap developed at the 
expense of other transnational African voices. Mitchell also describes Zim-
babwean rappers’ discomfort with black Americans’ use of African practices 
such as hair beading. He concludes that rap in Zimbabwe “challenges the 
standard rhetoric about the Afrodiasporic and Afrocentric aspects of Ameri-
can rap and hip- hop” (2000, p. 42).
In a similar vein, U.S. hip- hop’s power to influence global definitions of 
“black culture” and “black experience” in line with a culturally specific Ameri-
can experience has yet to be adequately addressed. So is its power to impact 
the global imagination of Africa through its construction of a U.S.- style Afro- 
centricism based on “a very particular way of looking at the world that, far 
more than it expresses any exilic consciousness of Africa, betrays a distinc-
tively American understanding of ethnicity and cultural difference” (Gilroy, 
2004, p. 89). Noting that “only thirty- seven percent of the blacks who live in 
the Western hemisphere live in the United States” British cultural critic Paul 
Gilroy points to the dangers of globally accepting such “Americocentric” 
(2004, pp. 88, 91) positions.
A translocal perspective demonstrates that racial dynamics may be negoti-
ated differently in different places, including through connections that bypass 
the United States altogether— or that race may simply not be a significant 
subtext of hip- hop’s discourse in some cultural contexts (see Barrer, 2009; 
Solomon, 2005, for specific examples). As Shome and Hegde remind us, the 
U.S.- style “narrative of ‘difference’ despite all its political value and theoreti-
cal potency, becomes unsettled in complicated ways in globalization” (2002, 
pp. 175– 76).
Interesting parallels exist, for instance, between the politics of race in 
Disjuncture and Difference from the Banlieue to the Ganba  •  89
Japanese and French hip- hop. Some Japanese rappers engage in a critical de-
construction of what it means to be Japanese by challenging the hegemonic 
notion that Japan is a racially homogeneous nation, and point to the racial 
subtext of the country’s history of imperialist aggression toward its Asian 
neighbors (Condry, 2006). Their message powerfully resonates with that of 
French rappers who challenge France’s position of “color blindness” to cel-
ebrate métissage (mixing) and construct “frenchness” as a multiethnic and cul-
turally diverse identity shaped by France’s colonial past. The “local” culture of 
the banlieue described above is indeed steeped in the translocal experiences 
of immigration, diaspora, and (post)colonialism: “To each his/her nostalgia, 
mine was the colonies” [À chacun sa nostagie, la mienne c’était les colonies] raps So-
laar (1998; for other examples see Sniper, 2001, 2011). Or, as Stam and Shohat 
put it, “At times, French rappers perform a percussive version of what in an 
academic context would be called postcolonial critique” (2012, p. 148).
As a consequence of this postcolonial position, French rappers who often 
“carry a genetic link to Africa” (Stam and Shohat, 2012, p. 146) as second- 
generation immigrants might find it difficult to engage in a U.S.- style Afro- 
centricism that may “not refer to present- day Africa, but to an older, some-
what mythical place of origin” (Dennis, 2006, pp. 281– 82; see also Gilroy, 
2004). Fully aware of Africa’s present- day realities— raï became popular 
among rappers, for instance, as an expression of solidarity with two well- 
known raï singers who were gunned down in Algeria in the 1990s (Orlando, 
2003)— and of the fact that they do not “fit” any better in their parents’ (often 
African) “home” lands than in middle- class French society (Marti, 2005; Stam 
and Shohat, 2012), they have “a closer physical and therefore less mythical re-
lationship  . . . to the ‘pays d’origine’ [African homeland] than [rappers] in the 
U.S.” (Cannon, 1994, p. 164). As rapper La Rumeur (2007) puts it in a song 
titled “Là où poussent mes racines” [Where my roots grow]:
I don’t like the warm water, the exoticism [Je n’aime pas l’eau tiède, 
l’exotisme]
On the village/homeland [Sur le bled]
Between you and me [De toi à moi]
This cult of black Africa [Ce culte de l’Afrique noire]
While expressing solidarity with the plight of racial minorities in the 
United States, French rappers do not see U.S.- style racial politics as a partic-
ularly useful model when applied to the French context— as one rapper put 
it in reference to the pro- black movement in France: “It’s a fad, it’s bullshit; 
three quarters of the people who claim to be pro- black don’t know anything, 
haven’t read anything and refer too much to Americans” (Little MC, quoted in 
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Boucher, 1998, p. 185, emphasis mine). They are also skeptical toward African 
American conceptualizations of Islam, particularly as defined by The Nation 
of Islam, which they see as too racially exclusionary. As another rapper ex-
plained, “The problem of Islam in France is very different from the problem 
of Islam in the United States. In the U.S., when you say Islam, it’s a religion 
for black people, you can’t enter it. In France, anyone can enter, there is a uni-
versality to the message” (Abu, quoted in Boucher, 1998, p. 194; see also Swe-
denburg, 2001).
Thus, if hip- hop’s attraction rests in part on the movement’s ability to cap-
italize on transnational solidarity, the complexity of its racial dynamics as a 
global phenomenon requires us to move beyond the limitations of U.S.- style 
identity politics. As Condry concludes in the case of Japan, while “Japanese 
hip- hop does deal with race issues,” it is “often in ways that contrast with hip- 
hop in the United States” (2006, p. 46).
Rappers Stay Pure, or the Problematics of Authenticity
Unfortunately, the politics of race in hip- hop (and in academic scholarship 
about hip- hop) are further complicated by their entanglement with issues of 
representation and authenticity. Indeed, despite its hybrid nature, hip- hop is 
generally positioned as representing specific (sub)cultures or ethnic/racial/class 
identities. While its various incarnations suggest that it may mean different 
things to different people in different places, the notion of authenticity re-
mains one of its significant recurring subtexts. A frequently discussed marker 
of authenticity in hip- hop is the common distinction between “commercial” 
and “underground” positions. While scholars have noted that the two are 
necessarily engaged in a symbiotic relationship— a large underground scene 
feeds a smaller commercial production business where artists, once signed 
by a major record company, are brought to stardom (Boucher, 1998; Condry, 
2006)— and while they recognize that underground rappers generally strive 
for commercial success, the two categories frequently remain strictly dichoto-
mized in analyses of hip- hop’s socio- cultural impact (Molinero, 2009). As the 
voice of the disfranchised, rap loses credibility with commercial success.
Discomfort with rap’s commodification is understandable in light of the 
trajectory of other forms of subaltern expression, which have historically been 
caught in a situation in which “black artists were prevented by the exclusion-
ary forces of racism from taking command of their intellectual property” 
(Basu and Werber, 2001, p. 243). Cultural critics Dipannita Basu and Pnina 
Werbner note, however, that hip- hop has not necessarily followed this too- 
familiar pattern. Contrasting the genre’s commercial development to that of 
earlier musical forms, they argue that black entrepreneurs have managed to 
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retain greater control over its process of commercialization to successfully 
“make a dent in the white domination and appropriation of the music indus-
try” (2001, pp. 243– 44). Or, as sociologist and public intellectual Michael Eric 
Dyson puts it, “thousands of young black professionals eat from hip- hop’s 
table” (2007, p. 54).
Commercial success is nevertheless frequently portrayed, both in aca-
demic work and in the larger cultural discussions surrounding hip- hop, as 
compromising a rapper’s authenticity. In his study of French rap, Boucher 
suggests that in order to be commercially successful, rappers must learn to 
“compromise” and avoid the more violent or political positions that “could 
frighten the larger public.” He criticizes Solaar for practicing a “reassuring” 
and “acceptable” rap steeped in literary references, and IAM for appearing 
on television as “nice boys, human, and close to the people” despite their “B- 
Boys look” (1998, p. 123). French historian Pierre- Antoine Marti (2005) simi-
larly notes Solaar’s “ambiguous position in the world of French rap” due to 
his extreme commercial success, and maintains that “the greater public natu-
rally turns to more festive or calm rap. It is less attracted by its more militant 
and activist dimensions” (2005, p. 47). Paradoxically, Boucher later argues 
that more “authentic” groups who “refuse to compromise with the system” 
have achieved financial success because expressing rebellion has become 
fashionable and because, to the business world, “any ‘product’ that can make 
benefits is potentially interesting” (1998, p. 126). Clearly, scholars themselves 
hold an “ambiguous position” toward rap’s commercialization.
While it is valid to question rappers’ ability to represent the plight of the 
financially marginalized once they have become millionaires— and while we 
should maintain a critical eye toward rap’s co-option by large transnational 
companies— equating rap’s commercial success with an automatic loss of 
authenticity introduces new tensions in the negotiation of its relationship to 
class, ethnic, racial, and/or national identities. First, reducing the definition 
of an “underground” (i.e., “authentic”) artist to one who “doesn’t shift many 
units” (Neate, 2004, p. 19) perpetuates the cycle of truncated economic op-
portunities rappers are denouncing in their songs by suggesting that rappers 
must (ideally) remain poor in order to remain authentic.
Dichotomized conceptualizations of underground vs. commercial rap 
also more generally perpetuate the cycle of marginalization along racial and/
or ethnic lines. Much ambivalence toward hugely transnationally popular MC 
Solaar, for instance, rests on the perception that he is too fully “integrated” 
within the French cultural context to remain “authentic” as a rapper. Noting 
that “Solaar is often compared to Gainsbourg and that critics like to inscribe 
him in the noble tradition of “French song” [la chanson française],” Marti “takes 
his defense” by suggesting that “[this] is not fully justified: Solaar has remained a 
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rapper” (2005, p. 46, emphasis mine). This powerfully contrasts with Solaar’s 
(1998) own assertion that he is “representing the French rhyme” [Je représente 
la rime hexagonale].
While Marti marvels at rappers’ attachment to French republican values— 
“Could rappers reveal themselves to be more republican than the Republic? It 
may be a bit excessive to say so, but they all display a profound attachment to 
some of its values. The republican motto ‘Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité’ is not 
without its appeal [n’est pas sans leur déplaire]”— he nevertheless describes them 
as “French on paper, a little less in the soul” (2005, pp. 235, 201). Similarly, 
while professor of French and Francophone literatures Valérie Orlando (2003) 
acknowledges rappers’ desire to be considered French— she cites a rapper as 
saying, “I’m French, formed by the Republican School system. I’m a young 
Maghrebian who mixes two languages, Arabic and French. Voilà! I’m a Mus-
lim Made in France!” (2003, p. 402)— she nevertheless concludes that “the 
Beurs17 seek to negotiate new identities for themselves somewhere between 
French and Other” (2003, p. 413, emphasis mine). By refusing to consent to rap-
pers’ assertions of French identity, these scholars theoretically reproduce the 
process of exclusion from full participation in French society hip- hop artists 
are denouncing in their work. In stark contrast to France’s official policy of 
color blindness, they subtly suggest that one cannot truly be French and black, 
brown, and/or Muslim (despite the fact that Islam is the second most widely 
practiced religion in France after Roman Catholicism).
The racial undertones of this positioning are indeed difficult to miss. For 
instance, after criticizing Solaar for using “turns of phrase that are poetic and 
‘close to home’ [bien de chez nous],” Boucher cites Fanon— “Nothing more 
sensational than a black expressing himself correctly, since, really, he as-
sumes the white world” (cited in Boucher, 1998, p. 123)— to suggest that So-
laar’s self- positioning as representative of French culture (I represent the French 
rhyme) compromises his black male identity. Boucher celebrates, on the other 
hand, the more “hard core,” “violent,” and “pure and hard [pure et dur]” rap 
of those who “want to keep their ‘authenticity’” (Boucher, 1998, pp. 120, 123, 
124, 124). This results in a gangsta rap- inspired characterization of “authen-
tic” ethnic/black identity as violent, threatening, and refusing to “integrate” 
that ultimately resonates with the discourse of ultra- conservative politicians 
and journalists who paint the banlieue as a site of social strife threatening 
France’s core identity. Scholars in the United States have pointed to the deeply 
essentializing nature of a similar process of definition in U.S. rap that “de-
nies and silences a wide range of black urban ghetto experiences and points 
of view” and ultimately serves as “a cover for perpetuating gross stereotypes 
about black people” (Rose, 2008, pp. 139, 141).
Associating authenticity with violence and street credibility also positions 
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rappers as cultural representatives of a limited conceptualization of ethnic/
racial/banlieue/ghetto identity that condemns them to a “a continuous rep-
resentation of the self ” [présentation de soi en continu] (Hennion, 2005, p. 122) 
from which they can only deviate at the risk of being accused of ethnic trea-
son. Like Spivak’s subaltern speech (1988), from the moment it gains recog-
nition (economic and otherwise) rappers’ discourse loses credibility as the 
voice of the oppressed and compromises their position as members of subal-
tern culture. In order to stay “pure”— Boucher describes ‘underground’ rap as 
“a step toward the myth of found again purity” (1998, p. 134, emphasis mine)— 
rappers must remain on the margins. Challenging such characterizations, 
Dyson suggests that we work to “acknowledge that it’s not a simple either/
or— either you sell out to white corporate interests and get exploited, or you 
stay pure and black and at home and undistributed and unable to cross over” 
(2007, p. 56).
French sociologist Anthony Pecqueux (2007) further warns that schol-
ars’ desire to validate “underground” rap’s political message often leads to 
a paradoxical idealization of rappers’ socio- cultural position as “representa-
tives of the street” that results in a suspension of critical judgment regard-
ing the genre’s violent, misogynist, and potentially racist subtexts (see also 
Gilroy, 1993). This, I contend, is often the case in analyses of hip- hop’s global 
spread, particularly as they relate to representation of gender.
Sexism: Global Rap’s Lost Dimension
“Gender and sexuality are central to the study of music’s cultural and emo-
tional resonance, often referred to as authenticity, in popular music studies,” 
writes Vincent Stephens (2005, p. 23) in his analysis of the intersection of 
gender, homophobia, and race in Eminem’s music. Scholars in the United 
States have powerfully critiqued U.S. hip- hop’s gendered constructions 
(see, for example, Calhoun, 2005; Conrad, Dixon, and Zhang, 2009; Dyson, 
2007; Peterson et al., 2007; Rose, 2008). Numerous others have explored the 
genre’s productive potential for feminist artists and scholars (for examples, 
see Haugen, 2003; Oware, 2007; Pough, Richardson, Durham, and Raimist, 
2007; Reid- Brinkley, 2008; Skeggs, 1993). Robust critiques of hip- hop’s mi-
sogynist subtext are, however, largely absent from analyses of the genre’s 
global spread.
For instance, while she acknowledges that female rappers often find it 
difficult to “reconcile their identity as rappers with their identity as women,” 
French sociologist Stéphanie Molinero (2009, p. 173) does not elaborate on 
why that might be the case in her analysis of rap’s reception in France. Her 
observation that rap’s public is mostly male and that female consumers tend 
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to prefer more commercial rap leads her to problematically conclude that 
women are uncritical media consumers who “remain dominated” (2009, p. 
194). Similarly, in his otherwise excellent analysis of hip- hop in Japan, Condry 
usefully acknowledges the presence and influence of female rappers on the 
Japanese hip- hop scene, yet fails to fully address the broader gender politics 
permeating the genre transnationally— including, but not limited to, the ob-
jectification of female bodies, the use of the “virgin/ho” stereotypical dichot-
omy, or the equation of “authentic” masculinity with violence and domination 
in some hip- hop texts.
Most frequently, analyses of gender in hip- hop’s different global incarna-
tions ultimately fall in line with a too familiar cultural narrative that recog-
nizes hip- hop as a historically male- dominated genre but suggests that the 
situation is slowly improving. Little empirical evidence supports this pic-
ture— at least when one looks at the more recently commercially successful 
forms of hip- hop. In fact, Rose convincingly argues that the relatively recent 
commercial success of gangsta rap has actually led to a sharp increase in hyper- 
sexism as the genre panders to “America’s racist and sexist lowest common 
denominator” (2008, p. 2). As a young artist involved in both the American 
and Japanese hip- hop scenes explained when asked whether she felt hip- hop 
today was still male dominated: “Yes, more than in the 90s, more than ever . . . 
[In the 90s] we got to see all different types of women.  . . . I saw women with 
negative messages, but I saw women with more positive messages, and I saw 
women working together, and that really shaped me as far as how I think 
about women in hip- hop and in culture, in terms of what we can have. But that 
was all taken away” (personal conversation, June 10, 2009, emphasis mine).
Scholars’ failure (or unwillingness) to fully address global hip- hop’s 
gender dynamics stems in part from the suspension of critical judgment dis-
cussed above and from scholars’ attempts to position themselves as “decod-
ers” of rappers’ messages (Pecqueux, 2007). Thus, rappers’ talk of sexual 
domination— as when Ministère AMER raps about retaliating against the po-
lice by having sex with and/or sodomizing their wives and daughters in Brigitte 
(Femme de Flic) (1992)— is interpreted solely as an act of rebellion against the 
establishment (Boucher, 1998; Marti 2005). Rappers’ suggestion that women 
should wear the Chador is seen as an act of provocation: “when Ministère 
AMER claims the Chador, it is first an act of provocation: Le tchador? C’est pour 
enerver les français! [the Chador? It’s to bug the French!]” writes Boucher (1998, 
p. 229). There is no denying that these acts are, at least in part, meant to pro-
voke. The fact, however, that this provocation is constructed through the ve-
hicle of women needs to be critically addressed. Wearing the Chador is not 
necessarily oppressive, but it should be a choice women make, not one dictated 
by male rappers. As Dyson reminds us, “Just because ‘the white man’s foot is 
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on your neck’ doesn’t mean that your foot can’t in turn be on a black female’s 
neck” (2007, p. 106).
This excusing of misogynist acts and/or lyrics as a form of subaltern ex-
pression also serves to locate sexism as an integral part of subaltern and/
or minority identity— as when Boucher notes that “dominated social actors 
can easily develop  . . . a form of segregation toward young women” (1998, 
p. 225). As Rose puts it when pointing to similar arguments in the U.S. con-
text: “It’s as if black teenagers have smuggled sexism and homophobia into 
American culture, bringing them in like unauthorized imports” (2008, p. 8). 
Such discussions not only construct “dominated social actors” as particularly 
sexist, but also— by defining hip- hop as an expression of dominated identity 
while it is, mostly, an expression of dominated male identity— normalizes 
masculinity in definitions of ethnic/racial identities. This results in a situation 
in which “black women simultaneously grapple with their disgust at black 
female representation in black popular culture and their fear of the possible 
ramifications for publicly attacking black men” (Reid- Brinkley, 2008, p. 249). 
As Rose concludes, “As long as the equation between attacking sexism in hip- 
hop and attacking black men remains in place, little critical commentary can 
occur within hip- hop culture, and women and men will continue to be viewed 
as traitors for challenging it and for demanding less exploitative expression” 
(2007, p. 157; see also Dyson, 2007; Morgan, 2004).
Thus, while it is important to acknowledge the contribution of female rap-
pers and recognize the fact that some artists (and scholars) have managed to 
re- appropriate and redefine elements of hip- hop’s misogynist subtext to form 
their own (feminist) cultural forms (Armstead, 2008; Báez, 2006; Pough, 
Richardson, Durham, and Raimist, 2007), we must also continue to more 
broadly critically explore hip- hop’s intersection with gender dynamics in a 
globalized world.
Among other things, doing so requires us to carefully locate rap’s misog-
yny within “the broader cultures of violence, sexism, and racism that deeply 
inform hip- hop, motivating the sales associated with these images” (Rose, 
2008, p. 28). After all, is Ministère AMER’s 1992 evocation of sexual activity 
with a “femme de flic” fundamentally different (even if perhaps more direct) 
than that of Brassens (1955/2005) some 37 years earlier, and to which the rap-
pers playfully refer? Indeed, the works of the celebrated artists French rap-
pers are frequently referring to point to a long tradition of rather less- than- 
empowering characterizations of female sexuality in popular French music. 
Brassens’ “Le Gorille” (1952/2004)— which French rapper Joey Starr (2006) 
refers to in “Gare au Jaguarr”— portrays women lusting after a large gorilla 
and suggests that an elderly woman would enjoy his sexual attention: “Bah, 
sighed the hundred- year- old woman / that someone might still desire me / 
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that would be extraordinary / and to be honest, beyond my wildest dreams 
[Bah, soupirait la centenaire / qu’on puisse encore me desirer / ce serait extraordinaire / 
et pour tout dire inespéré].” In case the nature of the sexual attention the gorilla 
might bestow on his prey is not clear enough, the term “rape” comes up later 
in the song: “Suppose that one of you might be / Like the ape forced to / rape a 
judge or a very old woman / which of the two would you choose? [Supposez que 
l’un de vous puisse être / Comme le singe, obligé de / Violer un juge ou une ancêtre / Lequel 
choisirait- il des deux?].”
In a similar vein, “Je suis un voyou” [I’m a ruffian], sung by both Bras-
sens in 1955 (1954/2002) and Renaud in 1996 (1996/2004), undermines the fa-
mous “no means no” rape education slogan by suggesting that women enjoy 
unsolicited sexual advances, even if they say they don’t. After descriptions of 
sexual activities ranging from biting the lips of the song’s heroine to tearing 
up her dress through “picking forbidden fruit in her blouse” the song repeat-
edly concludes: “She told me in a severe tone / ‘What are you doing?’ / But she 
let me go on / Girls are like that [Ell’ m’a dit, d’un ton sévère / ‘Qu’est- ce que tu fais 
là?’ / Mais elle m’a laissé faire / Les fill’s, c’est comm’ ça].”
One does not even know where to start with Gainsbourg, whose entire 
repertoire is famously permeated with characterizations of women as purely 
sexual objects: “There I take the girl and then pschtt (as in the sound made by 
a carbonated drink being opened) / I take my flight [Crac je prends la fille et puis 
pschtt / J’prends la fuite]” he sings in his onomatopoeia- filled 1973 song “Sen-
suelle et sans suite” (a play on words literally meaning “sensual and without 
follow up”), followed by: I’m a hero, for these little ones / Quick they’re on 
their back and me pschtt / I take advantage of it [J’suis un crac, pour ces p’tites / 
Crac les v’la sur l’dos et moi pschtt / J’en profite].
Of course, these often light- hearted songs are not meant to be taken 
literally— “Le Gorille” was intended as a biting attack on the death penalty 
(the gorilla ultimately chooses to rape the judge who screams like the man 
he had had executed that very morning)— and Gainsbourg’s bad boy image 
was an integral part of his media persona as he worked to shock French soci-
ety into discussing its greatest taboos.18 The same could be said, however, of 
much of rap’s content (Dyson, 2007).
Like the works of rappers they inspired, these songs’ representations of 
sexuality stirred much controversy in their own time even if they were to ul-
timately become celebrated pieces of French cultural heritage— “Le Gorille” 
was banned from the airwaves for two years after its release due to its “por-
nographic content.”19 Thus, rap’s tendency to treat women as sexual objects 
may be more productively addressed in relationship to this long legacy of 
similar representations in French popular music than as a symptom of sub-
altern (non- white/lower class) masculinity having to assert itself at women’s 
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expense. While the examples provided here draw from the French context, 
scholars in other cultural environments have made similar observations (see, 
for example, Dyson, 2007; Rose, 2008).
Questioning such a characterization would also help us more effectively 
address hip- hop’s potential contribution to the global spread of racial and 
cultural stereotypes, through its association (particularly in U.S. gangsta rap) 
of African American masculinity with violence and misogyny. While this as-
sociation has been to some extent problematized in the United States, it is 
not always as assertively addressed in studies of hip- hop as a transnational 
phenomenon. The spread of conceptions of authenticity “frequently defined 
by ideas about sexuality and patterns of interaction between men and women 
that are taken to be expressive of essential, that is, racial difference” (Gilroy, 
2004, p. 89) takes on new dimensions in a global context. As Gilroy puts it, 
“when these things come down the transnational wire to us in Europe and to 
black folks in other parts of the world, they become metaphysical statements 
about what blackness is” (2004, p. 90). In turn, these statements might reso-
nate, for non- black global audiences, with common stereotypes about black 
masculinity and/or U.S. culture as particularly sexist and violent (Condry, 
2006; Cornyetz, 1994), which can then be opposed to the situation “at home.” 
As Japanese female rapper Coma- chi explained when asked what she thought 
about the representation of women in U.S. hip- hop: “In Japan, mainstream 
hip- hop does not do that, they respect women. . . . I think it’s related to Japanese 
culture” (personal conversation, June 2009, emphasis mine). Recognizing that 
rap’s misogynist and violent subtext resonates with various aspects of global 
and local culture— not just those attributed to African American voices— 
might help complicate this notion.
No One Is Pure: Hybridity as Hip- hop’s Productive Potential
Because of the tensions that inevitably arise when subaltern voices attempt 
to gain recognition within the environment responsible for their domination, 
hip- hop has long been mired in identity politics. Its global spread has, how-
ever, rendered its politics of representation exponentially more complex. Hip- 
hop’s claims to authenticity are, for better or for worse, as varied as the dif-
ferent cultural environments to which the genre has been adapted. As Condry 
suggests, whether or not one accepts these claims is based on one’s location 
and is, to some extent, arbitrary. Thus, assertions of hip- hop’s “true” essence, 
if useful in helping us “understand conventions of inclusion and exclusion” 
(Condry, 2006, p. 35), are problematic at best, particularly when considering 
hip- hop as a globally influential genre.
But just because hip- hop has come to mean different things to different 
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people in different places does not mean that it has lost all meaning, or its 
productive potential. One of the most positive side effects of hip- hop’s com-
mercial success and its transnational spread is the multifaceted nature of the 
tensions it has introduced into notions of political engagement vs. commodi-
fication, into constructions of racial, ethnic, national, cultural, and class iden-
tities, and into the relationship between the global, the national, and the local. 
Global hip- hop’s productive potential rests, in other words, in its (ethnic, ra-
cial, cultural, (trans)national, commercial, underground, linguistic, regional, 
and so on) hybridity, which, rather than granting individuals ownership over 
essentialized identities, destabilizes boundaries. It rests on its ability to pro-
duce a “different notion of authenticity” that “affirms the value of mixing and 
what might be called creolization” (Gilroy, 2004, p. 91)— a form of authentic-
ity, as Gilroy concludes, “premised on the notion of flows” (2004, p. 91).
In this sense, the most “political” aspect of Japanese and French rappers’ 
intervention into their respective socio- cultural contexts is perhaps their po-
tential to ignite a discussion— at the local, national, and transnational level— 
about what it means to be Japanese and/or French. When Japanese rappers 
point to the plight of burakumin, nikkeijin,20 or Korean immigrants and their 
descendants, when they ask their audience to acknowledge the legacy of Ja-
pan’s imperialist history, they challenge hegemonic constructions of Japan as 
a racially and ethnically homogeneous nation21 and engage in a “transnational 
cultural politics of race by critiquing the enduring racism among right- wing 
Japanese toward their Asian neighbors” (Condry, 2006, p. 45).
Likewise, when French rappers claim their position as both representa-
tives and producers of “French culture” while simultaneously addressing the 
legacy of colonialism and celebrating hybridity, they help destabilize cultur-
ally and racially essentialist notions of what it means to be French and “cre-
ate other cultural forms that will become new references for French society 
and will be reappropriated within [France’s] cultural heritage” (Boucher, 
1998, p. 366). While France’s institutions may be slow to change, scholars 
have pointed to the profound effect hip- hop has had on conceptualizations 
of French cultural identity (see, for example, Orlando, 2003; Stam and Sho-
hat, 2012, p. 146). “Contemporary French hip- hop culture’s music and films 
demonstrate,” Orlando argues, “how the urban multiethnic communities of 
France are being reconstructed to bring the voice of the disconnected into the 
mainstream. As these artistic modes exemplify, France’s identity is no longer 
rooted in the tenets of assimilationist theory which marginalize ethnic minor-
ities on the peripheries of Français- de- souche culture” (2003, p. 412).
Even the notion of français- de- souche, however, is deconstructed by French 
rappers— as when French solo artist Passi (2000) (formerly of the group 
Ministère AMER), raps in his second solo album: “Our first steps were in 
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Africa five million years ago / if you put A+B together you will see we are all 
immigrants” [Nos premiers pas c’était en Afrique il y a cinq millions d’années / si 
tu fais A+B tu verras qu’on est tous des immigrés]. Or, as the French group KDD 
(1998) suggests, “We must remix France with our couscous sauce”22 [Il faut 
remanier la France à notre sauce couscous]. It is by claiming a hybridized identity 
as black/beur/from the banlieue (etc.) and French à part entière [fully French] 
that French rappers are being most political. As the group Sniper concludes in 
their 2001 song titled “La France” [France]: “France to the French (referring 
to a commonly used ultra- conservative slogan) / as long as I’m here / that will 
be impossible [La France aux français / tant que j’y serai / ce sera impossible].”
As a genre that, from its inception, was built upon both claims of au-
thenticity (at least symbolically) based on individuals’ material engagement 
with (hyper)local contexts and links to an imagined global community, hip- 
hop provides a particularly useful terrain from which to explore the mutu-
ally constitutive nature of the local/national/global nexus and its intersection 
with the politics of race, ethnicity, class, and gender. This chapter demon-
strates that hip- hop, as a global phenomenon, cannot be adequately under-
stood with a lens too broadly aimed at the political economic dynamics of its 
global spread or too narrowly focused on its local identity politics. It is only 
by considering hip- hop as a translocal genre built upon local- to- local connec-
tions within a global context— rather than as a global, local, or even localized 
phenomenon— that we can fully tease out its complex dimensions. Perhaps 
most importantly, a translocal perspective helps us critically assess which 
boundaries remain untouched both in artists’ conceptualizations of global hy-
bridity and in scholarly discussions surrounding the genre. It helps us move 
beyond the recognition of hip- hop’s hybrid nature to begin to tease out which 
hybridity gets privileged and how it matters. It helps us grasp, in other words, 
“how power works in concrete local settings” against the backdrop of global 
processes (Kraidy and Murphy, 2008, p. 351, emphasis in original). This case 
study demonstrates, in particular, that while recognizing hip- hop’s produc-
tive potential, we must work to more fully address its possible contribution to 
globally distributed hegemonic conceptualizations of masculinity, femininity, 
and sexuality that powerfully intersect with racial, ethnic, and national identi-
ties on multiple levels.
The complex translocal dynamics permeating hip- hop’s worldwide spread 
also illustrate the need to move beyond characterizations of transnational cul-
tural influence couched in a simplistic dichotomy between the United States 
as the most influential global cultural producer and a homogenized “Rest.” In 
order to further deconstruct such conceptualizations, the next chapter turns 
to Japan as a site of global cultural production. Comparing Japanese anima-
tion’s powerful and complex impact on the French popular cultural scene to 
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its trajectory into the U.S. context, it illustrates how analyses too narrowly fo-
cused on the U.S. experience result in dangerously essentializing character-
izations of both “the West” and “Japan.” It demonstrates the productive po-
tential of decentralizing the United States’ position as both a global cultural 
producer and as the taken- for- granted representative of “the West” in the recep-
tion of global culture.
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What West Is It? Anime and Manga 
according to Candy and Goldorak
Lord Ko, le dinosaure, deux balafres comme Albator
[Lord Ko[ssity] the dinosaur, two scars like Albator]
— French rapper Lord Kossity, Gladiator (2001)
Japanese “cool” is traveling popularly and profitably around the world and 
insinuating itself into the everyday lives and fantasy desires of postindustrial 
kids from Taiwan and Australia to Hong Kong and France.
— Allison, 2006, p. 5
If Japan’s rise to economic superpower dominated U.S. academic discussions 
in the 1980s, the last 15 years or so have been marked by an intense fascina-
tion, both in academic and popular discourse, with the country’s perceived 
increase in global cultural influence (see, for example, Faiola, 2003; Talbot, 
2002). As Pokémon and Hello Kitty invaded U.S. TV screens and supermarket 
aisles at a time when, paradoxically, Japanese economic influence was on the 
decline, U.S. scholars (and a good number of Japanese officials) started to 
point to the emergence of a new kind of Japanese superpower. The discus-
sion shifted from Japan’s Gross National Product to its “Gross National Cool” 
(McGray, 2002). The characters in Japanese animated cartoon series (anima-
tion or anime) and in the related genre of manga (Japanese- style comic books 
or graphic novels), along with their videogame cousins, came to symbolize a 
new order in millennial capitalism characterized by a decline in U.S. cultural 
hegemony and the fragmentation of global powers (Allison, 2006). Thus, 
Japanese animation provides a logical starting point to an analysis aimed at 
decentralizing the role of the United States as the world’s most significant 
global cultural producer.
This chapter will demonstrate, however, that while intending to point to 
Japan’s growing influence and to a concomitant relative decline in U.S. power, 
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the academic and popular discourse about Japanese animation’s “global” pop-
ularity has paradoxically resulted in the re- centralizing of the United States as 
both a global cultural producer and a consumer of globalized cultural forms. 
Turning a translocal lens to the genre’s transnational spread, this chapter il-
lustrates the multiple ways in which this discourse is problematic. Throughout 
the chapter, the names of a few scholars will frequently reappear. These schol-
ars are most assertively critiqued here not because their work is particularly 
problematic but, on the contrary, because they have produced the most com-
prehensive and sophisticated studies of Japanese animation and/or comics. 
Their works have become seminal texts in the academic study of Japanese pop-
ular culture in general and have greatly contributed to our understanding of 
its influence in the U.S. context. The chapter’s deconstruction of these schol-
ars’ characterization of global processes is offered in an effort to illustrate the 
productive potential of a more translocal approach. It does not invalidate their 
otherwise positive contributions to the field of Japanese studies.
The chapter starts with a critique of the tendency to merge the United 
States with “the West” in studies of Japanese animation’s global spread. It 
then turns to an analysis of the genre’s voyage to France— drawing both from 
historical evidence and from interviews with media consumers— to illustrate 
the multiple ways in which its powerful intersection with the French popular 
cultural context differed from its influence in the United States. It concludes 
with a reflection on what we can learn theoretically from these differences 
about the nature of the global imagination and its significance for media con-
sumers. It points, in particular, to the relatively unique position of the United 
States in relationship to “non- native” globalized popular cultural forms.
The Japanese term “anime” will frequently be used in the chapter as a 
shortcut for “Japanese animation.” The Japanese term “manga” will be used 
to refer to Japanese comic books and to differentiate these texts from their 
European counterparts, generally known as bandes dessinées (or the abbreviated 
“BD”), and from U.S.- style comic books.
The West according to the United States
The academic discourse on Japanese animation’s impact on “Western” cul-
tural environments tends to remain dominated today by the works of U.S. 
critics— most of them cultural anthropologists, Asian studies scholars, and/
or individuals with a long- term engagement in the genre’s fan subculture— 
and (to a lesser extent) by scholars of Japanese origin operating within an 
Anglo American academic setting. This is due in part to the fact that cultural 
studies in the United States and Britain has raised the status of popular cul-
ture to a higher level than in other academic contexts, resulting in a situation 
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in which Japanese academia has yet to fully enter the conversation (Choo, 
2008). The historical significance of Japan’s relationship to the United States 
also partly explains this situation. While these works have contributed to our 
understanding of anime’s cultural meaning in the Japanese context (see, for 
example, Napier, 2005, 2007; Poitras, 2008; Schodt, 1983, 1996, 2007) and 
of the significance of its entry into U.S. culture, their tendency to position 
the United States as representative of all of “the West” limits their usefulness 
when considering Japanese animation as a global genre (Berndt, 2008).
“America” and “the West” are frequently used interchangeably in discus-
sions of anime’s “global” spread. For example, after noting that the genre 
must convince “American children to adapt to its aesthetics,” U.S. cultural his-
torian Gary Cross continues with the observations that “Western children may 
embrace Japanese animation because it is ‘foreign’ and thus ‘cool’” (2006, 
p. xviii, emphasis mine). In his description of its search for “an appreciative 
Western audience” cultural critic Shinobu Price notes that “anime has been ap-
pearing on major U.S. television networks since the 1960s” but that “the true 
crossover boom came in the early 80’s when a new generation of Americans” 
began to appreciate it (2001, p. 160, emphasis mine). After observing that 
“Japanese animation was initially very hard to come by in the West,” profes-
sor of Japanese literature and culture Susan Napier adds that “a few series  . . . 
crossed into American television, but they were almost always Americanized be-
yond recognition” (2007, p. 134, emphasis mine).
More generally, these works tend to uncritically equate the cultural and 
historical trajectory of U.S. consumers’ engagement with anime and/or 
manga with that of the rest of “the West.” For example, when popular author 
Gilles Poitras suggests that “adult Westerners” are not familiar with Japanese 
animation and later contrasts Japanese texts to “the cartoons of their youth” 
(2008, p. 48), he is ignoring the fact that a rather large number of “adult West-
erners” outside of the United States actually grew up on rather heavy doses of 
Japanese animation, as this chapter will soon demonstrate. Similarly, while 
Napier sets out to analyze the cultural significance of Japanese influence in 
the mind of the West (as suggested by the title of her book), her conclusion that 
“unlike the fan cultures existing around Star Trek or Star Wars, non- Japanese 
fans of anime are coalescing around a non- domestic fan product that until quite 
recently did not even appear in English” (2007, p. 136, emphasis mine) implies that 
the “non- Japanese” fans she is describing are in fact both American (Star Trek 
or Star Wars as “domestic” products) and English speakers.
These slippages on the part of U.S.- based scholars studying Japanese 
cultural production are understandable considering the fact that a similar 
merging between “the West” and “America” frequently happens in Japan. 
Unfortunately, this results in the development of a genealogy of Japanese ani-
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mation’s entry into “Western” cultural territory based on a rather limited and 
not particularly “representative” set of circumstances. This genealogy almost 
exclusively equates “Western” animation with Disney in its comparisons with 
Japanese productions (see, for example, Napier, 2005; MacWilliams, 2008; 
Poitras, 2008; Price, 2008), focuses only on the relatively small portion of 
texts that “made it” to the United States, and pinpoints Japanese animation’s 
initial entry into “the West” to the 1960s (with such texts as Speed Racer, Astro 
Boy, and Kimba, the White Lion) but sees its apogee as taking place in the late 
1980s and beyond (Patten, 2004).
While this genealogy may paint an accurate portrait of Japanese anima-
tion’s relationship to U.S. popular culture and of the significance of U.S. fans’ 
engagement with these texts, it fails to take into account the genre’s different 
trajectory into other “Western,” particularly non- English- speaking, environ-
ments, as well as in other parts of the world. This “crossing of the Pacific” 
version of anime’s spread to “the West” must be problematized. A translo-
cal comparison with the French popular cultural context helps us accomplish 
this goal.
A Different “West”
Contrasting anime’s entry into the U.S. cultural context to its influx onto the 
French popular cultural scene quickly reveals differences that allow us to start 
deconstructing notions of the United States as representative of “the West.” 
Most broadly, Japan’s relationship to France is premised on a different set of 
historical circumstances than its relationship to the United States steeped in 
the legacy of its World War II defeat, of the psychologically marking events of 
the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and of a postwar period 
marked by American occupation and concomitant cultural influence. The full 
details of the complex cultural outcome of these historical events have been 
outlined by numerous scholars (see, for example, Gordon, 1993; Iriye, 1967) 
and are beyond the scope of this book, but suffice it to note that the United 
States’ shift from enemy to protector in the mind of the Japanese public fol-
lowed a necessarily tortuous path that continues to mark these two nations’ 
relationships. Similarly, Japan’s economic rise in the 1980s was experienced 
differently in the United States than in other parts of the world. Anxieties in 
the United States over Japan’s economic success— over the possibility that Ja-
pan may have after all “won the war” or “beaten America at its own game”— 
were so strong not only because they threatened the United States’ global 
economic domination but, more profoundly, because they challenged the very 
core of American identity as the world’s leader (Napier, 2007).
Japan’s relationship to France has, in contrast, been relatively less antago-
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nistic. If dread of the “yellow peril” certainly spread to France during World 
War II— and resurged to some extent in the 1980s— Hitler’s Germany rep-
resented a much more immediate and alarming enemy whose presence on 
French soil powerfully contrasted with the remoteness of the war in the Pa-
cific. Thus, as French cultural critic Anne Garrigue puts it, “Asia is today . . . a 
region that a majority of French nationals approach in a less confrontational 
or desperate manner than Africa, the Middle East or the United States” (2004, 
p. 15). It is a region, she adds, that “has always occupied a special place in our 
imaginary” (2004, p. 26, emphasis mine).
France’s relationship to Japan is indeed marked by a long history of trans-
national borrowing epitomized by the Japonisme of 19th- century French writ-
ers and artists whose “fan culture” (they gathered over Japanese food and sake 
to admire woodcut prints, which many of them collected, and wrote sonnets 
of haiku inspiration) is reminiscent of the anime and manga fan activity Na-
pier (2007) describes— a fact that, incidentally, she aptly recognizes. If this 
admiration for all things Japanese was tinted with Orientalism, it nevertheless 
had a remarkable impact on the development of French visual culture, an im-
pact that set up the stage for the later influence of the highly visual genres of 
anime and manga.
Furthermore, because of the circumstances of its historical development, 
the French media landscape provided a much more amenable terrain to early 
anime’s entry than the U.S. context. The destruction of the French infrastruc-
ture caused by World War II bombings and the German occupation resulted 
in a relatively later development of domestic television production and a later 
spread of television to a majority of French households. In 1950, television 
broadcasting only covered about 10 percent of the French territory, and French 
households owned a total of only about 3,500 sets. France’s second television 
channel was inaugurated in 1964, its third (a local channel that did not cover 
the entire territory) in 1972, its fourth came only in 1984. All non- pay channels 
were public until 1986, and cable and satellite did not have a strong penetra-
tion until the late 1990s.
This resulted in a situation in which French television consumers grow-
ing up in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s (the time, as we will soon 
see, of Japanese animation’s intense penetration of the French media mar-
ket) had access to a more limited set of viewing choices, mostly provided by 
the two largest (then) public channels, TF1 and Antenne 2, than viewers in 
the United States. If “by 1968 Japanese animation had become virtually un-
salable in America” because “American studios were creating an increasing 
quantity of TV cartoons better tailored for American audiences” (Patten, 2004, 
p. 54), Japanese animation encountered little such “native” competition on 
the French market. France’s comparatively weak position as a global cultural 
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producer has meant that it has long been flooded with all sorts of foreign im-
ports. The fact that quotas are still in place today to guarantee French cultural 
products a mere 35 to 40 percent share of the French audiovisual primetime 
landscape powerfully illustrates the scope of this foreign penetration.
Thus, despite the common stereotype of France as “a country not known 
for its generosity to non- native cultural products” (Napier, 2005, p. 5), French 
consumers are actually quite familiar with “non- native” fare. In addition to 
“native” texts such as French comedy films or Franco- Belgian comic books 
(bandes dessinées or BD’s) and to the usual globally distributed Hollywood and 
Disney blockbusters, the media consumers I interviewed in France reminisced 
about growing up with (British) Enid Blyton books— as a man in his 40s put 
it, “my entire childhood was shaped by Enid Blyton”1— American and Aus-
tralian TV series— “Little House on the Prairie, oh my, how I cried watching Little 
House on the Prairie!” (41- year- old woman)— Italian Westerns, German cop 
shows, and, of course, Japanese or Euro- Japanese animation.
Texts as diverse as the Japanese City Hunter, Captain Tsubasa, Princess Sarah, 
Heidi (both animated series), Dragon Ball Z, and Power Rangers, the Franco- 
Belgian Asterix, Tintin, Boule et Bill, The Smurfs, and Largo Winch (the comic book 
version), the French Barbapapas, Mickey Magazine, Hélène et les Garçons, and Tom 
Tom et Nana, the American Batman, Scooby- Doo, MacGyver, Lost, X- Men, House, 
M.D., CSI, Desperate Housewives, The A- Team, and Shrek, and the Swedish Pippi 
Longstocking, along with Tim Burton and Miyazaki films (to mention just a few), 
all repeatedly came up in interviews. Older viewers might add Candy, Goldorak, 
Ulysse 31, Saint Seiya, The Wild Wild West, The Avengers, Zorro, Maya l’Abeille, L’Ile aux 
Enfants, and Woody Allen and Wong Kar- Wai films to the mix. A highly non- 
scientific survey conducted in early 2010 of the vast DVD aisle of the supermar-
ket near the small town where I conducted fieldwork counted 18 non- French 
titles in its “top 20” recent DVDs. The DVD release of Avatar was quite an event 
for several weeks a few months later. In other words, the fact that France “in 
the mid 1990s carried over 30 hours a week of Japanese cartoons” (Napier, 
2005, p. 5) rested in large part on these cartoons’ intersection with an already 
hospitable cultural terrain and on a differently conditioned engagement with 
global popular cultural production than is found in the United States.
In addition, French media consumers’ attitude toward Japanese cultural 
texts is shaped in part by France’s complex relationship to U.S. popular cul-
ture whose highly popular nature raises the specter of cultural imperialism. In 
an essay comparing the cultural policies of the United States, Europe, and Ja-
pan, political scientist Harvey Feigenbaum reminds us of the relatively unique 
position held by the United States vis- à- vis transnational cultural influence. 
Noting that “every member of UNESCO voted in favor of the Universal Decla-
ration on Cultural Diversity, with the sole exceptions of the United States and Israel” 
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(2007, p. 374, emphasis mine), he suggests that “for Europeans, and others, 
the ubiquity of American popular culture is at best a mixed blessing, and to 
most represents one of the major liabilities of globalization” (2007, p. 375). 
Thus, as Garrigue contends, engagement with Japanese anime or manga can 
serve as “a form of resistance to American cultural hegemony” (2004, p. 114) 
on the part of French media consumers.
Anime’s Voyage to France
The differences between France’s and the United States’ historical and cul-
tural relationships to Japan (and to each other) have resulted in tangible dif-
ferences in the way anime and manga came to influence these two contexts. 
First of all, while Napier suggests that the 1989 release of Katsuhiro Otomo’s 
Akira “in many ways can be seen as the film that started the anime boom in 
the West” (2005, p. 41), the first major wave of culturally influential Japanese 
animation— France’s “anime boom”— actually hit France a full 10 years ear-
lier. It came with the broadcasting of two highly influential texts: Toei Anima-
tion’s Goldorak (UFO Robot Grendizer in Japanese) first aired on July 3, 1978— 
less than 18 months after it finished airing on the Japanese Fuji TV— and the 
hugely globally popular shôjo (girl) anime Candy (Candy Candy) on September 
18 of the same year, before it finished airing on NET TV (now TV Asahi) in 
Japan. Both were broadcast as part of (the French public channel) Antenne 2’s 
children’s program Récré A2. Both were inspired by popular manga (the Candy 
manga was published in France in 1982).
Due in part to the scarcity of programming targeted at a younger audience 
on French television at the time, these two texts enjoyed an immediate phe-
nomenal success. Goldorak was so popular that it landed on the cover of the 
French news magazine Paris Match under the heading La Folie Goldorak [The 
Goldorak Madness] on January 5, 1979. Both programs were constantly rerun 
through the mid- 1990s, and their cultural significance cannot easily be over-
stated (Hermelin, 2000). As a male informant in his 40s recalled: “Goldorak, I 
knew it was Japanese because everyone talked about it when it first came out.” 
To this day, the generation who grew up in the late 1970s and early 1980s is 
frequently referred to in France as “la génération Goldorak” [the Goldorak gen-
eration] (Garrigue, 2004). When the digitally re- mastered unedited version of 
the first 12 episodes of the series was released on DVD in late May 2013, it 
quickly made it to the number 1 slot in national sales despite its rather steep 
price tag of €34.99.
Regardless of their age, the French media consumers I interviewed were 
all familiar with these two texts. When reminiscing about this first wave of 
Japanese animation, and some of the other series that quickly followed, their 
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typical first reaction was to burst into a rendition of their theme songs— I can 
myself still recall all of the lyrics of the French version of Candy’s opening 
song (titled Au Pays de Candy [In Candy’s Country— which, incidentally, refers 
to the United States]) as well as those of other classics. Those who had been 
part of Candy’s and Goldorak’s original target audience remembered them as 
the most influential programs they had watched in their youth: “our genera-
Fig. 1. Goldorak was the best-selling video throughout France in early June 2013 
(photo taken by the author at a local supermarket).
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tion, it’s Candy and Goldorak” explained a 40- year- old woman. “If I must cite 
one [show] that made me, ah! . . . that provoked emotions in me, it’s Candy! 
I watched the whole thing . . . from when they find her baby in the basket 
until . . . when she’s a nurse afterwards. Yes, from the beginning to the end.”
These media consumers, now in their mid- 30s to early 40s, fondly 
reminisced about Goldorak’s powerful “fulguropoing” [which might be 
loosely translated as lightningfist]— “Goldorak was great! The lightningfist! 
(33- year- old man). “Goldorak, yes, the lightningfist!” (40- year- old woman)— 
and the transforming robot’s other numerous impressive attributes: “There 
was the lightningfist, his fist shot off, that was really something! He trans-
formed into a space ship . . . and you could buy the figurine that you put into 
the space ship and there was the head, Goldorak’s head that stuck out. Gold-
orak, I’m telling you, that was quite a machine, not your average kitchen ap-
pliance!” (37- year- old man).
They also identified these shows as significant contributors to their cul-
tural identity. As the man quoted above concluded: “Goldorak, it’s universal. 
You can ask my brother, you can ask all the kids I lived with [his family was 
a host family for disadvantaged children in the summers], that’s it . . . the 
glue at the base of culture. Because in the end, that’s what we’re talking about 
here, culture.” Other scholars’ discussions with French media consumers 
have prompted similar comments— as when a young woman explained in an 
interview with Garrigue: “Candy and Goldorak marked my generation. When I 
was six years old, I followed these almost traumatizing, dramatic, intense sto-
ries with passion. In our eyes it was much stronger than Walt Disney” (2004, 
p. 126).
These shows’ success quickly led to a genuine tsunami of Japanese shows, 
particularly those produced by Toei Animation, on the French popular cul-
tural scene. In 1980, the space pirate Albator (mentioned by rapper Lord Kos-
sity in this chapter’s opening quote) possibly surpassed Goldorak in popularity, 
particularly among the female audience, with his flowing long hair, “virile at-
titude” (40- year- old woman), and the famous scar— “he was beautiful with 
his scar” (32- year- old woman)— that marked his angular facial features. He 
was quickly followed by Capitaine Flam (Captain Future) in 1981 and countless 
others too numerous to mention. While some of these early imports were 
“Goldorakesque” science fiction shows, others— including Isao Takahata and 
Hayao Miyazaki’s Heidi (Arupusu no Shôjo Haiji), which started airing in France 
in December 1978, Yoshihirô Kuroda and Fumio Kurokawa’s Bouba le Petit Our-
son (Seton Dôbutsuki Kuma no ko Jacky) in 1981, and Osamu Dezaki’s Remi sans 
Famille (Ie Naki Ko Remi) based on a well- known French novel by Hector Malot, 
and Hiroshi Saitô’s Tom Sawyer in 1982— drew from different corners of Japa-
nese anime’s vast repertoire. Yet others, such as San Ku Kai (broadcast in 1979 
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in both France and Japan) and X- Or (broadcast in Japan in 1982 and in France 
in 1983), while not animated (they featured live Japanese actors) resonated 
with the early science fiction animation in their themes and overall aesthetic.
From then on, different waves of Japanese texts were to follow, each mark-
ing a generation of French youths in slightly different ways. Thus, following 
“the Goldorak generation” of those growing up in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, Garrigue (2004, p. 124) identifies the “Chevaliers du Zodiaque (Saint 
Seiya) generation” (late 1980s) and the “Dragon Ball Z generation” (1990s and 
beyond). In line with this characterization, the French satellite channel Manga 
advertised in late 2009 its upcoming programming of Albator, Flo et les Robinson 
Suisses (The Swiss Family Robinson), Ranma ½, Olive et Tom (Captain Tsubasa), 
and Dragon Ball Z by claiming that it “remains the channel of all generations.”
Aside from their relatively early arrival when compared to the spread of 
culturally influential anime and manga to the United States, these texts are 
significant in that they differ from the texts typically identified as the “semi-
nal” texts of Japanese anime’s voyage to “the West”— Speed Racer, Astro Boy, 
and Kimba, the White Lion, followed, for a later generation more consciously 
engaged with the genre, by Akira, Ghost in the Shell, Neon Genesis Evangelion, the 
later Miyazaki films (Princess Mononoke, Spirited Away), and the lighter Pokémon 
and Yugi- oh. In fact, many of these shows— including Goldorak and Candy— 
were not shown as full stand- alone series in the United States2 and are, 
consequently, generally ignored by U.S. scholars who fail to recognize their 
influence not only in France but also throughout Europe, Africa, and Latin 
America.3 Discussions of the works of the extremely popular (among scholars 
as well as audiences) Hayao Miyazaki typically fail, for instance, to mention— 
other than occasionally in passing (see, for example, Drazen, 2003, p. 257)— 
that he was involved in the Heidi project along with his current Studio Ghibli 
partner Isao Takahata.
Equally disturbing is the fact that U.S. scholars frequently miss these texts’ 
significance in the Japanese context. In May 2009, a TV Asahi special claim-
ing to have 10,000 respondents ranked Heidi number one “favorite child-
hood anime” among Japanese female viewers (Cooper- Chen, 2010). In 2005, 
the Ghibli museum in Tokyo had a major exhibit on the show that detailed 
its creation, included many of its early drawings and sketches, and featured 
photographs of Takahata and Miyazaki posing near the house that served as 
the inspiration for the home of Heidi’s grandfather during a research trip to 
Switzerland— all this despite the fact that the show was produced for another 
animation studio. Heidi and her friends from the series were even given their 
own postage stamps by the Japanese postal system (Arupsu no shôjo Haiji no 
kitte [Girl from the Alps stamp], 2013) in January 2013.
Like their French counterparts, the Japanese media consumers I inter-
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viewed fondly recalled watching Candy Candy, Captain Tsubasa (Olive et Tom), 
Captain Harlock (Albator), Heidi, and the numerous other shows that were part 
of the Nippon Animation “World Masterpiece Theater” (Sekai Meisaku Gekijô) 
series. Lasting for 28 seasons from 1969 to 1997 and resumed in 2007, the 
series features works inspired by famous European and North American liter-
ary texts, including (in addition to Heidi and Remi sans Famille) such classics as 
Little Princess (Shôkôjo Sêra/Princess Sarah), Tom Sawyer, Anne of Green Gables (Akage 
no Anne), Little Women (Ai no Wakasu Monogatari), and A Dog of Flanders (Furandâsu 
no Inu). They, too, frequently broke into song when reminiscing about their 
childhood engagement with these texts.
Like their French counterparts, those old enough to have been part of 
the “Candy generation” identified it as a cultural reference point: “When 
I was young, there was Candy Candy, the manga. There was also the anime” 
(41- year- old woman). When I explained to one of them that I was going to 
ask her about the shows she watched while growing up, her response was 
“All the way from Candy Candy?” Another wanting me to clarify (in a differ-
ent interview) what I meant by “shows she watched while growing up” asked, 
“like Candy Candy?” Even those too young (or too male!) to remember watch-
ing Candy often nevertheless had a relationship with it: “It was popular when I 
was very small. And Candy Candy had a special box in the show and my mother 
bought me that box. That’s what I remember. I was too young to remember 
the show” (30- year- old female); “In my house, my older sister watched it, so 
I’ve seen it a few times” (39- year- old male). Again, the cultural significance 
(global and otherwise) of these texts is difficult to overstate.
From Candy to Totally Spies!: Localizing Japanese Texts  
(and “Japonizing” French ones)
These differences between the French and U.S. cultural landscapes have more 
generally resulted in anime’s influence being negotiated quite differently in 
these two contexts. While scholars in the United States identify Japanese ani-
mation as progressing from relatively “culturally odorless” texts (Iwabuchi, 
2002)— such as Speed Racer or even the early version of Pokémon from which 
references to Japan were carefully erased— to more culturally marked prod-
ucts consumed at least in part for their “Japaneseness” (Allison, 2006), anime 
and manga in France were quickly localized on different axes and in particu-
larly complex ways. Or, to put it differently, they developed a different kind of 
hybridity.
While the early seminal texts of anime’s entry into the French cultural con-
text may be seen as fairly culturally neutral, at least as far as Japanese culture 
is concerned— Candy is a young American girl, Goldorak is a war machine and 
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his pilot is, technically, an alien, Albator wanders somewhere through space 
in his pirate ship— these texts unmistakably adhere to the highly marked aes-
thetic of classic Japanese animation. Candy flaunts a prototypical 1970s shôjo 
(girl) manga look, while Goldorak draws from the equally recognizable tradi-
tion of Japanese robot/transformer/superheroes from outer space (his “color 
scheme” and “facial features” are reminiscent of Ultra Man’s, and he is con-
stantly fighting dragon- like robotic monsters). In other words, while these 
texts are not ostensibly set in a Japanese context and do not propose to “rep-
resent” aspects of Japanese culture— there are subtle references to Japanese 
daily life in Goldorak (such as when the characters eat onigiri) but these are 
mixed in with loads of references to other cultural environments— they are 
strongly visually marked as Japanese or, at least, different. As one French me-
dia consumer in her 20s explained, “Goldorak and all that, they didn’t have the 
same look [pas la même tête] as the other cartoons” or, as a 46- year- old woman 
similarly recalled, “I think that we started to realize where cartoons came 
from when the Japanese entered the production scene [. . .] First of all, it was 
a new graphic style, and also, a new generation of cartoons that didn’t look 
like what we had seen until then.”
French media consumers came to associate these texts’ visual features— 
color scheme, lines, editing— with their Japanese origin. As a 40- year- old 
female informant recalled, “I think that I knew that when they had big eyes, 
it was Japanese, because there was a particular drawing style [un graphisme 
particulier]. . . . Yes, Candy, Goldorak, I knew it was Japanese. . . . It was in re-
lationship to the graphic elements that we could recognize that.” Thus, as 
French cultural critic François Hermelin puts it, “For years, starting at the 
end of the 1970s, the Japanese cartoon series [séries de dessins animés japonais] 
that poured onto the European airwaves prepared the younger generation for 
the stereotypes of the Japanese genre” (2000, p. 142). These distinctive fea-
tures are still easily identifiable today— as a 19- year- old man explained, “They 
don’t have the same eyes . . . They have big eyes, the Japanese [characters] 
they have big round eyes”— even though they have been adapted to a variety 
of non- Japanese texts: “Now [the animated series] Totally Spies!, they do the 
same kind of thing, even though it is French”4 (40- year- old woman).
Furthermore, because of limited production budgets, visual elements 
pointing to anime’s Japanese origins could not always be erased when the 
genre first entered the French cultural context. As a Goldorak viewer in his 40s 
recalled, “When they went places . . . it was written in Japanese, and that is 
something that impressed me, because if they went to a store and picked up a 
can or something, it was written in Japanese on it.” Japanese writing in kanji 
and kana (the two sets of characters used to write Japanese) appeared in titles, 
credits, or in the opening scenes of these early shows. As a 42- year- old woman 
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explained, “In the ending credits you had [Japanese] characters. Even in the 
titles, there was writing in Japanese underneath [the French translation], I re-
member . . .” Songs in Japanese punctuated Heidi’s most emotionally charged 
moments. In a particularly interesting twist for French viewers, the maps of 
France used in Remi sans Famille to follow the hero and his companions’ travels 
throughout the country were labeled in katakana (the Japanese set of charac-
ters used to identify words of foreign origin). These subtle references to the 
Japanese cultural context created a form of visual and aural hybridity indepen-
dent of the texts’ (often already quite hybrid) scripted narrative.
These texts’ status as cultural phenomena also rested, however, on their 
successful integration into the broader French cultural context. This was 
accomplished in part through a process of localization that involved the in-
clusion of opening and ending songs in French marketed as separate texts 
and sung by well- known artists. Chantal Goya, who marked a generation of 
French children with her cheery pop songs (many of them written by her fa-
mous singer- songwriter husband Jean- Jacques Debout), performed the theme 
songs of Capitaine Flam (Captain Future), Bouba le Petit Ourson (Seton Dôbutsuki 
Kuma no Ko Jacky), and Les Quatres Filles du Docteur March (Ai no Wakasu Monoga-
tari/Little Women). Dorothée (a close friend of Goya’s) performed a reworked 
version of Candy’s opening song when the show re- ran on her program Club 
Dorothée in 1987. As a result, informants too young to recall Candy’s or Gold-
orak’s initial entry into the French media market frequently commented in in-
terviews that they “remembered the music better than the show.”
These singers’ performances served to intertextually link Japanese anima-
tion to other elements of the French popular cultural scene. Perhaps most sig-
nificantly, Dorothée hosted Antenne 2’s Récré A2 (the show that brought Candy 
and Goldorak to the French market) from 1978 to 1987, when she moved to 
TF1 to host Club Dorothée. Thus, as illustrated in the songs of the French rap-
pers discussed in chapter 4, most media consumers growing up in France be-
tween the late 1970s and the late 1990s (Club Dorothée went off the air in 1997) 
encountered Japanese animation through the culturally specific experience of 
watching one of these shows.5 It is an experience they recall with much fond-
ness, as in the exchange below worth quoting at length as it illustrates both 
Dorothée’s importance and anime’s omnipresence.
When asked to recall the shows that were most important to them when 
growing up, three women and one man, all in their early 20s, replied:
brigitte: Dorothée.
christine: That’s exactly what I was going to say!
anne: The Club Dorothée. I was a member of the club so, at the end, when 
they ran the credits, at the end they put on the birthdays . . . 
114  •  imagining the global
david (sPeaking at the same time): The birthdays!
anne: And so, my birthday went on . . . 
christine: No way!  . . . 
brigitte [to me]: Because she had registered.
anne: Yes, I was registered with the club and I had received their letter and 
after each episode at the end of the Club Dorothée they put the names 
of all the participants and the date of their birthdays and they put my 
birthday on.
david: Yes, the birthdays! The ending credits lasted forever!
fabienne (to david): Did you watch Club Dorothée?
david: Of course, they showed Dragon Ball6 and Olive et Tom (Captain 
Tsubasa).
brigitte: Oh yes! Olive et Tom!
christine: I watched Princess Sarah.
anne: Oh yes! Me too!
david: Nicky Larson [from the manga Shitîhantâ— City Hunter].
brigitte: I watched Princess Sarah, Sailor Moon.
christine: Me too, I loved it!
Everyone under the age of 40 with whom I had a conversation on the topic 
had similar reactions: “Dragon Ball Z, I watched Dragon Ball Z, it was aired 
on Club Dorothée, that was something Club Dorothée!” (37- year- old male); 
“First [I watched] Récré A2, then Club Dorothée. (. . .) there was Goldorak, Gold-
orak, that I remember. (. . .) Les Filles du Docteur March [Ai no Wakasu Monoga-
tari/Little Women], and Princess Sarah, a little later” (33- year- old female); “The 
Club Dorothée showed a lot of cartoons. There was Candy, Remi sans Famille . . .” 
(33- year- old male), “It was Goldorak, Albator, in other words, it was Dorothée! 
[C’était Dorotheé quoi!]” (40- year- old male).
If Dorothée’s programs did broadcast heavy doses of Japanese animation 
they also aired, however, a lot of other things— the French- produced Boule et 
Bill, Bibifoc, Johan et Pirlouit, and Clémentine, the American Fantastic Four, Masters 
of the Universe, George of the Jungle, Thundercats, and Spiderman, to name only a 
few. Furthermore, the immediate early success of Goldorak and Candy quickly 
prompted the development of numerous Franco- Japanese or Euro- Japanese 
co- productions that further blurred and complicated anime’s cultural origins. 
The 1981 Franco- Japanese Ulysse 31 loosely inspired, as its name suggests, 
by Homer’s Odyssey and the 1983 Franco- Luxembourgian- Japanese series Les 
Mystérieuses Cités d’Or (Taiyō no Ko Esuteban) relating the travels of a young Span-
ish boy to the New World in 1532 (it aired in Japan on the educational NHK 
public channel) were most frequently mentioned in interviews. Both are still 
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quite popular today, due in part to the fact that parents like to introduce their 
children to these highly influential texts. As one father explained, “I really 
liked Ulysse 31, and in fact, I introduced [my daughter] to it, I have the whole 
series, from the first to the last episode. [. . .] The Cités d’Or also, we know it 
all,” to which his daughter added, “I have the theme song!” One informant 
even suggested that a young boy named Esteban who attended the village’s 
school was named after the Cités d’Or’s main character (the show was still air-
ing on French television in the summer of 2014).
Thus, Japanese animation entered the French media market as one ele-
ment of a large repertoire of native, non- native, and co- produced texts. As 
Tom Sawyer, Capitaine Flam, and La Chanson de Candy joined such diverse titles 
as Bécassine, C’est Guignol, Comme Tintin, Babar, Bravo Popeye, Allons Chanter avec 
Mickey [Let’s Go Sing with Mickey], Snoopy, Mon Pinocchio, Les Schtroumpfs [The 
Smurfs], The Little Ewoks (yes, the ones from Star Wars), and the theme songs for 
Disney’s Davy Crockett or Rox et Rouky (The Fox and the Hound), in the repertoires 
of Dorothée and Chantal Goya, anime’s hugely popular characters joined a 
hybrid cast of global and local icons.
When Candy Met Asterix: Bandes Dessinées  
as a Vector of Manga’s Penetration
In the case of manga (which started to be distributed en masse in France in 
the 1990s) this process was further facilitated by the huge popularity and cul-
tural influence of bandes dessinées (BD)— the much- celebrated Franco- Belgian 
comic books— that created a particularly favorable cultural terrain for the re-
ception of the genre. Indeed, ever since the 1929 arrival of Tintin, the young 
Belgian reporter, on the Francophone popular cultural scene— followed by 
the Franco- Belgian Spirou et Fantasio in 1938, Lucky Luke in 1946, Gason Lagaffe in 
1957, and the legendary Gaulois Astérix et Obélix in 1959 (whose magic- potion- 
induced resistance to Roman domination and encounters with such mythi-
cal figures as Julius Caesar and Cleopatra have made them some of the most 
globally famous “French” citizens despite the fact that their story takes place 
before France existed as a nation)— bandes dessinées have become an integral 
part of France’s cultural identity. It is also a celebrated component of Franco-
phone global cultural capital.
The fact that two of the three floors of the small community library I fre-
quently visit when in France (located in a village of approximately 1,200 inhab-
itants) are dedicated to bandes dessinées and other graphic novels from around 
the globe— I found Jiro Taniguchi and Natsuo Sekikawa’s excellent historical 
manga series The Times of Botchan there— provides an anecdotal illustration of 
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the genre’s importance. So does the fact that the original artwork for the cover 
of Tintin en Amérique [Tintin in America], the third volume of the Adventures of Tin-
tin series published in 1932, recently sold for 1.3 million Euros at an auction in 
Paris (Lévêques and Johnny, 2012).
With comments such as “I had a neighbor friend whose father had all of 
[the Tintin and Asterix] [. . .] and it’s thanks to her that I read them all— I didn’t 
own all of them, but I have read them all” (40- year- old woman); “I didn’t have 
a lot of them at home, but I got some from my cousins” (43- year- old man); “I 
visited people who had adolescent children and they read a lot of Asterix and 
Obelix, or Gaston Lagaffe, so it made it easy because they lent us their books” 
(37- year- old man); “[Our daughters] are very much into BD’s right now. They 
started with the ones we had at home, with Asterix,” (42- year- old mother); and 
“there are so many BD’s, I can’t even tell you which ones [I read the most]” 
(13- year- old girl), the French media consumers I interviewed illustrated the 
extent to which bandes dessinées were simply an unavoidable feature of growing 
up in France.7
As a result, French informants all remembered reading bandes dessinées in 
their youth— Tintin, Asterix, Gaston Lagaffe, Lucky Luke, Iznogoud, Les Schtroumpfs, 
Yoko Tsuno, Les Tuniques Bleues, but also more “adult” fare such as Le Cinquième 
Evangile, Le Génie des Alpages, and Rubrique à Brac— and, often, U.S. comics as 
well. As a 33- year- old man recalled, “my sister loved the Marvels. So, I ended 
up reading them all because she had a lot of them. So there was Spiderman 
and the entire Wolverine team, Captain America and all of that . . .” Many 
continued to read them into adulthood— as a 43- year- old man quoted above 
added: “I’m in the process of buying them all again.”
Perhaps because bandes dessinées are more similar to Japanese manga than 
to American comics in their stylistic and thematic diversity (which ranges 
from science fiction and fantasy in texts such as Yoko Tsuno, Lanfeust de Troy, 
and La Quête de l’Oiseau du Temps to youth- oriented fare such as The Smurfs) and 
also because they are targeted to and read by adults as well as younger au-
diences, manga quickly resonated with French audiences. As Hermelin con-
tends, “[manga’s] popularity can no doubt be explained by the presence of a 
style common to these genres” (2000, p. 140; see also Garrigue, 2004, p. 110). 
Manga also offer a convenient, relatively cheaper alternative to the hardbound 
bandes dessinées that are released less frequently and sell for about €10 ($12 to 
$15) each.
As a result, manga integrated relatively easily into the French media mar-
ket. In fact, France is one of the largest markets for the sale of manga outside 
Japan, bringing in 50 percent of all European sales (Davidson, 2012). While 
the distinctive aesthetic qualities of the Japanese texts are generally recog-
nized, however, manga are not necessarily perceived in France— as is the 
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tendency among U.S. fans (Napier, 2005, 2007)— as an entirely separate cat-
egory. Manga are now exhibited at the Frankfurt international book fair and 
celebrated at the Angoulême festival, the “Mecca of Franco- Belgian BD” (Gar-
rigue, 2004, p. 109). Even at the production level, manga and Franco- Belgian 
bande dessinée are becoming increasingly linked. For example, French cartoon-
ist Frédéric Boilet’s Nouvelle Manga movement “aligns like- minded creators 
of bande dessinée (BD) and manga under one conceptual banner” (Vollmar, 
2007, p. 34) and encourages French and Japanese artists to collaborate (see 
also Boilet, 2006). In sharp contrast to the clearly dichotomized treatment of 
foreign and domestic production in the cultural policies of the French gov-
ernment, the consumption of manga and anime has come to represent one 
(important) dimension of French consumers’ multidimensional engagement 
with global cultural production.
Anime and U.S. Academic Cultural Imperialism
Aside from challenging the stereotype of France as a culturally arrogant na-
tion closed to outside influences, the differences between anime and manga’s 
encounters with the French and U.S. cultural contexts point to the dangers of 
assuming that the Anglo- American experience of (trans)cultural negotiation 
matches that of the rest of the West.
On the most basic level, this assumption leads to inaccuracies in the as-
sessment of the possible factors of influence that might have led to anime 
and manga’s popularity in “the West.” For instance, the common argument 
that anime’s “far more open approach to sex and nudity” (Napier, 2007, p. 
135)— which, according to Price is “from a Western perspective, certainly one 
of [its] most shocking features” (2001, p. 159, emphasis mine)— had an im-
portant impact (both negative and positive) on the genre’s initial reception 
in “the West,” does not fully apply to the fairly large portions of “the West” 
where sex and nudity are approached in a much more open manner (both vi-
sually and culturally) than in the United States.8
Similarly, the notion that anime provides an antidote to the formulaic 
happy endings of “Western” texts and allows “Western” audiences “to ‘break 
the rules’ of Western culture, to go beyond the Hollywood happy endings, or 
the need for a defined good and evil” (Napier, 2007, p. 204) may apply to parts 
of the U.S. audience. It does not adequately explain, however, the genre’s at-
traction for the large portion of the “Western” audience for whom ambiguity 
and non- happy endings— including in texts targeted at younger audiences— 
are more culturally resonant. I was recently reminded, for instance, of the un-
comfortably unsettling ending of Antoine de Saint- Exupéry’s much celebrated 
Le Petit Prince, read by most French children as they enter third grade (and 
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highly popular in Japan) when, incidentally, reading its graphic novel version 
(found in the public library described above) with my children. Remi tragi-
cally loses most of his companions in the course of his coming- of- age voyage 
through France in both the French novel and the Japanese animated series. 
Hollywood and Disney, while certainly globally influential, are not the only 
“Western” texts available to worldwide audiences.
This positioning of the United States as the natural representative of “the 
West” ignores the experiences and cultural contributions of non- U.S. (partic-
ularly non- English speaking) “Westerners” and essentializes both “the West” 
and Japan. As values most closely associated with U.S. culture are uncritically 
attributed to all of “the West”— as when Yamanaka contrasts Miyazaki’s texts 
with the Calvinist ethic of rugged individualism, which he links to the United 
States but describes as “the Western model” (2008, p. 245)— “Western cul-
ture” is treated as if it were a singular homogenized entity (see, for example, 
Napier, 2005, 2007).
Perhaps more disturbingly, failing to compare anime and manga to a 
broader set of transnational cultural references results in a limited under-
standing of their significance as Japanese genres. Too close a focus on the 
U.S. context produces descriptions that “tend to reinforce exoticism and neo-
nationalism” (Berndt, 2008, p. 297) by characterizing anime and manga as 
unique and peculiar.
Because anime consumption in the United States developed as a fan activ-
ity initially “very closely intertwined with the SF and comics fandoms from 
which it has grown” (Patten, 2004, p. 57; see also Cooper- Chen, 2010), U.S. 
consumers’ engagement with the genre is generally more exclusive than in 
France or Japan— and, as noted above, not quite as widespread. Cultural 
critic Henri Jenkins’ description of manga and anime’s entrance into the U.S. 
market “through small distributors who targeted Asian immigrants” and of 
its spread through “fans [who] would venture into ethnic neighborhoods in 
search of content” or “start their own small- scale (and sometimes pirate) op-
erations” (2011, p. 550) powerfully contrasts with Goldorak’s or Candy’s spec-
tacular and very public (remember the Paris Match cover) entry onto the French 
popular cultural scene.
The relatively narrow focus on a more “culturally fragrant” repertoire— 
which typically does not include anime and manga’s engagement with Euro-
pean or North American cultural productions (Heidi, Tom Sawyer, Remi, Anne of 
Green Gables)— further amplifies the tendency to characterize these genres as 
exotic and different. Price concludes, for instance, that “the way anime uses 
its medium of animation is so fundamentally different from the artistic tradi-
tion of Walt Disney, that it creates a freshly intriguing aroma that lures foreigners 
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into its mist [sic]” (2001, p. 166, emphasis mine). Napier contends that “anime, 
at least until very recently, has been uncompromisingly true to its Japanese 
roots” (2007, p. 5). Celebrated manga aficionado and popular author Frederik 
Schodt claims that manga are “an open window onto the Japanese id, a view— 
not necessarily of reality itself— but of a culture’s aspirations, dreams, night-
mares, fantasies, and fetishes” (2008, p. vii).
This positioning of anime and manga as both highly distinctive and “rep-
resentative” of Japanese culture powerfully resonates with the nationalist dis-
course on Japanese uniqueness promoted in Japan by conservative politicians 
and critics. Jacqueline Berndt, a German- born scholar who teaches at Yoko-
hama National University, challenges such claims of “national particularity” 
(2008, p. 305). She warns, however, that “from a foreign perspective it is easy 
to repeat this position without realizing its essential conservatism” (2008, p. 
305; see also Vollmar, 2007). This positioning also obscures the presence of 
more prosaic non- cultural factors contributing to the Japanese genres’ global 
popularity.
Indeed, if fans’ engagement with anime and manga certainly facilitated 
their global spread (Leonard, 2005), the facts that their exportation turned out 
to be highly economically viable and that the Japanese government has come 
to recognize them as significant tools of Japanese transnational influence— as 
illustrated by the Japanese Ministry of Education prize established in 1990 
(Kinko, 2008)— are equally significant. In a move that he qualifies as a case 
of “soft nationalism,” Asian and Religious studies scholar Mark MacWilliams 
notes, for instance, that since the Iraq war, the Japan foundation has made 
the broadcasting of the Captain Tsubasa (Olive et Tom in French) series— highly 
popular as Captain Majed in the Middle East since the 1990s— on Iraqi national 
television “one of the key priorities of its cultural diplomacy” (2008, pp. 15, 
16). The Japanese coalition forces even obtained permission to put Captain 
Tsubasa stickers on their trucks. As he concludes, “In effect, Captain Tsubasa 
as ‘Captain Majed’ became an important part of the Japanese government’s 
public relations campaign to propagandize its reconstruction efforts.  . . . 
Here, Japanimation is used as a cipher of Japanese identity” (2008, p. 16). 
Political scientist Peng Er Lam similarly locates the use of manga and anime 
as “instruments of global outreach and appeal” within a larger effort on the 
part of the Japanese government to promote “a cheerful ‘Japan Cool’ thesis” 
(2007, pp. 353, 352) seeking to burnish Japan’s international image (see also 
Condry, 2009).
Pointing to the fact that anime and manga constitute “an extraordinary 
successful culture industry,” Berndt also reminds us that their characteriza-
tion as specifically Japanese, in what she deems a form of “‘economic Japa-
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neseness,’” powerfully serves the business interests of Japanese producers 
(2008, p. 299). In a similar vein, Casey Brienza argues in an article in Publish-
ing Research Quarterly that manga’s recent popularity in the United States has 
more to do with a shift in publishing and distribution practices than with a 
sudden infatuation with Japanese culture. Critiquing current research for 
“relying extensively upon nebulous notions of textual exceptionalism and/or 
emphasizing Japan’s unique talent for the creation of escapist fantasies with 
cross- cultural appeal,” she suggests that the publishing industry’s decision 
to migrate manga “from the comics field into the book field” (2009, p. 104) 
by redefining them as “graphic novels” to be sold in non- specialized stores 
is a better explanation for their growth in market share. While such factors 
are certainly not the only explanation for manga and anime’s popularity, they 
point to the need to develop a more nuanced understanding of the articulation 
of different dimensions of the genre responsible for its global spread.
Unfortunately, the tendency to remain strictly focused on Japan and the 
United States as the two main axes on which manga and anime’s status is 
considered results in a rather limited portrayal of global power dynamics. 
Japanese influence becomes an antidote to the alleged homogenizing nature 
of U.S.- dominated globalization: “In a world where American domination of 
mass culture is often taken for granted and local culture is frequently seen as 
either at odds with or about to be subsumed into hegemonic globalism, an-
ime stands out as a site of implicit cultural resistance,” writes Napier (2005, 
p. 9). Noting that “when Disney held the international monopoly on enter-
tainment, ‘globalization’ was synonymous with ‘Americanization,’” MacWil-
liams argues that “‘Japanization’ is now a dominant transnational economic 
and cultural force” (2008, p. 13). In her otherwise compelling study of Japa-
nese characters’ entry into the global imagination, cultural anthropologist 
Anne Allison similarly concludes: “At work here is a new kind of global imagi-
nation: new, at least, in the way it differs from an older model of Americaniza-
tion” (2006, p. 275). A more translocal approach points to a more interesting 
phenomenon.
Anime and Manga’s Multiple Resonances
Because, like hip- hop, anime and manga are globally linked to a vast array 
of cultural texts, considering them solely in terms of their ability to provide 
the world with “a window to Japan” (Poitras, 2008, p. 65)— just as consid-
ering contemporary global hip- hop solely in relationship to African Ameri-
can culture— does not do justice to their complexity. On a global scale, anime 
and manga might resonate with audiences in different cultural environments 
not only because they promote some sort of universal human values, as some 
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scholars argue (see, for example, Yoshioka, 2008), but also because they reso-
nate on different levels with a variety of elements in a given popular cultural 
context, including, but not limited to, “native” ones.
Indeed, the anime versions of Heidi, Remi sans Famille (Ie Naki Ko Remi), and 
Belle et Sébastien (Meiken Jorii) resonated with French audiences in part because 
they were based on familiar French or European children’s literature— as a 
woman in her 50s put it, “They were from our own books.” They also repre-
sented environments intimately familiar to French viewers. With comments 
such as “Heidi, it was— quote and quote— ‘our mountains’” (42- year- old 
woman); “Heidi it was for me, so faithful to our own lives, I mean for me, I 
lived in the Alps, in the mountains, it was so faithful to the Alps, the Alpine 
pasture” (32- year- old woman); or “I spent much of my childhood among the 
cows and the herds, and because there were [in Remi sans Famille] cows, fairs, 
people trading things and everything, you found yourself [in that universe] 
and you told yourself ‘yes, it corresponds to the model’” (39- year- old male), 
informants suggested that these texts represented their own lives. As a result, 
they sometimes found it difficult to reconcile these representations with the 
texts’ Japanese origin— as the 42- year- old woman quoted above put it, “I had 
trouble projecting it elsewhere.”
Thus, the most interesting aspect of anime and manga is the extent to 
which they are able to blur cultural origin and loosen the requirements of 
cultural representation. As Japanese studios offer their animated versions of 
popular American and European literature and locate their quintessentially 
shôjo manga in foreign settings (as in Candy and the hugely popular Rose of 
Versailles [Lady Oscar in French] set in France at the time of the revolution), as 
Belgian artist Roger Leloup chooses to make his main character, Yoko Tsuno, 
Japanese in his famous 1969 science- fiction bande dessinée, as Japanese art-
ists and French and Luxembourgian directors collaborate to tell the story of 
a young Spanish boy’s 16th- century voyage to Latin America (Les Mystérieuses 
Cités d’Or/Taiyô no Ko Esuteban), they break down the boundaries of cultural 
representation.
When French viewers watch Candy, they, consequently, are not only engag-
ing with foreign culture through their consumption of a text that is clearly 
visually marked as Japanese (and part of the larger specifically Japanese cat-
egory of shôjo manga/anime) but also through their consumption of an exoti-
cized (Japanese) version of America— the opening lines of the first episode 
state that the story takes place “on the shores of Lake Michigan.” For a gen-
eration of French television viewers (of which I am part), Tom Sawyer is first 
and foremost the main (American) character of a Japanese anime text rather 
than the hero of a Mark Twain novel. And the aforementioned Totally Spies!— 
popular both in the United States and Japan— can draw from Japanese anime 
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in its overall visual aesthetic, situate its main characters in a United States 
context (the three “spies” live in Beverly Hills), and be popularized as a French 
series all at the same time.
Thus, Napier is correct when she positions anime “at the forefront of cre-
ating an alternative cultural discourse that goes beyond the traditional catego-
ries of ‘native’ or ‘international’ to participate in what may well be a genuinely 
new form of global culture” (2005, p. 292). As she notes, this “global culture” 
has less to do with geography than with a broader engagement with an imag-
ined global scape. When the French- language version of the Japanese Tom 
Sawyer anime series’ opening song states that “Tom Sawyer, c’est l’Amérique, 
le symbole de la liberté [Tom Sawyer, it’s America, the symbol of freedom]” 
it is not referring to the actual geopolitical and territorially based entity that 
we know as the United States, but to the global imagination of “America” as 
a mythical land of opportunity— an imagination to which the show power-
fully contributed. It is the imagined America of the French expression “c’est 
l’Amérique” used to refer to great opulence or an extremely positive outcome, 
rather than that of Bush or even Obama. Tom Sawyer’s or Candy’s popular-
ity in both France and Japan suggests that this imagination is translocally 
shared— in fact, the Japanese and French media consumers who participate 
in my research often express a very similar mix of admiration (as a producer 
of high- quality cultural texts) and anxiety (as a potentially cultural imperialist 
nation) toward the United States.
This case study demonstrates that the “global culture” to which anime 
and manga contribute is significantly more complicated than descriptions 
couched in U.S. vs. “the rest” terms— where the United States stands as the 
putative representative of “the West”— can account for. Japanese animation 
is a lot more than a window on Japanese culture or an antidote to U.S. cul-
tural imperialism. It is one contributor to the complex process of negotiating 
locality and globality as mutually constitutive elements— a process that may 
take on different shades and nuances in different contexts, but which, overall, 
profoundly shapes our collective contemporary condition. In other words, Japa-
nese animation is and has long been an important contributor to the disjunctive 
messiness of imagining the global.
Indeed, the “global culture” Napier describes is not as new as she sug-
gests. Engagement with a wide range of non- domestic or “partially domes-
tic” (co- produced) texts and characters has long been commonplace in most 
areas of the world. This is certainly the case in both France and Japan where 
Snoopy, Garfield, Winnie the Pooh, Spiderman, and the Disney Princesses 
easily cohabit with the (French) Barbapapas, Gaspard et Lisa, the Little Prince, 
and Babar; the (Belgian) Tintin; the (Italian/Japanese) Calimero; the (Finn-
ish) Moomins; and, of course, a cast of Japanese characters too numerous to 
What West Is It? Anime and Manga according to Candy and Goldorak  •  123
name. While the fast pace of evolution and increasingly diverse nature of glo-
balized cultural forms spurred by the development of the Internet and other 
forms of digital communication is certainly noteworthy, what is, perhaps, 
most “new” and significant in the current development of “global culture” 
is the fact that the United States is starting to avidly consume (Kelts, 2007) 
rather than simply produce it. What is most interesting about recognizing the 
(often ignored) long history of Japanese animation’s complex contribution 
to global culture is the extent to which it was not— despite its long- standing 
global spread— previously part of U.S. consumers’ imagination of the global (at 
least not to the extent found in other parts of the world). In this sense, Napier 
(2007) is correct in identifying U.S. media consumers’ engagement with non- 
domestic anime and manga as an important turning point. It suggests that 
the experience of U.S. audiences9 is becoming more in line with that of indi-
viduals across the globe.
The potential repercussions of this shift, as well as the continuing sig-
nificance of the United States’ historical influence, are further explored in 
our next chapter. Building on what we have learned so far about globalized 
cultural forms and drawing parallels between the three sites that constitute 
the focus of this book, the chapter provides a broader final exploration of 
the nature of individuals’ imagination of the global. It considers, in particu-
lar, how the different histories of transnational influence in these three sites 
have resulted in U.S. media consumers having a different relationship to both 
“global” and American texts than their Japanese and French counterparts.
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Imagining the Global: Transnational  
Media and Global Audiences
So much of the way that people just operate, whatever culture they’re from, 
is through stories. It’s the way that people imagine their world and how they 
see things. Stories are always the backdrop. The kind of assumed things that 
are unspoken, find their way in the stories. And so when you see a story that 
comes from a different place, you . . . you run up against different assump-
tions. And that’s always kind of exciting.
— 33- year- old American male
This book has suggested that what is most distinctive about our contempo-
rary condition is not just the extent to which different world economies and 
cultures are interconnected but the extent to which we are aware of this in-
terconnection. The obvious markers of globalization surrounding us (Star-
bucks, sushi bars, YouTube videos in different languages) are increasingly 
difficult to ignore. As global media scholar Jack Lule puts it, “we feel more 
intensely the closeness of the world” (2012, p. 56). This sometimes creates 
the impression— particularly among privileged members of economically 
rich nations— that we live in a world in which individuals routinely communi-
cate with each other across national and cultural boundaries. While this is true 
to a certain extent, especially for the small fraction of the world population 
that has access to air travel or a fast enough Internet connection, individuals’ 
experience of “the global” remains, as we have seen, largely imagined— Lule 
speaks of the world as an “imagined community” (2012, p. 55). It is the prod-
uct of their engagement with various transnationally distributed commodities 
or cultural texts rather than a sustained relationship with individuals living in 
different places under different conditions. In a world in which the majority 
of people do not have easy access to an Internet connection, “cyber- connected 
utopias” remain “essentially incomplete” (Shome and Hegde, 2002, p. 181).
Drawing from interviews with media consumers in France, Japan, and the 
United States, this chapter turns to audiences to provide a broader reflection 
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on how this imagination of the global takes shape in individuals’ daily lives 
and in different contexts— how, as Appadurai (1996, 2013) would put it, glo-
balized cultural forms shape the production of locality. After a brief discussion 
of the mass- mediated nature of individuals’ relationship to the global, it re-
flects on the position of the United States in the global imagination. It then 
considers the significance of this “imagined America” when located within the 
broader context of individuals’ engagement with a vast array of globally dis-
tributed media. It closes with an examination of the possible consequences of 
the history of U.S. dominance of global cultural markets for media consumers 
in the United States. It concludes that this history has resulted, among U.S. 
media consumers, in a different kind of engagement with the hybrid global-
ized cultural forms described throughout this book— in a different experience 
of global culture, a different path, in other words, to imagining the global.
The Mass Media and the Global
Regardless of their location, the media consumers I interviewed when re-
searching this book were highly aware of the mediated nature of their en-
gagement with “the global.” Noting that the ideal solution of “going to see 
for oneself ” (as a 22- year- old French informant put it) is rarely available, 
especially when forming an informed direct impression of a place may take 
months or even years, they pointed to the extent to which the popular media 
shaped their impression of the global. Comments such as “I haven’t gone to 
see for myself, but [I get a sense] from TV, or from the Internet” (Japanese 
woman in her 30s), “The only information we can get comes from the me-
dia, television, newspaper, or the Internet” (41- year- old Japanese woman), 
“We are necessarily tied to the media” (23- year- old French woman), “We are 
always more or less influenced by something, some images” (21- year- old 
French woman), “[We see] what transpires in the media, because, really, the 
only way to get information about what happens [in the world] is through the 
media” (21- year- old French man), “The image that is spread [in the media] is 
what influences us, I mean, even if we know that it isn’t like this” (20- year- old 
French woman), frequently reoccurred in our conversations. As a 41- year- old 
American male concluded, “I think my interest in looking beyond my imme-
diate [surroundings] was really through TV and film and books [. . .] I think 
it’s interesting in the U.S. because I think media can keep you insular, but I 
think there is also opportunity anywhere you are to expand your horizon.”
If the Internet has made access to cultural texts from a broader range of 
cultural perspectives a lot easier (I used to have to travel to New York City or 
the West Coast of the United States to find VHS copies of my favorite Japa-
nese shows, none of which were subtitled in anything other than Chinese), 
126  •  imagining the global
sustained direct interaction between individuals from different parts of the 
world remains relatively rare— unless one considers watching a homemade 
30- second YouTube video a case of sustained direct interaction. Individuals’ 
ability to enter a global online conversation is also still often significantly 
restricted by technological, language, and/or cultural barriers. As the young 
French man quoted above explained, “my level of English does not allow me 
to read an American or British website or anything like that, so I have to stick 
with the French sites.” Or as a Japanese professional woman in her 30s noted, 
“I have to say I try to watch BBC, CNN every day, but English is sometimes so 
difficult, so after 10 minutes, even 5 minutes, I give up . . .” Of course, enter-
ing the conversation is even more difficult for the millions who still lack ac-
cess to the very technology that renders it possible in the first place.
Thus, despite the technical possibility of more direct means of commu-
nication and/or interaction with different cultural contexts, individuals still 
most frequently engage with “the global” not simply through communication 
technology but, more specifically, through mass- mediated texts. This means 
that the most influential global cultural producers/distributors still hold the 
greatest power to shape the global imagination even though people may cre-
ate and distribute their own alternative cultural products. Furthermore, in a 
highly intertextual globalized cultural environment where cultural products 
frequently draw from older, previously influential texts— think, for instance, 
of the number of films based on earlier popular television series (Starsky and 
Hutch, 21 Jump Street) or characters (The Smurfs, Tintin, The Lorax)— the historical 
significance of globally distributed cultural forms adds a significant dimen-
sion to their continuing influence.
Consequently, while the United States’ position of complete economic 
domination of global cultural industries may have suffered a blow with the 
entry of other major players (Japanese animation companies, Bollywood, En-
demol) into the competition for a piece of the worldwide mass media market, 
“America” still held a central position in the global imagination of the French 
and Japanese media I interviewed.
“America” Imagined
Whether sitting down with my daughter’s 10- year- old friend to watch the Back 
to the Future trilogy (recorded for her from French television by her parents), 
finding myself face- to- face with the Na’vi version of Sam Worthington in ev-
ery single store I entered on the day of Avatar’s DVD release on the French 
market, discussing Leonardo DiCaprio’s weight gain with Japanese fans, or 
considering whether Jurassic Park is too scary for a 6- year- old to watch with a 
young Japanese mother, my conversations with Japanese and French media 
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consumers and observations in both of these cultural contexts clearly pointed 
to the remaining global presence of U.S. texts. U.S. TV series such as CSI (as a 
young French woman explained “right now in France, you can see CSI on TV at 
least two or three times a week”), House, M.D., Desperate Housewives, Bones, Lost, 
24, Scrubs, Dexter, or even older— and extremely “culturally fragrant”— classics 
such as The West Wing, kept on popping up in casual conversations and were 
discussed at length in formal interviews with both Japanese and French in-
formants. Hollywood movies remained highly popular— an observation em-
pirically supported by the hefty profits made globally by U.S. films (Verrier, 
February 23, 2011). Regardless of their age (unless they were too old to have 
grown up with television) or geographical location, and thanks to the low cost 
of reruns, people recalled growing up with Little House on the Prairie, The A- Team, 
and Charlie’s Angels. Two young Japanese women who had shared their fond-
ness for Full House with me when I first interviewed them as 16- year- olds in 
1999 told me 10 years later that they were now watching the show with their 
own children.
Indeed, because cultural texts from the United States have historically 
been globally influential, their consumption held an element of nostalgia for 
many viewers, including those growing up outside the United States. Older 
French and Japanese informants remembered going to the movie theater, of-
ten for the first time in their lives, to see U.S. films in the immediate postwar 
era: “King Kong! I really liked that! I liked movies from the West. I loved John 
Wayne movies. I watched all of John Wayne’s movies” (77- year- old Japanese 
woman); “When I was young, we went to the movie theater every week with 
my mother. I remember having seen High Noon . . . we saw a lot of American 
films, with Lauren Bacall” (75- year- old French woman). Those a little younger 
watched U.S. texts on television as well. As a 47- year- old Japanese farmer ex-
plained, “Until high school, I wasn’t allowed to go to the movies, so I mainly 
watched movies on TV, but I liked actresses like Audrey Hepburn or Grace 
Kelly.” A 45- year- old French woman recalled: “I watched Tweety, Tom and Jerry, 
the Pink Panther  . . . the American cartoons, Scooby- Doo, the Road Runner . . .”
Both French and Japanese media consumers fondly recalled the Disney 
movies that had “cradled their [or their children’s] childhood”: “We never 
went to the movies. The only time we went to the movies was when the fac-
tory had their Christmas party [for the children of employees]. They offered 
us a Walt Disney” (52- year- old French woman); “There were the Disney’s that 
we went to see at the theater when they came out and that we had on video 
tape. . . . Cinderella, I went to see with grandma, Snow White, The Little Mer-
maid  . . . well, everything, all the classics” (28- year- old French woman); “[My 
daughter] loved the Disney characters like Ariel, Sleeping Beauty, and Snow 
White” (52- year- old Japanese woman).
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Engagement in their youth with such texts as Gone with the Wind, Roman 
Holiday, Casablanca, Planet of the Apes (the original version), the Star Wars and 
Indiana Jones series, Superman, and Tron made a lasting impression on these 
media consumers. As a 37- year- old French man explained, “My first film [at 
the movie theater] was Superman and I also saw Tron.  . . . Tron, that was phe-
nomenal! I will be marked by Tron for my entire life, I never found an equiva-
lent.” Or, as the 77- year- old Japanese woman quoted above offered in a dif-
ferent interview: “They showed Casablanca on TV four or five days ago and I 
watched it. . . . I watched that movie when I was young and I loved it, I was 
very glad to be able to see it again. I loved those movies and still love them.” 
Even younger informants felt that U.S. texts had a lasting impact on their 
media consumption. As a 23- year- old Japanese woman explained, “When 
we were little, we listened to Western music, watched Popeye or Tom and Jerry, 
these kinds of things. At that time, I didn’t understand English, but somehow 
we were moved by these programs. They were so impressive that we can re-
member them even now.”
Yet, if Japanese and French media consumers’ recollections of getting up 
in the morning to watch Looney Tunes or of enjoying Disney films were often 
quite similar in tone to those of the U.S. consumers I interviewed (and for 
whom these texts were not “global” but “culturally native”)— as a 40- year- old 
U.S. informant put it, not mentioning the Warner Brothers would be like 
“leaving an element off the periodic chart”— this book has demonstrated 
that these experiences must be interpreted with caution. Most importantly we 
must resist the impulse to equate the (omni)presence of U.S. texts with a kind 
of cultural imperialism à la Dorfman and Mattelart (1971) generating visions 
of non- U.S. consumers abandoning their baguettes or onigiri (Japanese rice 
balls) to run to the nearest McDonald after watching the latest episode of Des-
perate Housewives.
First of all, because the United States still holds a relative economic ad-
vantage in terms of its production budgets— think of the average cost of a 
Hollywood movie compared to a French or Japanese film1— these texts were 
frequently appreciated for the overall technical quality of their production, re-
gardless of the value of their textual content. Both French and Japanese media 
consumers frequently commented on the “larger scale” and the higher pro-
duction value— as one Japanese informant put it, “If you have a lot of money 
you can do these kinds of things”— of U.S. fare. Thus, Avatar was praised as a 
visually stunning work employing innovative production techniques (that no 
one outside Hollywood could ever afford to use) despite the fact that its nar-
rative was often read as a disappointing rehashing of the too- familiar Holly-
wood tale of the white (North American) man saving the non- white feminized 
natives.
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Incidentally, this perceived technical expertise and higher production 
capacity of the U.S. film and television industries frequently led to a rather 
negative comparative assessment of “native” texts. With comments such as 
“Growing up, I found it difficult to watch French films, I felt so much like 
the quality . . . it was corny, there was no action at all” (22- year- old French 
woman), “When they try to copy [American series] in France, it isn’t worth a 
hoot, it’s lame! I don’t know, they should get a grip, it’s really a catastrophe!” 
(42- year- old French women), “You look at CSI and you compare it to what they 
tried to do in France [rolling her eyes]” (23- year- old French woman), “I can’t 
remember the last French series we watched that we thought wasn’t too bad” 
(40- year- old French woman), and “We don’t watch Japanese movies, we are 
not interested in them, on TV or at the theatre, if it’s a Japanese movie, we 
don’t watch it. If it’s American, we do” (16- year- old Japanese woman), infor-
mants assertively critiqued the relatively lower production value of more “lo-
cal” production.
This does not mean, however, that U.S. popular culture is uncritically con-
sumed. As a French couple in their 40s explained:
wife: There are some nights when we tell ourselves that we feel like watch-
ing something completely brainless [une grosse daube] and typically, 
brainless movies, they’re American.
husband: Or it could be French comedy.
wife: Or it’s bottom- line French comedy. Otherwise, the brainless movie 
it’s something like Bruce Willis saving the world for the umpteenth 
time, you know . . . or the meteorite, the total catastrophe, there you 
go.
husband: But we do get tired of these.
wife: But sometimes, while eating sushi in front of TV, it works. Even if 
afterwards we go to bed telling ourselves it was really stupid!
Furthermore, appreciation for U.S.- produced texts and the recognition 
that “America” still maintains a privileged symbolic position in the global 
imagination does not necessarily translate into a positive assessment of the 
United States or into a desire to adopt values and/or practices associated with 
its society or culture. For instance, after commenting that “the United States, 
it’s magical, there’s a magical side. Before it was El Dorado,” a French woman 
in her 20s nevertheless noted that she had an “extremely bad image” of the 
United States and “hated their politics.” In a similar vein, after discussing at 
length their fondness for American TV series— “I watched all of Sex and the 
City, I loved it!”— or their consumption of American popular music— “lately, 
I’ve been listening to music from the old days, like the Carpenters”— a group 
130  •  imagining the global
of five Japanese women in their 30s and early 40s concluded in a 2009 inter-
view that “America is the scariest place in the world.” Or, as a French infor-
mant in her early 30s put it, “the image I have of the United States is [one of ] 
insecurity, with lots of murders and rapes, people living in social conditions 
that, yes . . . with lots of violence and things like that. There is this sentiment 
that everyone just has to fare for themselves. It’s true, I generally don’t have a 
very positive image of the United States.”
While recognizing the continuing symbolic power of “the American 
dream” and the frequent nostalgic association of America with freedom and 
opportunity— as is the case, for instance, in the Japanese animated version of 
Tom Sawyer: “With the Mississippi . . . Tom Sawyer, it makes you dream,” com-
mented a 28- year- old French woman— Japanese and French informants read-
ily differentiated between the “America” of the global imagination (or of the 
French expression “c’est l’Amérique”) and the United States as an actual geo-
political entity. With comments such as “I think that the image of what [the 
United States] actually is and the image that is given in movies or television 
series are completely disconnected” (40- year- old French woman), “There’s a 
gap, a gap between the image and the reality” (23- year- old French woman), 
“It doesn’t really correspond to what is promoted by Hollywood or TV series” 
(43- year- old French man), “It’s the image that is promoted . . . even if we 
know it’s not like that” (28- year- old French woman), and “What we see on 
TV, that’s only part of America . . . The first image and the reality are a bit dif-
ferent” (52- year- old Japanese woman), French and Japanese media consum-
ers alike aptly pointed to the significant disconnect between the Hollywood- 
influenced global image and what they could gather of the daily realities of life 
in the United States. Or as French rapper MC Solaar put it in his 1993 song 
“Nouveau western”:
While John Wayne is made up like Lucky Luke2 [Tandis que John Wayne 
est looké à la Lucky Luke]
Clean like an archduke. Uncle Sam dupes me [Propre comme un archiduc. 
Oncle Sam me dupe]
Hollywood deceives us. Hollywood deceives! [Hollywood nous berne. 
Hollywood berne]
Thus, if imagined “America” might at times tint individuals’ experiences 
of the United States as a physical space— as one French informant recalling a 
recent trip to Washington, DC, explained, “In fact, it’s not very beautiful but 
you’re happy to have gone because in all the American series they sit on the 
steps and talk and tell each other things as the sun sets. There’re 50 movies 
in which I have seen this scene and you tell yourself, ‘wow, I’m at the Lincoln 
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Memorial.’ It’s like the White House, it’s super fun! We took 50 pictures in 
front of the White House!”— it is nevertheless generally recognized and enter-
tained as its own separate entity. As the woman quoted above continued, “it’s 
about the symbol.” Then she added: “the image is much nicer than reality.”
“America” in Context
The continuing presence of “America” as a global symbolic entity must fur-
ther be carefully considered in relationship to individuals’ overall consump-
tion of globally produced and distributed media. As I hope to have demon-
strated here, if people outside the United States consume impressive amounts 
of popular cultural fare associated with the United States, they also engage 
with a vast array of popular texts— music, animation, literature— produced in 
a number of other places, including, of course, their own “native” cultures. As 
a 40- year- old Japanese woman illustrated when trying to recall all the texts she 
enjoyed when growing up: “Candy Candy, I liked it. And Sailor Moon . . . I liked 
manga . . . Ghibli, like Future Boy Conan and Totoro . . . there are so many Ghibli 
movies and Disney too, like Peter Pan. When I was a child, I liked the period 
dramas on NHK. . . . I also liked Rascal the Raccoon and also Anne of Green Gables 
and Princess Sarah. And Heidi! Tom and Jerry, I liked that! I watched that a lot!”
Furthermore, while some texts might be more clearly associated with a 
specific (imagined) conceptualization of a particular place— Tom Sawyer 
and America as “the symbol of liberty” (as the opening song of the Japanese 
animated series goes), the more culturally fragrant animation and Japan as 
a mystical space steeped in tradition or (on the other hand of the spectrum) 
as a hyper- cool postmodern futuristic fantasy— others’ “culture of origin” 
may simply not matter as much. In fact, adult informants often found it dif-
ficult to assess whether or not they knew the cultural origin of their favorite 
shows when they were consuming them as children— as a 22- year- old French 
man put it, “now it seems obvious, but I don’t know if when we were kids 
we told ourselves ‘this comes from there’ when we turned the TV on,” to 
which his friend added, “It came from the TV!” Or, as a 19- year- old recalling 
his early consumption of cartoons explained, “I never wondered where they 
came from. I watched [those shows], I enjoyed them, and it’s true that Uncle 
Scrooge was sitting on piles of dollar bills, but if you asked where these came 
from, I wouldn’t have been able to tell you they were American.”
Perhaps more interestingly, while informants recalled being able to as-
sociate certain graphic features with Japanese animation or being aware that 
Disney was an American company, they unanimously agreed that where pro-
grams were produced ultimately did not matter to them as children: “Whether 
it was French or American, I didn’t care” (40- year- old French woman); “I 
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think that the first time I watched Sleeping Beauty, I didn’t ask myself who 
was making the anime”3 (28- year- old French woman); “I didn’t give a damn 
[where the shows came from]. It absolutely didn’t matter to us” (43- year- old 
French man).
The children I interviewed confirmed this assessment. If they were able to 
identify the cultural origin of some relatively culturally marked texts— such 
as Pokémon or Spirited Away— and knew that most of the blockbuster mov-
ies targeted at children (Ice Age, Shrek) are “made in America,” they asserted 
not “really noticing a difference.” Like their parents before them, French 
children consumed an assorted mix of Japanese animation (Miyazaki films, 
Pokémon, Captain Tsubasa, Dragon Ball), American fare (Disney and Pixar films, 
classic cartoons such as Scooby- Doo and Looney Tunes as well as newer ones, 
such as the currently highly popular Ben 10), French series (Totally Spies!, Mar-
supilami, Wakfu, Tituf, Foot 2 Rue, Les Zinzins de l’Espace, Galactik Football), and 
co- productions (Les Mystérieuses Cités d’Or, Kirikou). Similarly, while Japanese 
children certainly consumed heavy doses of Japanese fare, they mentioned en-
joying a mix of “native,” U.S., co- produced, and (to lesser extent) European 
texts— including many of those mentioned above— the origin of which they 
were not always able to identify. Their engagement with “non- native” media 
was such a routine endeavor that they simply did not give much thought to it.
Armed with impressive amounts of global cultural capital, the French 
and Japanese media consumers I interviewed easily navigated the highly hy-
brid and intertextual media environment surrounding them. They frequently 
employed one global text to make sense of their engagement with another. 
For instance, both Japanese and French manga readers traced their interest in 
fantasy not only to their consumption of early Japanese animation but also to 
the Harry Potter and Lord of the Rings series, which they saw as having sparked a 
resurgence in the genre. French consumers also mentioned their engagement 
with both classic Franco- Belgian bandes dessinées and American comics. Japa-
nese readers added Chinese ghost tales to the mix.
In such a context— and because cultures represent each other as well as 
themselves in popular cultural texts— the global imagination of “America” is 
not only shaped by Hollywood’s worldwide influence and by the popularity 
of American television series but also by the Japanese version of “America” 
in such globally influential texts as the Tom Sawyer or Candy animated series, 
the image of Beverly Hills in the French- produced Totally Spies!, or that of the 
American West in the Franco- Belgian comic Lucky Luke. The global imagina-
tion of Japan is likewise shaped by U.S. films such as The Last Samurai or Mem-
oirs of a Geisha as well as Miyazaki’s animation; that of Europe, by Disney clas-
sics and Japanese animation.
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As suggested in chapter 5, globalized “non- native” cultural forms can even 
contribute to the imagination of one’s own “native” environment. French 
consumers enjoyed Disney’s renditions of European tales in part for their cul-
tural proximity. As a 52- year- old woman noted regarding Disney’s version of 
rural France in Beauty and the Beast: “I found it really really beautiful. And it re-
ally looks like Europe, Europe is represented very accurately.”4 The numerous 
Japanese animated series based on French or other European literature (Remi 
sans Famille, Heidi, Princess Sarah) powerfully resonated with French media con-
sumers because they drew from texts and/or environments highly familiar to 
them, and which they frequently described as “theirs.” These “non- native” 
versions of familiar texts or contexts significantly shaped their image of 
French culture, as well as that of other European environments. For instance, 
a fan of Japanese animation and manga recalled being constantly reminded 
of the Japanese animated series Cathy la Petite Fermière (Makiba no Shôjo Katori)5 
when visiting Finland. As another admitted, “Remi sans Famille, if it wasn’t for 
the anime I wouldn’t even know the story because I haven’t read the Hector 
Malot novel!”6
Japanese informants, on the other hand, enjoyed these same shows in part 
for their exotic value— the architecture, the costumes, the scenery, even the 
food were frequently mentioned as pleasurable elements— but also because 
they capitalized on familiar themes celebrated throughout Japanese culture. 
Candy, Heidi, and Remi were admired, for instance, for their “ganbare (do your 
best) spirit,” their ability to cheerfully endure in the face of extreme adversity. 
As a 33- year- old Japanese man explained: “I watched [Remi] a lot! I loved that 
show! The main character encounters many challenges but he faces them 
with courage and overcomes adversity. It’s the same thing [in Heidi]. She’s 
courageous . . . Also, the cheese, these kinds of things looked good.” Or as a 
40- year- old woman put it while speaking of Candy, “She’s very cheerful, she 
had many troubles and struggles but she was always very cheerful, I thought 
that was good.”
Thus, we must resist the temptation to draw too direct a link between a 
text’s context of production and the meaning of its transcultural influence— 
anime as quintessentially Japanese, Disney as a blatant example of Ameri-
can or (worse) Western cultural imperialism— or its interpretation. As a 
43- year- old French informant explained: “For example, the [1960s television 
series] The Wild Wild West, they speak French, but we know it takes place in 
the United States. [. . .] It is certainly not because it takes place in another 
country that that’s where it’s necessarily produced.” As another concluded in 
a different interview, “it’s not because [a cartoon] takes place in Japan that it’s 
necessarily Japanese.”
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Global Culture and the U.S. Audience
Media consumers in different parts of the world engage with globally dis-
tributed and/or globally influenced texts in complex ways and from multiple 
points of entry. The differences in these points of entry became most evident 
in interviews with U.S. media consumers. Indeed, the historical dominance 
of U.S. popular cultural texts has not only resulted in consumers around the 
globe being familiar with Disney, Hollywood, and U.S. television series but 
also in a relative lack of reciprocal exposure to “non- native” culture on the 
part of U.S. audiences— at least when compared to the other cultural contexts 
considered in this book.
Aside from U.S. popular cultural production (which everyone seemed to be 
familiar with), French and Japanese informants avidly consumed numerous 
globally distributed texts that never made it to the mainstream in the United 
States. The example of Japanese animation is perhaps the most striking, but 
French and Japanese consumers shared a familiarity with a number of other 
texts. French films (which have long been easily and widely available in Ja-
pan7) and French chansons were frequently mentioned by Japanese informants 
as texts they remembered enjoying in their youth— older Japanese women 
particularly loved Alain Delon— and that they still enjoyed today. French and 
other European cartoon or comic book characters such as the Barbapapas, 
Gaspard and Lisa, Tintin, The Little Prince, Calimero, or Moomin were also 
familiar to them, as these have naturally joined the large cast of other kawaii 
(cute) characters omnipresent throughout the Japanese landscape.
Due in part to the historical dominance of U.S. media, particularly in the 
immediate postwar period when domestic production was limited by the 
physical destruction of their nations’ infrastructure, French and Japanese 
consumers of all ages also more broadly shared the experience of growing up 
surrounded with global media. As a result, they expressed a relatively greater 
tolerance for subtitles and/or dubbing than their U.S. counterparts. I remem-
ber realizing with surprise when taking my daughters to see Monsters Inc. at the 
movie theater in Tokyo one summer that the film was in its original English- 
language version despite the fact that the majority of the audience in the the-
ater seemed to be under the age of five, and consequently probably found it 
difficult to read the fast- moving Japanese subtitles. In contrast, the “problem” 
of subtitles came up frequently in interviews with U.S. consumers who felt 
that watching a non- English- language text required extra attention and could 
not be done as casually as watching a text that did not require translation. In 
addition, with the notable exception of animation, the dubbing of foreign- 
language texts is not as routinely practiced on the U.S. market as it is in France 
Imagining the Global  •  135
or Japan where the practice is simply a natural part of watching television or 
going to the movie theater— as a French informant explained, “Foreign actors 
have French voices. If we hear them speak [their native language] it’s not the 
same!”
Furthermore, the channels of distribution historically established though 
the intense importation of global media have meant that French and Japanese 
media consumers do not have to wait long for “foreign” texts to reach their 
market. For instance, Miyazaki’s film The Secret World of Arrietty released in Ja-
pan in July 2010 reached French movie theaters in January 2011, more than a 
year before it was to be released in the United States. Toei Animation’s One 
Piece series (based on the popular manga) was broadcast on French national 
television shortly after it experienced a resurgence in popularity in Japan fol-
lowing the release of a film version of the show in 2011 and quickly sparked 
a resurgence in the manga version of the text. Even films produced in the 
United States sometimes reach global markets before being shown domes-
tically. The world premiere of Steven Spielberg’s The Adventures of Tintin, for 
instance, took place in Brussels in October 2011, but U.S. consumers had to 
wait until December 21 to see it.
Fig. 2. The French Barbapapas welcome customers in the tobacco shop of a small 
Japanese village (photo taken by the author).
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As a result, the media consumers I interviewed in the United States recalled 
engaging with relatively fewer “non- native” texts than their French or Japa-
nese counterparts. While cultural products from outside the United States did 
come up in interviews— particularly British texts— they constituted a smaller 
portion of informants’ total media consumption: “There was a little bit of it. 
I don’t think it was a . . . mainstay of our household. But I do remember every 
so often going to the [independent movie theater] to watch it. I don’t think 
we ever really . . . rented foreign films at home” (32- year- old female); “I don’t 
think there was so much foreign stuff when I was a kid” (33- year- old female).
When specifically prompted about their consumption of global media 
when growing up, U.S. media consumers frequently responded that they sim-
ply “were not around.” In stark contrast to Japanese and French media con-
sumers’ tales of intense and complex engagement with global culture, “for-
eign texts” were not among those U.S. informants considered most formative 
to their identity— with the possible exception of The Smurfs.8 As a 35- year- old 
African American woman noted: “Nothing pops to mind. You know Ameri-
cans always feel like that they are worldly in some way, so I have this sense 
that there had to be something that we saw, but I doubt it. I mean, in the 
house, we probably had some, like, random African stuff lying around in the 
household, but nothing that is really significant in my . . . nothing that I feel 
like ‘oh yeah . . .’” Or, as a 41- year- old male recalled, “I can’t think of anything 
that would be something [from another culture] . . . actually, when I was in 
my teens, I would watch Benny Hill with my dad.”
The texts that were most frequently mentioned by U.S. consumers as 
highly culturally influential included Mister Rogers’ Neighborhood— “in college 
I found Mr. Rogers had died, and I cried. I was like, oh my God, Mr. Rogers 
has died” (28- year old woman)— Sesame Street, The Muppets, The Wizard of Oz, 
the multiple Star Wars episodes, The Simpsons, Disney animation, and, as al-
ready noted, the Warner Brothers cartoons— “Looney Tunes. They were classic. 
I mean, they spanned so many different generations” (33- year- old male). As 
a 39- year- old woman recalled, “back in the days of thriving network TV, The 
Wizard of Oz was on, I don’t know which network carried it but it was like life 
stopped because The Wizard of Oz was on and you looked forward to it every 
year . . . the TV was so different back then. It was like everybody in America 
was watching that.”
The texts they identified as “stuff that was around” and that they, con-
sequently, felt they could not avoid being exposed to included soap operas, 
Westerns, musicals, war and mafia films, and “classic” TV series such as 
Hogan’s Heroes, Gilligan’s Island, The Cosby Show, Family Ties, and M*A*S*H (to 
name only a few)— “My dad watched M*A*S*H a lot. I remember literally ly-
ing on top of my father as he was couch potatoing, watching M*A*S*H, not 
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understanding any of the context” (31- year- old woman). As a 41- year- old 
man put it, watching Happy Days and Laverne and Shirley on Tuesdays and The 
Cosby Show, Family Ties, and Whiz Kids on Thursdays was the “TV experience 
[. . .] typical of most American kids growing up in the late 70s and 80s.” 
With few exceptions, the texts U.S. media consumers deemed culturally im-
portant, as well as the ones they were still watching today, were similar to 
those frequently mentioned by French and Japanese informants in our dis-
cussions of U.S. popular culture: Disney classics, U.S. television series rang-
ing from Little House on the Prairie to Dexter, Hollywood productions from E.T. 
to Pirates of the Caribbean and Star Wars.
Informants in the United States were aware that these texts were signifi-
cant contributors to a global popular culture shared across national bound-
aries— as a 28- year- old woman recalled, “we lived in Germany for a year and 
a half, and I was told that I watched Sesame Street in German”— but they were 
not as familiar with other major players on the global scene. This is not to 
suggest that non- U.S. production is not available on the U.S. market. Cer-
tainly, texts from a broad array of cultural contexts were accessible to those 
who sought them out, through cable/satellite channels or VHS rentals, long 
before anime or Bollywood became household terms and before the Internet 
allowed viewers to develop a liking for Brazilian telenovelas or Korean dra-
mas. The combination of the historical legacy of U.S. global popular cultural 
dominance— regardless of whether or not this dominance is waning today 
(Tunstall, 2007)— and of the early fragmentation of the U.S. market into 
niche audiences brought by the large and relatively early penetration of cable 
and satellite in the United States has meant, however, that the consumption 
of “non- native” cultural texts in the United States has been (at least until rela-
tively recently) more of a specialized activity often linked to one’s ethnic iden-
tity rather than something one simply cannot avoid doing, as Napier (2007) 
cogently notes.9
This was certainly the case among the U.S. consumers I interviewed. Noth-
ing illustrated this fact more powerfully than our discussions about Japanese 
animation. While older informants did recall watching Speed Racer or Kimba 
the White Lion, they did not bestow on these Japanese texts the “cult” status 
given to the likes of Candy Candy, Heidi, and Goldorak/Grendizer in France or Ja-
pan, and, incidentally, throughout large areas of the world. Relatively younger 
informants typically pinpointed the growing influence of Japanese animation 
in the United States to the mid- to late 1990s— “you know, during sort of ’98, 
’99, 2000, Japanese animation got popular” (31- year- old female)— and while 
some of them did fondly remember engaging with these texts, they generally 
located this engagement within the context of a fan or subculture activity. As a 
28- year- old man interviewed in 2011 explained:
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Anime I would like to think that I was one the early adopters for somebody 
at my age. As a kid I grew up watching Robotech, that was on cartoon sta-
tions in the morning, but anime, around 10 or 12, I started to become ob-
sessed with anime. They had a small section at Blockbuster of foreign ani-
mation, and I think there was like one French, but of course it was mostly 
[Japanese] anime [. . .] So I think there is this element for me, part of this 
identity that is like I was into it before it was cool when it was still under-
ground, something like that.
Or, as a 31- year- old woman recalled, “So I graduated high school in ’97, and 
[got into] anime, because I was so much into the rave culture. So dressing 
like that, looking like one of the characters, you know from a Japananimation 
film, or getting into Dragon Ball Z . . . watching Ninja Scroll, watching Ghost in 
the Shell [that was part of the culture].”
Even the cultural products most frequently discussed by scholars as 
quintessential examples of contemporary globally influential Japanese ani-
mation were not necessarily experienced as “mainstream” cultural capital, 
particularly among informants who did not have children. For instance, a 
28- year- old woman who had taken Japanese in high school and participated 
in an exchange program recalled watching Miyazaki films as part of her Japa-
nese class: “Well, I mean in Japanese class, we used to watch, um . . . it is not 
manga, it’s, what is it called? Anime, anime. . . . We watched Spirited Away 
and a bunch of others, and I don’t remember the names. . . . And I remember 
watching Spirited Away, and we were like ‘Sensei what’s going on’ like, this 
doesn’t make any sense!”
In contrast to the experiences of French or Japanese media consum-
ers who, regardless of their age, recalled growing up surrounded by “non- 
native” cultural forms, U.S. media consumers’ engagement with foreign texts 
(particularly non- English- language texts) most frequently began in (young) 
adulthood: “Yeah, I think I probably started watching foreign flicks in the art 
houses that were by the college. Like you know that college kids would go 
to. That’s when I probably started doing that” (51- year- old female); “When 
I was in college I got to explore all these wonderful foreign films, I got into, 
you know, some French films, some German films” (41- year- old male); 
“[Growing up] it was like, mainstream, The Brady Bunch, Nancy Drew . . . I 
mean, other cultures, I didn’t get that till college. I invented that for myself ” 
(39- year- old female).10
Watching Miyazaki animation, Wong Kar- Wai films, and “foreign flicks 
in the art houses” was also more of an intellectualized and/or specialized 
activity— as the 39- year- old woman quoted above explained when discuss-
ing her lack of exposure to non- English- language texts when growing up: “I 
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was pretty white mainstream, my parents were not arty, they weren’t intellectuals.” 
Rather than being a natural and unavoidable facet of daily media consump-
tion, their engagement with “non- native” texts stemmed from the desire to 
“expand [their] horizon” (41- year- old male) and learn about other cultures.11 
It came as a conscious effort, as the quote opening this chapter illustrates, to 
“see a story that comes from a different place” and “run up against different 
assumptions.” As a woman in her 30s explained when asked what she enjoyed 
about foreign films, “We like cultural stuff. We like stuff that like . . . can . . . 
makes you step into something different. With, like, different languages or 
different . . . cultural ideals and stuff like that,” or as another put it, “I like to 
see what life is like in other places.”
Thus, the U.S. media consumers I interviewed experienced “global culture” 
quite differently than their French or Japanese counterparts. Of course, this is 
not particularly surprising considering what we know about the local negotia-
tion of transcultural influence. What is, perhaps, more interesting is the fact 
that French (“Western”) media consumers’ engagement with global culture 
was more similar to that of Japanese (“non- Western”) media consumers’— 
and vice versa— than to those born and raised in the United States (“West-
ern”). Significant similarities between French and Japanese informants arose 
in their relationship to the United States as an entity whose symbolic image 
(the “America” of the global imagination) was avidly consumed, enjoyed, and 
even admired but whose status as an actual powerful geopolitical entity was 
seen with suspicion (the United States as a violent, scary place). On a more 
basic level French and Japanese media consumers shared a common history 
of much greater engagement with globalized popular cultural forms and fa-
miliarity with specific texts, characters, and genres that were simply never 
present on the U.S. cultural landscape. This fact challenges the notion that 
there is such a thing as an essentialized “Western” experience of cultural glo-
balization. It also clearly establishes that the experience of media consumers 
in the United States cannot be taken as representative of those of individuals 
in other parts of “the West.” As media critic Alessandra Stanley (2013) bluntly 
put it in a recent New York Times article, “American audiences today are a little 
like Italians in the era of Marco Polo: They have a few exotic spices and a faint 
sense that there may be a lot more somewhere out there.”
Indeed, the history of U.S. transcultural influence has resulted in plac-
ing media consumers in the United States in a rather unique position as they 
negotiate global popular culture. On one hand, the historical legacy of U.S. 
global influence and its remaining economic edge means that U.S. popular 
cultural texts still frequently become instant global phenomena most people 
around the world are familiar with. This means that U.S. media consumers 
traveling to other cultural environments will necessarily encounter a cer-
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tain level of familiarity with “their” culture. On the other hand, the lesser 
degree of ostensible penetration of non- U.S. texts into the U.S. market (the 
United States does not have, for instance, to establish quotas to protect its 
cultural industries) also means that U.S. media consumers have not, at least 
historically, had the same relationship with texts produced in other cultural 
contexts.
This, more generally, means that we must be particularly wary of theo-
retical arguments about the cultural dimensions of globalization based on 
analyses of the U.S. context. For instance, the concept of “pop cosmopolitan-
ism” as proposed by Henri Jenkins may accurately describe the experience 
of privileged “younger Americans” whom he suggests “are distinguishing 
themselves from their parents’ culture through their consumption of Japa-
nese anime and manga, Bollywood films and bhangra, and Hong Kong ac-
tion movies” (2011, pp. 546– 47). It does not, however, tell us much about the 
process of imagining the global in other parts of the world, including in other 
economically powerful nations, where engagement with global culture is not 
something that hipsters do to “differentiate themselves from their parents,” 
but something that has been going on for generations— not to mention the 
imposed transcultural influence stemming from the legacy of colonialism in 
less economically powerful contexts.
Such arguments also tend to place excessive emphasis on new techno-
logical developments, particularly the rise of digital communication, in their 
analyses of transcultural flows— “Cosmopolitans use networked communi-
cation to scan the planet in search of diversity and communicate with others 
of their kind around the world,” writes Jenkins— and, consequently, on the 
experiences of the relatively privileged groups of individuals walking “a thin 
line between dilettantism and connoisseurship” (2011, p. 549) who enjoy easy 
access to it.
As I hope to have demonstrated, French and Japanese media consumers 
were consuming heavy doses of globalized cultural forms long before they 
had an Internet connection. My Japanese informants might have had to take 
a trip to their local Tsutaya— one of Japan’s largest video rental chains oper-
ated by a company tellingly named the “culture convenience club”— when they 
wanted to watch a French, American, or Chinese film in the late 1990s, but 
they just as passionately and knowledgeably discussed global media with me 
then as they do today. French children may no longer have to wait for Wednes-
day morning to watch their favorite anime (there are now entire channels 
dedicated to it) or Disney films but their parents are just as likely to break into 
song when Dragon Ball Z or Beauty and the Beast is mentioned. While digital 
media may have further facilitated the sharing and spread of various cultural 
forms, it did not revolutionize these individuals’ engagement with global 
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culture. If anything, the Internet is allowing (middle- class) U.S. audiences to 
jump on a bandwagon much of the rest of the world joined half a century ago. 
We are yet to see the full impact of the appearance in greater numbers of Ko-
rean dramas, Japanese animated series, or French films on Netflix and cable 
television on U.S. consumers’ imagination of the global. Future research will 
need to continue to explore the possible consequences of their increasingly 
active engagement with the inescapable hybridity of contemporary global cul-
ture described throughout this book.
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Lessons from a Translocal Approach— 
or, Reflections on Contemporary 
Glocamalgamation
We live in a time when global technological and information systems are pro-
ducing such complex cultural dynamics that the politics of colonialism, race, 
nation, and belonging are undergoing massive shifts. New insights and lenses 
are continually needed to rethink the diaspora and hybridity.
— Shome, 2006a, pp. 120– 21
This book set out to examine hybridity’s “finer points and meanings” (Piet-
erse, 2009, p. viii) through a number of case studies of globalized cultural 
forms and their “local” negotiation. Considering three sites in relationship to 
each other and in different configurations, it has explored the multiple ways 
in which the global/national/local are mutually constitutive elements of our 
contemporary era marked by an increased awareness of worldwide connect-
edness. The translocal mosaic sketched by its different chapters illustrates the 
highly hybrid nature of global culture. Moving beyond the basic recognition 
of hybridity’s inescapability it also illustrates, however, the political nature 
of hybridity’s formation and of its negotiation— or what Appadurai recently 
called the “obstacles, bumps, and potholes” (2013, p. 65) of global cultural 
flows. To put it differently, it answers the questions of what hybridity matters 
and how it contributes to the “complex, partly imagined lives” (Appadurai, 
1996, p. 54) that characterize contemporary social conditions in a transcul-
tural, deterritorialized world.
Reflecting on the lessons learned throughout the book, this chapter draws 
a closing assessment of what we have learned, both empirically and theo-
retically, from its translocal explorations. It first examines how hybridity— or 
what I will come to term “glocamalgamation”— normalizes the presence of 
“the global” in individuals’ daily lives and makes its imagined dimension par-
ticularly salient as the global, national, and local are continuously (re)negoti-
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ated in relationship to each other. This chapter further reflects on the often 
contentious nature of this imagination of the global, particularly as it inter-
sects with racial and gender dynamics, and explores its problematic as well as 
productive potential. From a more theoretical standpoint, it argues that the 
book’s translocal approach demonstrates the need to move beyond conceptu-
alizations of transnational cultural dynamics couched in East/West terms and/
or taking the United States as the quintessential representative of “the West.” 
It closes with a reflection on the need to decentralize the United States in our 
considerations of global processes while simultaneously keeping a critical eye 
on its continuing influence.
The Global in Everyday Life
The examples provided in this book illustrate the extent to which “the 
global”— as an imagined entity, a space envisioned through one’s interaction 
with globalized cultural forms— has entered individuals’ daily lives. Global-
ized hybridity is so much part of our contemporary condition that we rarely 
stop to think about it. When the “Quick” restaurants recently started to in-
clude Totally Spies! and Dragon Ball Z gifts in their boxed kids’ meals, the fact 
that a Belgian American- style fast food chain should offer figurines from a 
French- produced show drawing from the visual aesthetic of Japanese anima-
tion and taking place in Beverly Hills (Totally Spies!) alongside characters from 
a seminal Japanese anime text (Dragon Ball Z) did not seem to faze French con-
sumers. Hybridity is the raw material of the global imagination.
As we have seen repeatedly throughout this book, this normalization of 
globalized hybridity results in a situation in which the global, national, and 
local are constantly and simultaneously (re)negotiated in the production, 
distribution, and consumption of popular cultural forms. Whether in real-
ity television, news, magazines, hip- hop, or animation, this process is more 
complex than can be expressed through the concepts of globalization, local-
ization, or even glocalization. None of our current vocabulary really does jus-
tice to its multidimensional blurring of boundaries— perhaps the term “glo-
camalgamation” gets a little closer to describing its frustrating messiness.
Glocamalgamation signals transformations and contradictions on 
multiple levels. On one hand, it reminds us that corporate consolidation, 
conglomeration, and convergence are central trends in contemporary me-
dia industries. It reminds us that hybridity is, after all, the cultural logic of 
globalization— that it “is compatible with globalization because it helps global-
ization rule” (Kraidy, 2005, p. 148, emphasis mine). It reminds us that the very 
technologies that produce and allow us to engage with global media are of-
ten owned by large corporations operating transnationally but incorporated 
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in the most powerful nations. It reminds us that market forces are generally 
behind “any fast and heavy traffic” (Appadurai, 2013, p. 69) in the global cir-
culation of cultural forms. It points to both “the top- down push of corporate 
convergence” produced by increased concentration of ownership and “the 
bottom- up pull of grassroots convergence” (Jenkins, 2011, p. 546) character-
ized by increased consumer participation.
The Internet serves as a useful metaphor here. The Internet is arguably the 
paradigmatic example of a rhizomic, networked, decentralized arrangement 
(Castells, 2001). It is the stuff of social networking, flash mobs, global grass-
roots movements, and “Arab Spring” revolutions. Nation- states cannot seem 
to fully control it. On the other hand, it is the site of intensified surveillance, 
of invasions of privacy, of increasingly sophisticated and targeted marketing 
techniques (Turow, 2011), of “lateral markets that involve traffic in human or-
gans, armaments, precious metals, and sex work” (Appadurai, 2013, p. 61). 
Access to much of its infrastructure and content is controlled by multibillion- 
dollar corporations— at least for consumers with average computer skills. It 
remains mostly out of the reach of the majority of the world population (Inter-
net World Stats, 2013). Glocamalgamation reminds us of the fact that “among 
the most vigorous proponents of mongrelization are the world’s biggest, 
richest, most profit- hungry corporations” (Zachary, 2000, p. xx).
But glocamalgamation is also shaping (and being shaped by) local subjec-
tivities. Just as different elements of our daily life combine in our dreams into 
a phantasmagoric experience, global culture’s multiple translocal references 
amalgamate to create “a plurality of imagined worlds” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 
5) that deeply affects what Appadurai calls “the production of locality” (1996, 
2003). Hybridity, like the imagination, has no limits. Actarus— Goldorak/
Grendizer’s pilot also known as Duke Fleed— may be the prince of the Eu-
phor planet (Fleed in the Japanese version), but he lives on a ranch owned by 
an old cowboy where horses and spaceships happily cohabit. He is also, on 
another level, the hero of a Japanese text and a cultural icon celebrated by an 
entire generation of French (and Middle Eastern) viewers— all under different 
names. This increased role of the imagination in social life, in how we envi-
sion our place in the world, is, perhaps, one of the most defining elements of 
contemporary globalization.
Thus, while the words “localization” and “glocalization” still connote 
a sense of the merging of two or more relatively distinct entities, I propose 
“glocamalgamation” to suggest a more chaotic and transformative blending 
of multiple social, cultural, and economic dynamics that helps us address 
the “curious inner contradiction” (Appadurai, 2013, p. 65) of globalized cul-
tural forms. Glocamalgamation is meant to position the global not merely 
as “the accidental site of the fusion or confusion of circulating global ele-
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ments” but as “the site of the mutual transformation of circulating forms” 
(Appadurai, 2013, p. 68)— a transformation that, as Appadurai reminds us, 
always occurs through the work of the imagination. The term is intentionally 
a mouthful— a word intended to describe such a messy process should not 
easily roll off the tongue.
Glocamalgamation has particularly salient implications for media schol-
ars. It means that the Japanese animated versions of classic European or 
American literature can be more culturally significant for French media con-
sumers than the “original” texts on which they are based. It means that hip- 
hop must be understood as a phenomenon drawing from multiple dimen-
sions of individuals’ imagination of the global and not just the imagination of 
the place(s) generally associated with its cultural roots. It means that we need 
to come to terms with the fact that the Wakfu license— composed of a televised 
animated series, three massive multiplayer online role- playing games, a col-
lector card game, and a bande dessinée— can be graphically and textually linked 
to Japanese animation (the Wakfu is a form of energy similar to that found in 
Dragon Ball or Naruto, and the card game is inspired by Pokémon cards), make 
direct references to Japanese texts, use English- language titles, be reminis-
cent of U.S.- produced online games, and yet be claimed as an example of suc-
cessful French cultural production. It means that we need to learn to better 
address how “different forms circulate through different trajectories, gener-
ate diverse interpretations, and yield different and uneven geographies” (Ap-
padurai, 2013, p. 67).
While some texts retain culturally specific and/or historically conditioned 
elements, the vast array of globally distributed references available to both 
producers and consumers complicates the notion of transnational cultural 
influence. Thus, we must be wary of arguments positioning various texts— 
typically ones identified as “alternatives” to “Western” cultural produc-
tion— as “representative” of the cultural environment in which they are pro-
duced, or from which they are ostensibly originating. We must also resist the 
related temptation to search for links between individuals’ engagement with 
globalized culture texts and actual/physical geographies— as when Jenkins 
mentions that “Some anime fans do cultivate a more general knowledge of 
Japanese culture” and might even “travel to Japan in search of new material or 
to experience the fan culture there more directly” (2011, p. 550). While these 
links might at times exist, the examples provided in this book demonstrate 
that a much more significant and widespread dynamic lies in glocamalgama-
tion’s imagined dimensions. Glocamalgamation renders media scholars’ job 
significantly more complicated. Because the global is imagined in large part 
through individuals’ consumption of (mass- ) mediated texts, genres, or for-
mats, our job is also particularly important.
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Race and Gender in the Global Imagination
As the concept of glocamalgamation suggests, the fact that hybridity has be-
come a normalized feature of individuals’ daily lives does not mean that it is 
devoid of political implications. Hybridity’s specific character, the facets of 
global culture it emphasizes or represses (“what hybridity”), are contentious 
and contested. One of the most striking common running themes of the vari-
ous cultural forms analyzed here is the centrality of race and gender dynamics 
in the negotiation of the global/national/local nexus. In an environment per-
meated with the awareness of the global, race and gender are never “simply” 
locally negotiated. While racial and gendered identities are certainly shaped 
by local conditions— instances of discrimination, legal, social, and cultural 
conditions— these local conditions are symbolically negotiated in relation-
ship to the global. This book provided examples of this process in different 
contexts and from different angles in reality television, international news, 
fashion magazines, and hip- hop.
If racial and gender issues are not always ostensibly addressed and may 
even be assertively erased in contemporary cultural forms— as in the case of 
reality television in France or news of “local” dramatic events in all three cul-
tural contexts examined— they remain an important subtext of the symbolic 
construction of the local/national in relationship to the global. The denying 
or downplaying of racial or gender prejudice in “local” texts is particularly 
effective when it is coupled with less generous transnational comparisons. 
Comparisons with other economically powerful nations are particularly com-
pelling. Indeed, if, in all three contexts examined in this book, transnational 
comparisons sometimes served to locate race and gender discrimination in 
“less developed” nations, comparisons with other highly influential global 
players served to suggest that— regardless of the “local” crisis at hand— each 
environment was doing better than virtually anywhere else in the world. This pro-
cess was most powerfully illustrated in the case of international news, but it 
is a more general dimension of individuals’ engagement with the global. The 
global success of American gangsta rap, for instance, rests in part on the fact 
that it reassures transnational consumers about the comparatively less vio-
lent, racist, and sexist nature of their own “local” socio- cultural context.
In turn, the racial and gendered subtext of globalized cultural forms sig-
nificantly shapes individuals’ daily experiences of the local/national/global 
nexus as they engage in media consumption— it shapes, in other words, the 
production of locality. We have seen how Japanese women, for instance, find 
themselves in the difficult position of having to negotiate their gendered, ra-
cial, cultural, and class identities in the face of white- dominated globalized 
representations of upper- class fashion and feminine beauty originally heavily 
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influenced by the United States and Europe. As illustrated in chapter 3, these 
different identity factors— as well as others such as age and geography— are 
all significant dimensions of their negotiation of a segment of global culture 
in which they find themselves in the position of racial minorities.
From a more theoretical point of view, chapters 5 and 6 illustrated the dif-
ficulty of adequately addressing the politics of hybridity in academic work 
where local identity politics and the tendency to celebrate “subaltern” speech 
have sometimes resulted in reductionist interpretations of global processes. 
Accounts positioning anime as a quintessentially Japanese alternative to 
Disney or global hip- hop as an imitation of an African American genre may 
be partially correct, but they fail to fully address glocamalgamation’s multi-
dimensional nature. Similarly, accounts celebrating the recent entry of vari-
ous new actors on the global popular cultural scene must be carefully located 
within the global politics of hybridization. As Kraidy reminds us, “Hybridity is 
a risky notion, it comes without guarantees” (2005, p. vi).
Moving beyond East and West
One important boundary to blur in our theoretical engagement with contem-
porary hybridity is the common division of the world along East/West lines. 
As this book’s translocal approach demonstrates, it is not a particularly useful 
heuristic device when it comes to understanding processes of transnational 
cultural influence. It results in a problematic essentializing of both sides of the 
axis as it “overlooks all the forms of heterogeneity that have always existed— 
and continue to exist— within the West” and “leaves no room for any idea that 
there might be a multiplicity of modernities, some of them of non- Western 
origin” (Morley, 2007, p. 158).
The need to resist employing such problematic shortcuts is complicated, 
however, by the fact that the divide is a significant subtext of the politics of 
hybridity. It may be strategically employed as different contexts negotiate 
their position in relationship to each other against the backdrop of a global-
ized popular cultural scene. In the case of the three sites examined here, we 
have seen, for instance, how news coverage in France and the United States 
engaged in a process of “othering” of Japan as a “non- Western” nation and 
how this schema intersected with the global geopolitics of race. In other 
words, Japan is not “Western” not only because of its different cultural and 
historical trajectory on its (highly successful) path to modernization, but also 
because it is not racially white dominated. On the other hand, opposition to 
“the West” is a frequent rhetorical device in Japanese nationalistic discourse 
that conveniently serves to veil the country’s history of imperialist aggression 
against other Asian nations. The East/West divide further intersects with the 
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construction of culture, race, and gender when it is employed, for example, 
to construct Japanese femininity in opposition to “Western” sexuality in Japa-
nese women’s magazines.
In a similar vein, critiques of “Western” transnational power paradoxically 
re- centralize the United States as a global cultural producer when merging 
U.S. cultural production with that of the rest of “the West.” Positioning the 
United States as representative of “the West” is particularly problematic con-
sidering the fact that, as we have seen in chapter 6, U.S. media consumers’ 
experiences of “the global” are not particularly representative of those of indi-
viduals in other parts of the world— including other parts of “the West.” This 
book illustrated, for instance, how French and Japanese media consumers 
share a common history of active engagement with “non- native” U.S. popu-
lar cultural fare and with a relatively greater array of other globalized cultural 
forms. The U.S./West merging leads to a dismissal— or, perhaps more accu-
rately, to a simple lack of awareness— of non- U.S. Western cultural produc-
tion, especially when such production is not in the English language. It also 
downplays the influence of non- U.S. globally distributed cultural products 
in other Western contexts, as illustrated by the example of Japanese anima-
tion in France. More generally, it veils the presence of “Western” alternatives 
to U.S.- style capitalism and cultural policies— to, in other words, U.S.- style 
globalization.
The common merging of “Western” academic thought with English- 
language texts mostly originated in the United States and Britain similarly dis-
misses the possibility that alternative academic conversations may be taking 
place in other parts of “the West.” Such conversations do take place, how-
ever, even if they are not always translated into English. French theorists,1 
for instance, differ from their colleagues across the Atlantic (and, to some 
extent, across the English Channel) in the amount of attention they pay to 
“West/West” dynamics— particularly those operating along a France/Europe/
U.S. axis. While recognizing the historical impact of European imperialism 
on “non- Western” nations, they also locate their work within the context 
of power struggles waged at the national level in relationship to the United 
States and (not always as successfully) the rest of Europe (see, for example, 
Matouk, 2005; Mattelart, 2005a, 2005b; Warnier, 2004).
This different positioning has resulted in a characterization of globaliza-
tion subtly different than that found in the works of Anglo/U.S. scholars. The 
common use of the term of Latin origin “mondialisation” over the more di-
rect English translation “globalization” reflects this different angle of vision. 
While “globalisation” is also used, “mondialisation” serves to describe the 
more complex sum of cultural, linguistic, political, and economic processes 
that characterize the formation of global modernities and their local manifes-
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tations (Matouk, 2005). More than a simple reaction against another “Angli-
cisme” (even though certainly partly that), mondialisation provides a “West-
ern” alternative to the Anglo/U.S. concept of globalization. It linguistically 
and conceptually separates Francophone scholars from their Anglophone 
counterparts— and potentially links them to Latin American intellectuals who 
have similarly opted for the term “mundialización” in their translation of the 
English term into Spanish (Stald and Turfe, 2002). The twin concepts of mon-
dialisation/mundializacion characterized by Stald and Turfe as “the process 
where a process of world modernity is developing, but articulated and differ-
entiated according to the particular historical circumstances of each country” 
(2002, p. 4) serve as acts of resistance against Anglo/American power to de-
fine the terms through which transnational influence is understood and dis-
cussed in intellectual discourse. They at least help diversify the debate by pro-
viding a potentially alternative vision (Matouk, 2005).2
These different philosophical positions— Yúdice speaks of “a kind of 
transcultural and translational parallax” (2001, p. xviii) in his introduction 
to the English- language edition of García Canclini’s Consumers and Citizens— 
further point to differences in the nature of identity politics on either side of 
the Atlantic (particularly between the United States and non- English- speaking 
Europe) and between the United States and other parts of America. As García 
Canclini notes, “If the Anglo- American and Latin American worlds experience 
globalization differently it is because of the different ways in which they con-
ceptualize their multicultural character” (2001, pp. 9– 10). These differences 
were empirically illustrated in this book in the contrasting ways in which 
French and U.S. popular cultural texts— reality television, news, hip- hop— 
dealt with the ethnically and racially diverse nature of their respective socio- 
cultural contexts. They are further reflected in the different theoretical posi-
tions on race historically held by French and U.S. scholars (for an excellent 
detailed description of these dynamics see Stam and Shohat, 2012). Working 
translocally exposes the political nature of these various boundaries placed 
on identity— East vs. West, color blindness vs. multiculturalism, global vs. 
local— both in popular cultural texts and in academic discourse. It forces us 
to conceptualize identities in their “unavoidable relation to hybridity” (García 
Canclini, 2011, p. 11).
The United States in the Global Imagination
Such a conceptualization also requires us to challenge the position of the 
United States as the natural representative of “the West”— and, by extension, 
of global capitalism— in our examinations of processes of globalization. Rec-
ognizing the political nature of this positioning and the presence of alterna-
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tive perspectives and modes of cultural production decentralizes the role of 
the United States as the source of “Western” transnational cultural influence 
and, more generally, as an unavoidable and totalizing model of modernity. 
This does not mean, however, that we should ignore the historical legacy of 
its global cultural influence or its continuing transnational power. The role of 
the United States must be differently centralized to focus on its complex en-
gagement with globalized hybridity— or, to put it differently, on its historical, 
economic, and symbolic contribution to glocamalgamation.
This book demonstrated that even as new players are becoming increas-
ingly globally influential, we cannot ignore the historical impact of U.S. trans-
national cultural power. As discussed in chapter 6, transnational media con-
sumers’ imagination of the global and of their own locality are significantly 
shaped by the experience of growing up surrounded by Hollywood, Disney, 
and U.S. television series. While these are certainly not the only globalized 
cultural forms French or Japanese media consumers were exposed to with 
in their youth— chapter 6 demonstrated, for instance, the equally significant 
presence of Japanese animation in the French context— these texts continue 
to hold a special, and often nostalgic, position in individuals’ imagination. 
If this engagement with “imagined America” must be carefully differentiated 
from individuals’ attitudes toward the United States as a geopolitical entity, 
the symbolic status of “America” remains an influential subtext of the process 
of imagining the global (including, ironically, in texts produced in other parts 
of the world). Media scholars must contend with this subtext not as a bla-
tant example of U.S. cultural imperialism but as one ingredient of globalized 
hybridity— one important dimension of contemporary glocamalgamation.
Interestingly, the nostalgia surrounding “classic” globalized cultural 
products can easily be cultivated today as digital technology facilitates the re- 
release of older texts for newer generations. Indeed, if digital technology fa-
cilitates the development and spread of new globalized cultural forms, it also 
permits us to (re)engage with old ones. A large portion of contemporary pop-
ular culture is simply recycled stuff— periodic DVD re- releases of classic Dis-
ney animation, film remixes of popular Marvel comics, the return to the the-
ater of the Star Wars prequel (itself drawing on a entire generation’s nostalgic 
engagement with the earlier trilogy) this time in 3D. Parents who participated 
in my research frequently turned to the Internet to share with their children 
the texts that had shaped their own childhood— hence young informants’ 
ability to sing the Candy theme song. Searching for a specific text might, in 
turn, lead to the (re)discovery of another in the vast pool of shared memories 
and fan favorites making up much of YouTube. This nostalgic dimension of 
global culture means that historically influential texts may remain significant 
well beyond the generations that first experienced them. In this context, the 
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historical legacy of U.S. global cultural power, the fact that it has provided 
much of the “original” raw materials of globalized hybridity— even if these 
were subsequently remixed, re- interpreted, and/or re- appropriated— remains 
significant even as new actors are assertively entering the scene of global cul-
tural production.
The United States’ relative economic power and its historical influence 
also mean that its cultural industries retain much power to borrow, remix, 
and redistribute globalized cultural forms. Texts such as Slumdog Millionaire 
(Bollywood), Speed Racer (classic Japanese animation), The Smurfs, The Adven-
tures of Tintin (Franco- Belgian bandes dessinées), and Ugly Betty (telenovela) are 
relatively recent examples. Hollywood studios and U.S. television producers 
are not the only media companies engaged in this process— as we have seen, 
Japanese animation studios have long been selling European culture back to 
Europe (and to much of the rest of the world)— but they remain influential. 
We must keep a critical eye on their ability to serve as a filter through which 
cultural forms from relatively less economically powerful cultural produc-
ers must pass if they are to reach a truly global status— we need to remain 
attuned, in other words, to the “blockages, bumps, and interference” (Appa-
durai, 2013, p. 69) that line the circuits of culture. After all, the Smurfs come 
home to their destroyed village only to rebuild it in New York City’s image at 
the end of the 2011 Columbia Pictures film.
On the other hand, these texts actively draw on contemporary media con-
sumers’ large pool of global cultural capital. Viewers are expected to “get” the 
references to the “original” text or genre— as when Tintin finds a picture of 
himself (as he is drawn in the Franco- Belgian bande dessinée) in the market in 
the Steven Spielberg movie. In a globalized media market, these “American” 
texts may even be mainly targeted at a non- U.S. audience— as noted, Tintin 
was first released in Belgium and France, then in Quebec, before it opened 
in the United States and English- speaking Canada. Furthermore, the need to 
carefully locate U.S. influence within the broader context of media consum-
ers’ engagement with a wide array of globalized cultural forms has been well 
established throughout this book. I will not return to it here. These examples 
suggest that we need to continue to explore how cultural forms produced 
in the United States contribute to glocamalgamation’s intense blurring of 
boundaries and to the imagination of the global in different localities.
More interesting, and less frequently recognized, side effects of the leg-
acy of U.S. transnational cultural power discussed in chapter 6 are its con-
sequences for U.S. media consumers who do not share the history of natu-
ralized engagement with “non- native” media found in other environments. 
Thus, the most important dimension of the increased hybridity of global-
ized cultural forms may not be its ability to mitigate U.S. global cultural in-
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fluence, even though that is certainly important, but its power to bring U.S. 
media consumers’ imagination of the global a step closer to that of individu-
als in other parts of the world. As texts produced and originally distributed in 
other cultural contexts are increasingly becoming readily available on the U.S. 
market— The Mysterious Cities of Gold (the classic animated series so frequently 
mentioned by French and Japanese consumers) can now be viewed instantly 
on Netflix— and as Hollywood increasingly ostensibly draws its raw materials 
from globalized cultural forms, U.S. media consumers are given new points 
of entry into various elements of global culture. They are encouraged to more 
fully engage with the globalized hybridity that characterizes our contempo-
rary era. The door may still only be cracked open (Stanley, 2013), but they are 
given more of a glimpse at the glocamalgamation surrounding them. This, in 
turn, might help them develop a more nuanced understanding of the fact that 
the notion of “the United States as the repository of good in the world” (Shor, 
2010, p. 32) is but one mythical element of the global imagination.
Thinking in terms of glocamalgamation helps us understand how hybrid-
ity matters. It matters because it normalizes the presence of the global in our 
daily lives and blurs the boundaries of cultural representation. It matters be-
cause it is a contentious subtext of the negotiation of racial, gendered, class, 
and cultural identities under conditions of globalization. It matters because it 
decentralizes the role of the United States as a geopolitical entity while expos-
ing its continuing symbolic power. It matters because it has the potential to 
challenge the “fetishism of boundaries” (Pieterse, 2003/2009, p. 98), to de-
construct all sorts of identities. It matters because it points to the bumps, road-
blocks, and traffic jams in the flows of global culture that shape the imagina-
tion of the global.
Perhaps most importantly, thinking in terms of glocamalgamation can 
help us better understand how local subjectivities are constructed through 
“temporary negotiations between various globally circulating forms” (Appa-
durai, 2013, p. 69). It can help us wrap our heads around the fact that these 
subjectivities “are not subordinate instances of the global, but in fact the main 
evidence of its reality” (2013, p. 69). The case studies discussed in this book 
have started to sketch the contours of some of these temporary negotiations. 
We must continue to work to empirically identify and theoretically explore 
glocamalgamation’s productive potential. Doing so will require us to further 
expand our horizon to include other contexts, other points of entry, other 
ways to experience the world in our academic texts. It will require a more 
translocal perspective.
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Conclusion: Getting over  
Our “Illusion d’optique”
Last, and most daunting, is the prospect that we shall have to find ways  
to connect theories of intertextuality to theories of intercontextuality.  . . .  
Yet a framework for relating the global, the national, and the local has 
 yet to emerge.
— Appadurai, 1996, pp. 187– 88
In his seminal work on the hybrid nature of contemporary cultures, Argen-
tinian Mexican cultural critic Néstor García Canclini describes the anthro-
pologist as entering the city by foot, the sociologist “by car and via the main 
highway,” and “the communications scholar by plane” (1995, p. 4). The 
empirically informed theory of translocalism developed in this book aims at 
bringing communication scholars a little closer to the ground while keeping 
in mind the “bigger picture” of globalization. Heeding Kraidy and Murphy’s 
suggestion that “it is through the comparative study of local life in various 
locations that a living, breathing sense of global communication flows, pro-
cesses, and outcomes can be comprehensively grasped” (2008, p. 339), a mul-
tisited comparative analysis approaches the local/national/global as mutually 
constitutive elements of our contemporary condition. Considering the concrete 
conditions under which various local/national environments relate to each 
other in a globalized world and putting the emphasis on the multi- faceted re-
lations, connections, and dynamics between local sites, it “[refocuses] on the 
local  . . . without disengaging from issues involving global forces” (Kraidy 
and Murphy, 2008, p. 339). The three- way comparison encourages us to move 
beyond dichotomized conceptualizations. It forces us to develop thicker de-
scriptions of both “local” processes and “global” interactions. It helps com-
plicate our understanding of the local/national/global nexus. It gets us a step 
closer to developing “a practice of representation that illuminates the power 
of large- scale, imagined life possibilities over specific life trajectories” (Ap-
padurai, 1996, p. 55).
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A translocal approach is always necessarily partial. This book’s focus on 
three powerful cultural producers aimed at deconstructing the common divi-
sion of the world along East/West lines by pointing to significant differences 
within “the West” and drawing connections between contexts rarely consid-
ered in relationship to each other. By pointing to the continuing significance 
of racial and gendered dynamics in these three sites’ negotiation of local/na-
tional/cultural identities it also challenged the notion that these economically 
powerful nations (including those classified as “Western”) are comfortably 
installed in the “posts”— postracial struggle, postfeminism, postmodernity. It 
suggested that the intersection of race, ethnicity, and gender with definitions 
of national/cultural identity remains highly contentious in all three contexts, 
even if it is not as ostensibly recognized as it might be in environments— such 
as the Middle East (Echchaibi, 2011; Kraidy, 2009) and India (Hegde, 2011b; 
Parameswaran, 2011)— positioned as currently negotiating their entry into 
(post)modernity.
Translocal comparisons focusing on other contexts would be equally, if 
differently, productive. Other scholars have already engaged in them from dif-
ferent angles, even if the focus has thus far mostly remained on theoretical 
debates and intellectual positions (for examples, see McMillin, 2007; Stam 
and Shohat, 2012). I hope this book will inspire further work in this direc-
tion. Particularly needed is the kind of “more situated and empirically driven 
research” moving “beyond abstract and acontextual theorizations” (Shome, 
2006b, p. 257) that scholars have identified as a crucial building block to our 
understanding of “how globalizing forces are working, or not working, in cul-
ture” (Morris, 2004, p. 181). Work, in other words, employing empirical evi-
dence as a vital starting point to theorizing.
Scholarship at its best is a collective endeavor, a conversation based on 
mutual engagement, a “multidirectional polylogue” (Stam and Shohat, 2012, 
p. xix). While no individual scholar can provide a fully developed picture of 
processes of globalization spanning the entire globe— at least not when one 
is trying to develop the kind of “thick descriptions” advocated in this book— 
each contributes one building block of a larger intellectual edifice. Each 
strand of this conversation is necessarily affected by the context in which a 
scholar operates. Even “transnational interdisciplinarity is very much tied to, 
although not fixed by, the politics of the geography from within which we per-
form it” (Shome, 2006c, p. 21).
While this is, to some extent, unavoidable, developing a theory of trans-
localism requires us to develop a greater awareness of our own location(s). 
Exposing hybridity’s normality and “exploring its genealogies” (Pieterse, 
2003/2009, p. 91) require us to recognize both the productive potential and 
the possible blind spots of our own identities. It requires us, in other words, 
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to tease out the politics of our own hybridity. Because “powerful interests 
are invested in boundaries and borders” (Pieterse, 2003/2009, p. 145), this 
is not always an easy task— including within an academic context where 
“boundary fetishism” often remains. Scholars’ work is, for instance, fre-
quently interpreted in light of their perceived membership in rigidly defined 
groups— “Western,” “non- Western,” “White,” “minority,” “woman”— with 
little consideration to the specific intricacies of their multiple selves (Shome, 
2006c). Those who do not neatly “fit” in these categories are encouraged to 
“pick a camp.” Under such conditions, as Stam and Shohat explain, the chal-
lenge is to engage in “a synergistic coalition rather than a competitive cock-
fight in which hyphenated Americans fight for the leftovers from the master’s 
table” (2012, pp. 79– 80).
Thus, one central task of the translocal project is to develop a critical 
awareness of the boundaries placed upon us by the culture of academia. This 
book has discussed some of the blind spots specific to the U.S. academic con-
text and their possible influence on our conceptualizations of processes of 
globalization and transnational influence. More generally, because academic 
culture, wherever it might be, “takes its capital from the scholarly tradition, 
from the machineries of literacy and education, which are affordable only to a 
privileged few” (Chow, 1993, p. 114), it fosters (upper- ) class biases. We must 
be careful not to assume that the experiences of cosmopolitan, middle- class, 
educated individuals (the kinds of people academics are most frequently in 
direct contact with) can be taken as the norm when considering individuals’ 
engagement with the global.
Particularly problematic, as far as studies of global media are concerned, 
are the assumptions regarding the use of technology that permeate English- 
speaking academic culture. We may know that the majority of the world pop-
ulation does not have the kind of access to technology that academics typi-
cally enjoy, but moving beyond a purely intellectual recognition of this fact to 
imagine its ramifications is not an easy task. Furthermore, even in highly 
economically powerful nations where technology is widely available, rural, 
relatively lower- class (the two are frequently related) individuals may have 
quite a different relationship to it than upper- class and/or urban folks. For in-
stance, the rural informants who participated in my research (both in France 
and Japan) frequently differentiated themselves from urbanites by pointing to 
what they characterized as the latter’s obsession with technology. Privileging 
personal interaction over virtual engagement they often chose to use email or 
cell phones sparingly— I had to learn to resist my instinct to try to set up in-
terviews through email as my messages were left unanswered for weeks at a 
time. Their Internet use tended to be hyperlocal— listings of the films to be 
shown at the community center, local flea- market summer schedule— and 
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pragmatic. They distanced themselves from the YouTube obsessed, Facebook 
fixated Twittering crowd of the city. In other words, when engaging with digi-
tal technology, they negotiated their local/rural identities in relationship to 
the urban and national, as well as the global.
Other scholars have pointed to the urgent need to move beyond the study 
of metropolitan and urban practices in a number of other environments (for 
examples, see Shome, 2009; Spivak, 2004). While the Internet and other 
digital technologies are certainly shaping the way people engage with the 
global— as well as the national, local, and, more generally, each other— our 
understanding of these relatively new developments must be nuanced by an 
active commitment to placing them within their proper context.
As García Canclini reminds us, “It is not enough to study only from the 
metropolis, or from the context of peripheral or postcolonial nations, or 
even from one isolated discipline, or even a totalizing knowledge. An effec-
tive study of culture focuses on the intersections” (2001, p. 12). By forcing us 
to move beyond dualism(s) and binary thinking, an empirically driven and 
multisited translocal approach pushes us to recognize “the in- between the inter-
stices” (Pieterse, 2003/2009, p. 120, emphasis in the text), the “cracks and crev-
ices, and silences and sutures of the global” (Shome, 2006c, p. 3). It raises our 
awareness of the “fateful optical illusion” (Warnier, 2004, p. 91) created by the 
politics of the geography from which we perform research and, more gener-
ally, by the socio- cultural context in which we evolve— an illusion that neces-
sarily shapes contemporary discourses about globalization.
In his recent sequel to Modernity at Large, Appadurai proposes that we start 
thinking about research as a human right. Calling for a reconceptualization 
of research as “the capacity to systematically increase the horizons of one’s 
current knowledge,” he proposes that we work to make this capacity “more 
widely available to all human beings” (2013, pp. 282, 283). Because it encour-
ages us to destabilize the boundaries of all identities (including our own), a 
critical translocal perspective moves us a step closer to this more fluid and 
deparochialized definition of research as part of everyday life, wherever in 
the world we might be. A translocal perspective expands and complicates our 




 1. It is important to note, however, that while France’s policies are frequently 
portrayed as idiosyncratic by the U.S. media and U.S. scholars alike, the policies of 
other non- English- speaking European nations (including other larger nations such as 
Spain, Italy, and Germany) are generally much closer to those of France than to those 
of the United States or Britain (McPhail, 2010).
 2. The historical and institutional origins of the East/West dynamic are numer-
ous and complex, but the most obvious ones include: (1) the disciplinary division 
into area studies that scholars must “fit into” if they are to receive funding and the 
complex identity politics arising from this division; (2) the historical influence of 
postcolonial theory on studies of globalization (Kraidy, 2005); and (3) the influ-
ence of the 1970s debates regarding the New World Information and Communica-
tion Order, which led to an additional focus on North/South dynamics (Mowlana, 
1986/1997). Today, these two dividing lines are often used interchangeably. For in-
stance, in Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination, Appadurai speaks in the 
same paragraph of the “cultural wars of the Western academic world” and the “the-
ory mill of the North” (2001, p. 5).
 3. Shome also frequently uses the terms “North Atlantic,” “America,” “U.S.,” “An-
glo,” “West,” and “Western” interchangeably in her work (see, for example, 2006c, p. 
8; 2009, p. 700). While she carefully acknowledges that when she uses such terms as 
“Western students,” “students in the West,” or the “western academy,” she is “think-
ing of the U.S. or U.K. primarily” (2009, p. 696) one wonders why these more general 
terms have to be used at all.
 4. I am not mentioning these slippages here to dismiss these influential scholars’ 
otherwise enlightening work (the extent to which they are cited throughout this book 
demonstrates the significance of their contribution), but to point to the persisting na-
ture of these biases in English- language work coming out of a U.S. academic context. 
To use Shome’s own words, “Recognizing such issues is less to point fingers and more 
to understand the (geo)politics informing the travel and recognition of politically 
committed interdisciplinary scholarship” (2006c, p. 7).
 5. Condry emphasizes the performative aspects of the genba in his work and 
would, consequently, probably not apply the term to some of the texts examined here. 
I contend, however, that the concept of genba as sites offering a contextualized space 
through which to examine the simultaneous negotiation of global, national, and local 
identity under specific circumstances can be extended to other aspects of cultural pro-
duction. After all, even “big media,” while financed by large corporations often por-
trayed as faceless monolithic entities by globalization scholars, are produced and con-
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sumed by individuals who, at least to some extent, express and negotiate their identity 
in the process.
Chapter 1
 1. TF1 was the first French channel to be privatized by then prime minister Jacques 
Chirac in 1987. Today, the French television system consists of six analog channels 
(known as the “chaînes Hertziennes”), including two free private channels (TF1 and 
M6), one pay private channel (Canal +), and three free public channels (France 2, for-
merly Antenne 2; France 3, formerly France Régions; and France 5/Arte, which share 
a channel with France 5 broadcasting during the day and the Franco- German Arte 
in prime time). Since 2005, 18 free additional channels and 10 pay digital channels 
known as the TNT system (télévision numérique terrestre/digital terrestrial television), also 
available with a decoder, and several Internet providers also offer additional digital 
channels for free with an Internet subscription.
 2. A product of the European Broadcasting Union, which also produces the Euro-
vision Contest, Jeux sans Frontières owes its original concept to former French president 
Charles de Gaulle who wanted to provide a forum through which German and French 
youth could meet in order to heal the wounds of World War II. Eurovision television, 
the programming branch of the European Broadcasting Union, proposed to resurrect 
the show in 2007, but ultimately cancelled production due to financial difficulties (Eu-
ropean Broadcasting Union, n.d.).
 3. The celebration of holidays and customs of religious (typically Catholic) origin 
on the part of non- practicing Christians (and, often, non- Christians) is not uncom-
mon in France where the Catholic religion is generally perceived as one element of the 
country’s cultural and historical fabric rather than as a personal lifestyle choice. Thus, 
viewers would be more likely to interpret Star Academy’s nod to Candlemas as point-
ing to a cultural tradition rather than to a religious practice. The different approach to 
religion in the United States and France is further illustrated, for instance, by the fact 
that individuals of all faiths (or no faith at all) send their children to Catholic schools, 
including a large section of France’s Muslim population attracted by these private 
schools’ greater tolerance for the display of religious symbols— including the veil— 
prohibited in public schools.
 4. The show aired continuously from 2001 to 2008 with 2008 featuring two 
seasons.
 5. Cyril was the first black candidate to win Star Academy in the show’s 6th season 
(2006– 7).
 6. The constitution of the 5th French Republic states that “France is a Republic . . . 
that guarantees the equality of all citizens in the eyes of the law, regardless of origin, 
race or religion.”
 7. The French republic is divided into 27 administrative regions— 22 in metropoli-
tan France and 5 overseas. Martinique is one of France’s 5 overseas regions.
 8. A Franco- Congolese rapper, originally part of the group Ministère AMER, to be 
further discussed in chapter 4.
 9. For example, Jenifer, the show’s first winner in 2002, has released four albums 
since and has won an MTV Europe music award. In 2007, her effigy was included in 
the Grévin wax museum in Paris.
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 10. Such as the award of the 2008 Nobel Prize in literature to French writer Jean- 
Marie Gustave Le Clézio, which Prime Minister François Fillon claimed “blatantly re-
futes the theory of a so- called decline of French culture” (Lyall, October 9, 2008).
 11. The shows may actually be recorded but are shown as if they happened in real 
time.
Chapter 2
 1. Speaking of a “transatlantic short circuit” in the ways French and U.S. intel-
lectuals approach race relations and multiculturalism, Stam and Shohat highlight the 
historical significance of race relations in the competitive relationship between France 
and the United States. They argue, for instance, that France’s postwar embrace of Afri-
can American artists and intellectuals (fueled in part by the influx of African American 
soldiers on French soil) “while undoubtedly sincere . . . also afforded a narcissistic 
payoff for French whites, who could simultaneously demonstrate their relative lack 
of racism while also using blacks as a vehicle for expressing resentment against U.S. 
power in Europe” (2012, p. 47).
 2. One editorial was titled “Nation Must Pool Wisdom to Prepare for Unforesee-
able,” but actually consisted of a call for local governments to pool their resources 
together and for stronger safety checks on nuclear reactors (April 10, 2011). Another 
warned in its headline that “Excessive Self- Restraint May Hinder Recovery” (April 8, 
2011), but focused on the possible economic consequences of failing to return to nor-
mal levels of consumption.
Chapter 3
 1. Pseudonyms are used throughout the book to identify all informants. In the case 
of Japanese informants, the use of first name (“Takako”) or last name followed by the 
title “san” (“Horie- san”) is employed to indicate the nature of my relationship with 
different informants— first name only for those informants with whom I conducted 
extensive participant observation and with whom I have a relatively close relationship, 
and the more commonly used last name followed by “san” for those informants with 
whom my relationship was more formal.
 2. The East/West division is alive and well in Japanese popular discourse. The term 
“Western” is generally used in Japan to refer to a hybrid mix of Euro- American cultural 
influences.
 3. Many Caucasian models in Japanese magazines are actually from Eastern 
Europe.
 4. Of course, my informants’ professed admiration for Caucasian features may 
have had something to do with my presence in the interviews. Because of our close 
relationship, the women I interviewed were probably careful not to hurt my feelings by 
criticizing the physical appearance of members of my race. While this may have been 
at least partially the case, a number of factors suggest that this was not the only pos-
sible explanation. For one thing, my informants typically did not hesitate to criticize 
Western women on numerous other levels— deeming them, among other things, self-
ish, lazy, and sexually promiscuous. Furthermore, strangers stopped me in the streets 
of the village to comment on how white, beautiful, and tall I was. A woman once com-
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mented to me at the public bath that “all gaijin have such good bodies”— a statement 
clearly not empirically supported by the presence of my then pregnant, and starting to 
show, naked body.
 5. Note the association of “America” with “whiteness.”
 6. It should also be noted that hip- hop has not reached the kind of popularity in 
the Japanese countryside that it enjoys in Tokyo where, as will be discussed in chap-
ter 4, hip- hop clubs allow fans to directly engage with DJs and the broader hip- hop 
culture.
 7. A highly popular pop artist in the late 1990s, Namie has since successfully rede-
fined herself as an R&B star. She is partly responsible for making identification with 
African American styles more appealing to young women in Japan.
 8. I am aware that other identity factors— such as sexual orientation and ability— 
also enter into the equation here. These factors, however, were not ones I had enough 
of a chance to explore with my informants to knowledgeably discuss in this chapter.
Chapter 4
 1. Scholars have noted that it is through rapping that hip- hop most powerfully 
inscribes itself in different socio- cultural and linguistic contexts (Pecqueux, 2007). 
Consequently, while the terms “hip- hop” and “rap” will both be used in this chapter, 
greater focus will be placed on rapping than on other constitutive elements of hip- hop 
such as dance or graffiti. Furthermore, the globally distributed cultural production of 
French artists in the hip- hop genre is generally known as “French rap.”
 2. Scholars have described a similar process in places as diverse as Puerto Rico 
(Baez, 2006), Slovakia (Barrer, 2009), Newfoundland (Clarke and Hiscock, 2009), Al-
geria (Davies and Bentahila, 2006), Malawi (Gilman and Fenn, 2006), Montreal (Low, 
Sarkar, and Winer, 2009), Colombia, Cuba, and Mexico (Tickner, 2008) to name only a 
few of the most recent examples.
 3. While the roots of hip- hop are complex and debated, scholars generally agree to 
pinpoint the origins of the global phenomenon that we know today as hip- hop to the 
East Coast of the United States in the 1970s (Dyson, 2007; Mitchell, 2001; Rose, 2008).
 4. All artists in the tradition of socially engaged singer- songwriters.
 5. Metropolitan France is often referred to as “the hexagon” because of its some-
what hexagonal shape.
 6. One of the world’s best- known francophone singers, Renaud (his full name is 
Renaud Séchan) is a politically engaged singer- songwriter with leftist, environmental-
ist, and, at times, anarchist leanings whose songs are often highly critical of French 
culture and politics.
 7. A former member of the group NTM— which, as discussed, can either stand for 
“le Nord Transmet le Message” or “Nique Ta Mère” (fuck your mother)— along with 
Kool Shen. Formed in 1989, NTM was a highly influential force in the development of 
French rap, particularly in its more openly violent form.
 8. French rappers also frequently engage in the long tradition of “letters to 
the President”— songs written as open letters to France’s leader— that Pecqueux 
(2007) identifies as a significant element of France’s cultural heritage. Written and 
first interpreted by Boris Vian in 1954 (who was himself inspired by a longer 19th- 
century tradition of calling draftees to desert in songs), the “original” letter titled 
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“Le Deserteur”— in which Vian declared his refusal to fight in the Algerian war— 
was later interpreted by, among others, Marcel Mouloudji, Maxime Le Forestier, and 
Johnny Hallyday, before Michel Sardou offered his own version in 1979 (“Monsieur le 
Président de France”) followed by Renaud in 1983 (“Déserteur”). The tradition was 
then taken up by rappers such as Lionel D. in 1990 (“Monsieur le Président”) and 
Fabe in 1997 (“Lettre au Président”). Salif ’s 2001 song “Notre Vie S’Résume en une 
Seule Phrase” also refers to the practice, even though he refuses to engage in it: “Pour 
parler au président pas b’soin de faire de letters / Si j’puis me permettre qu’il aille se 
faire mettre” [To talk to the president no need to write a letter / If I may say so, he can 
go do himself ].
 9. French schools have historically been closed on Wednesdays.
 10. In one of the most famous songs of the French version of the musical, the char-
acter of Gavroche sings “Je suis tombé par terre / c’est la faute à Voltaire” [I fell on the 
ground / it’s Voltaire’s fault].
 11. I am consciously choosing to use the term “black” American rather than “Afri-
can” American because if the term “African American” refers to a racial (black) as well 
as cultural characteristic in the U.S. context, this is not necessarily the case in other 
parts of the world. Algerian rappers, for instance, are (North) African but (typically) 
not racially black, and the politics of race they discuss significantly differ from those 
faced by American rappers.
 12. A variation on the American “N” word sometimes used in the Japanese hip- hop 
scene.
 13. The reasons why I am choosing to define Solaar as a French rapper rather than 
as Senegalese will, I hope, become obvious later in the chapter.
 14. The so- called Carignon Law (named after then minister of communication Alain 
Carignon) passed in 1994 and modified in 2000 (Conseil Superieur de L’Audiovisuel, 
n.d.).
 15. He has indeed been one of most globally influential French artists since the 
mid- 1990s. In addition to multiple tours throughout Europe, Africa, and the United 
States, he has appeared in several Bollywood films. One of his songs was used as the 
soundtrack for the final episode of the U.S. television series Sex and the City.
 16. He even was one of the first celebrities to be caricatured as a puppet, along with 
the likes of Johnny Hallyday, Vanessa Paradis, Josiane Balasko, and Gérard Depar-
dieu (to name a few), in Les Minikeums— a youth program parodying various aspects of 
French (and global) popular culture in short skits.
 17. Second- generation immigrants, generally of Arab descent.
 18. Incest, homosexuality, pedophilia, and eroticism were constant themes in his 
songs and films.
 19. The ban is discussed in some of Brassens’ letters displayed at the Espace George 
Brassens in Sete, France.
 20. Burakumin are descendents of members of Japanese society historically outcast 
because of their professional activity— butchers, tanners, executioners, gravediggers. 
They still face severe discrimination today in employment and marriage. Nikkeijin 
are second- and third- generation descendents of Japanese emigrants who settled in 
South America (especially Brazil) starting in the late 19th century. Often of mixed racial 
heritage, nikkeijin and their spouses are allowed to work as migrant workers in Japan 
(Roth, 2003; Sellek, 1997).
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 21. While, from a Western point of view, Korean and Japanese might appear to 
share an “Asian” racial identity, Yoshino Kosaku (1997) describes a tendency among 
Japanese to think of themselves as a distinct racial group (see also Kondo, 1990).
 22. Couscous is a popular dish in France that is generally associated with the cuisine 
of North African immigrants.
Chapter 5
 1. Blyton’s books and characters are still highly popular in France today, as her 
original series such as Noddy (Oui- Oui in French), The Famous Five (Le Club des Cinq), and 
The Secret Seven (Le Clan des Sept) have been reprinted for a new generation of young read-
ers to enjoy. Noddy was also turned into a television series.
 2. Goldorak appeared under the title Grandizer— with an “a” as opposed to Grendizer, 
the more commonly romanization of the Japanese グランダイザ found in other parts 
of the world— in Jim Terry’s Force Five series produced in response to the popularity of 
the Shogun Warrior’s toys. The series was not shown nationally, however, only briefly 
appearing in a handful of local markets.
 3. One of the first and most globally successful anime series, Candy enjoyed great 
popularity throughout Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In a recent 
personal email exchange regarding the global influence of Japanese animation, a 
Mexican journalist had this comment: “Candy Candy and some other Japanese cartoons 
were part of my childhood too, even nowadays my friends and I talk about them, they 
became ‘a cult’ television show . . . they had successful re- runs until a few years ago . . . 
and they even became one of best seller DVDs in the black market in Mexico! But it’s 
funny to hear how my friends still talk about falling in love the very first time with An-
thony or Terry [Candy’s two consecutive love interests]. Those stories have created a 
great impact and identification among people from different countries.”
 4. In an anecdotal illustration of this process, my younger daughter recently called 
on her sister to “come watch the Japanese show” when watching Olive et Tom (Captain 
Tsubasa) on French television. When I asked her how she knew this show featuring a 
relatively culturally odorless soccer team was Japanese, she answered “the faces.”
 5. The generation following the “generation Goldorak” is frequently referred to in 
France as “the Club Dorothée generation.”
 6. He is referring to the original Dragon Ball Toei Animation series (not the later 
Dragon Ball Z) broadcast in Japan from 1986 to 1989 and in France starting in 1988.
 7. These comments were reminiscent of those of Japanese informants who all 
remembered growing up with manga. They contrasted, however, with those of U.S. 
consumers who often noted that comics were not really something they engaged with 
while growing up: “Comic books did not grab me, they were not around. Nobody that 
I knew was reading comic books,” (35- year- old female); “I didn’t have any friends that 
did the comic book thing” (32- year- old female); “Comic books was like . . . I don’t 
know, the direction of the books confuses us. Like I don’t know where to read what, 
do you know what I mean?” (28- year- old female); “I just never read comic books. I just 
was never interested in them” (33- year- old male); “My parents wouldn’t allow [comic 
books] in the house” (55- year- old female). While some (mostly male) U.S. media con-
sumers did remember enjoying comic books, the level of penetration of the genre in 
the United States does not match that found in France or Japan. Comic book charac-
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ters, however, such as Spiderman, Batman, and Flash Gordon were certainly familiar 
to U.S. (and, incidentally, global) consumers: “[The original Batman series] was the 
only thing we could watch at night. And Flash Gordon. If we ate . . . if we ate all our food 
and helped with clean up, we could watch Flash” (55- year- old female).
 8. A 2005 survey of advertising in women’s magazines in seven countries (Brazil, 
China, France, India, South Korea, Thailand, and the United States) found that French 
(and Thai) advertisements “showed the highest levels of sexuality” (Nelson and Paek, 
2005, p. 380). The United States was somewhere in the middle.
 9. I am aware that, considering the wide diversity of the U.S. population, the sug-
gestion that there is such a thing as “the U.S. audience” is essentializing. I hope the 
reader will excuse this temporary oversimplification, as the nature of U.S. consumers’ 
experiences of global culture will be further elaborated in chapter 7.
Chapter 6
 1. The average cost of a film produced in France was $7.3 million in 2010, up 13.5 
percent from $6.8 million in 2009 (Leffler, January 13, 2011). Compare that to the 
United States where the average cost of a major studio movie was about $65 million 
when the MPAA stopped tracking the number in 2006 (Glossary of Movie Business 
Terms, 2014). Avatar cost about $280 million, the third Pirates of the Caribbean $300 
million— not counting marketing costs (Keegan, December 22, 2009).
 2. The cowboy hero of the Franco- Belgian bande dessinée of the same name.
 3. The fact that she used the term “anime” to refer to the Disney film illustrates 
how blurry the cultural distinction between different texts can be.
 4. The consumption of Disney fare was further complicated for both Japanese 
and French informants (particularly relatively younger ones) by the fact that Disney 
has been physically reterritorialized into their own national geographies in the form 
of theme parks in their respective capitals (Tokyo Disneyland and Disney Paris): as a 
15- year- old French woman exclaimed, “Disney, it’s in Paris!” For rural informants liv-
ing hundreds of miles away from these parks— most frequently visited within the con-
text of a (school) trip to the capital— Disney symbolized the urban/national as well as 
the global.
 5. The series takes place in Finland under Russian occupation and relates the 
adventures of a young girl forced to work on a farm after her mother’s departure for 
Germany.
 6. Note here that while she may not have read it, she is familiar with the novel and 
can identify its author.
 7. When I first moved to Japan in the mid- 1990s, I was happy to find out that 
French films and even television series were much more widely and rapidly available 
there than in the United States. I was able to catch up on much French popular culture 
I had missed while living in the United States.
 8. The Smurfs animated series was indeed frequently mentioned in interviews, pos-
sibly due to the fact that interviews with U.S. informants took place relatively shortly 
after the release of the Hollywood movie of the same name. While the animated televi-
sion series was produced in the United States, the fact that the characters themselves 
are classic Franco- Belgian bandes dessinées characters complicates their identity.
 9. The U.S. media consumers I interviewed frequently linked their overall media 
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consumption to their racial or ethnic identity: “the Cosby Show was huge thing for me 
as a teenager, because I lived in a black family with two professional parents, and I felt 
like, hey it is us, we exist on TV. I felt that was a positive representation of black people 
that was closer to my reality” (35- year- old African American woman); “We saw Kung Fu 
Theater a lot growing up. Because it was about Asians and we never saw Asians on TV” 
(38- year- old Asian American woman). A 31- year- old Italian American fondly recalled, 
“the Golden Girls, it is like a huge part of my relationship with my grandma . . . she 
loved them, and my family is very identifiable Italian Americans. The grandma Sophia 
Petrolo was Sicilian, although to my grandma she does not make that distinction, so 
that was a huge shared experience.”
 10. Of course, like their French or Japanese counterparts U.S. informants may have 
consumed non- U.S. fare (in particular British texts) without being aware of their cul-
tural origin while growing up. The fact that, as adults, they could not recall engaging 
with global culture at the time significantly differs, however, from the experiences de-
scribed by French and Japanese media consumers.
 11. As noted in the introduction, the media consumers I interviewed in the United 
States were relatively more urban and more highly educated than my informants in 
France and Japan. Thus, their tendency to actively engage with foreign texts as an intel-
lectualized activity might in part stem from this different status.
Chapter 7
 1. By “French theorists” I mean intellectuals operating within the French cultural 
environment and academic system. Thus, Mattelart, while born in Belgium, would fit 
this category as a professor at Paris VIII and researcher at MSH- Paris- Nord. It should 
be noted, however, that theorists outside the French environment, while facing dif-
ferent global circumstances, might share some of the elements of these individuals’ 
approach to globalization. Canada’s situation vis- à- vis the United States, or Quebec’s 
complex relationship to both the United States and France, for instance, cannot be 
adequately understood in conceptualizations of globalization focusing solely on East/
West or North/South power dynamics.
 2. The term “alter- mondialisme,” used to refer in French to what in English is gen-
erally characterized as “anti- globalization,” further illustrates the key philosophical 
differences between globalization and mondialisation. Rather than negatively defining 
the movement as an oppositional position, it (literally) recognizes it as a valid alternative.
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